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1. IntroductIon
this is a book about economic methodology. to sum it up in one sentence, 
this book tries to justify a normative role for methodology by sketching a 
pragmatic way out of the dichotomy of two major strands in economic meth-
odology: empiricism and postmodernism. As with every one-sentence sum-
mary of a complicated subject, this might cause more confusion than clarity, 
and therefore a more detailed synopsis will be provided in this introduction. 
In order to avoid possible confusion right from the beginning, it is helpful to 
state first what I will not attempt to do. As I said, this book is about method-
ology, and this means that I will not try to write a prescription for how eco-
nomics has to change in order to become a better science (or a proper science 
at all). rather, I will discuss several methodological approaches and assess 
their aptness for theory appraisal in economics. this is not another book 
about what’s wrong with economics. A central point of the works in this tra-
dition is their presumption that mainstream economic reasoning is method-
ologically flawed and that economics can only be saved by adopting a new 
methodology.1
the aim of my work is not to develop a shiny new methodology for eco-
nomics that promises to solve the many problems economic theorising has. 
My aim is more modest: I try to show what fruitful criticism of economic 
models2 can look like. As it turns out, fruitful criticism cannot fundamentally 
contradict the basic premises of economics, as sketched out below.3
My approach to arrive at this is rather simple: I start with the most com-
mon views on methodology — empiricism and postmodernism — and then 
argue why they are ill-suited for giving methodological prescriptions to eco-
nomics. After that, I look for positions that avoid the errors of empiricism 
and postmodernism. I will first identify why these two major strands of meth-
odological criticism fail to give helpful methodological advice to economists 
and second, I will sketch out a pragmatic approach that can do this. More 
philosophically speaking, I will venture into the defence (and the limits) of a 
normative role for methodology.
1 See e. g. reiss (2007) for a recent work based on this kind of argumentation.
2 I follow Kleindorfer/o‘neill/Ganeshan (1998) in seeing models as »miniature scienti-
fic theories«.
3 this is the main reason why I do not adopt here a criticism that seems accepta-
ble for individuals: It states that economics is normatively on the wrong track, 
because empirical results show quite convincingly that the maximisation of sat-
isfaction of individual needs is not what makes people happy. While this may be 
true, it is a plain rejection of the basic assumption of economics, and so it has no 
constructive use. Besides, economists can defend themselves by pleading non-
paternalism.
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In spite of the rather philosophical approach, the target readers of this book 
are economists with an interest in methodological questions. Philosophers 
with some background in economics may be able to gain insights as well, al-
though they should not expect a detailed discussion of traditional questions 
of science theory but rather a focus on theory evaluation in economics.
there is no simple way to teach how one should appraise economic mod-
els, and I will argue against any easily summarised cookbook-methodology. 
As is the case with many philosophical books, the benefits of this work prob-
ably manifest themselves more indirectly, through an increased awareness 
for methodological problems and a higher level of reflection when designing 
and interpreting economic models.
throughout this book I will speak about »economics«, »neoclassical eco-
nomics«, »mainstream economics«, »the rational-choice approach« and »the 
homo oeconomicus method«.4 As a clear understanding of these notions 
is of crucial importance for my work, I will provide a characterisation right 
here. My definition of »economics« includes various types of models for dif-
ferent sorts of problems; I do not intend to define mainstream economics by 
its scope but rather by its method. the mainstream economic-research pro-
gramme is well characterised by the following statements:5
1. Economics is about explanations for changes in macro-rates as the re-
sult of individual actions.
2. Individuals are assumed to maximise their personal welfare and are sub-
ject to boundary conditions. this is the so-called rationality assump-
tion, which is as such free of empirical content, because the definition 
of »personal welfare« depends completely on the respective model and 
problem.6
3. Preferences of individuals are seen as constant. this is again not an em-
pirical statement but a heuristic recommendation, because allowing for 
changing preferences would deprive economic models of any empirical 
content, as every outcome could be »explained« by a sudden change of 
4 note that I do not reject the fact that there is heterodox research in economics 
that does not fit to the given characterisation. However, this drawback is una-
voidable and is true for every definition.
5  My definition is inspired by Erlei/Leschke/Sauerland (1999), p. 51 –53 as well as Ho-
mann/Suchanek (1989), p. 75 et sqq. and Lütge (2001), p. 85 et sqq. In section 2.3.1.3 
you will find a more detailed definition of the economic research programme.
6 note that critics of economics often assume the rationality principle to be the empir-
ical claim that humans perform short-term income maximization. As we will see, this 
has been the source of many misunderstandings. the only empirical requirement for 
a rational-choice methodology is that humans react somehow systematically to exter-
nal incentives. See Lagueux (2010) for a recent interpretation of the rational choice 
approach that is in line with my thought.
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preferences.7 therefore, economics concentrates on changes of observ-
able boundary conditions.
the above principles are not always explicitly referred to in every economic 
model. this is especially the case in models of macroeconomics, but as mac-
roeconomics can be reduced to microeconomics8 the above principles are 
still in use, even if hidden. With the preliminary remarks done, I will now 
sketch out an overview of the contents of this book, section by section.
the first section of this work starts with a summary of methodological po-
sitions that argue for more empirical work at the core of economics.
Basically there are two different demands from the empiricists: the first 
one demands that economic models must become more falsifiable and their 
results must be more severely tested. the second demand claims the behav-
ioural basis of economics (i. e. the rationality assumption) must be enriched 
or replaced by more empirically founded theories of human behaviour.
this is the most common and best-known form of criticism against main-
stream economics, which is why I will portray it in quite some detail and then 
spend considerable time analysing its shortcomings. Historically, the empir-
icist school was strong in economics in the German-speaking world, and the 
Methodenstreit in Germany ran in the opposite direction: the empirically 
oriented historical school was attacked by carl Menger, who tried to estab-
lish methods that he hoped could lead to more generally valid relations.9 
Even if my presentation, which starts with a short account of the historical 
philosophical background of empiricism in modern philosophy of science 
(section 2.1), might suggest otherwise, there already was a lively debate within 
economics about the status of empirical research. So while the birth of mod-
ern philosophy of science has certainly influenced the debate, as can be best 
seen in the works of the economist terence Hutchison, it would be wrong to 
see the demand for more empirical work as an completely external one, orig-
inally stemming from a philosophical discussion.
Section 2.2 presents the empiricist stance by condensing the claims of 
four methodologists of the empiricist camp: terence Hutchison, Hans Al-
bert, Mark Blaug and Scott Moss. Hutchison and Blaug mostly argue for tak-
ing falsification more seriously in economics, while Albert stresses both the 
importance of falsifiable theories and the need to work with more empiri-
cally founded behavioural assumptions. Scott Moss’ position is unusual, be-
cause unlike classic economists, he works with agent-based computer simula-
tions and claims the agents of simulations should be designed as accurately 
descriptive as possible and not be restricted by considerations of simplicity.
7 Again, many critics misunderstand the status of the constancy of preferences, tak-
ing it as an empirical statement, and therefore attack it as false.
8 See Boland (1982), p. 141.
9 See Backhaus/Hansen (2000) for an overview of the Methodenstreit.
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In section 2.3 I will present and discuss arguments against the empiricist 
claims. Section 2.3.1 is concerned with problems of defining »unproblem-
atic background knowledge«, which is needed for both falsificationism and 
inductive empiricism. Interestingly, there is an essay by Karl Popper that al-
ready sketches out the main argument against falsificationism and empir-
icism at the foundation of economics: the rationality assumption is justi-
fied as an unempirical, heuristic device similar to the causality assumption. 
thomas Kuhn’s work gives additional insight that this view is indeed con-
stitutive to economics and may be the main reason why empiricist critics 
are mostly ignored by practicing economists. Imre Lakatos’s constructive 
falsificationism can be seen as a merger of Popper’s approach with Kuhn’s 
insights and stresses another reason why the theoretical core of econom-
ics has not changed despite constant criticism: there is (yet) no alternative 
that can constructively replace the rational-choice heuristic. the last subsec-
tion of section 2.3 elaborates on the problem of »unproblematic background 
knowledge« on a more abstract level and presents the concept of holism and 
coherentism and the duhem-Quine thesis. these concepts undermine the 
naïve empiricist view that observation can be a firm foundation on which 
theory is built.
Section 2.3.2 shifts the focus to the problem of theory evaluation in eco-
nomics by empiricist standards. First of all, there are practical problems for 
empiricist methodologies in the social sciences, because neither experiments 
with human beings nor whole economies can be controlled to the degree 
found in natural sciences such as chemistry and physics. the next subsec-
tion discusses the notion of »truthlikeness« and the connected conviction 
that scientific progress consists in an ever-increasing descriptive accuracy, in 
the sense of increasing the true consequences of theories and decreasing the 
false ones.10 It is argued that this view has several internal problems which 
can be overcome by an instrumentalist understanding of theories. the next 
subsection elaborates on this idea and argues that theory appraisal can draw 
inspiration from economic cost-benefit analyses. this rejects the claim that 
theories should strictly focus on increasing their corroborated empirical con-
tent, but argues that the input for achieving this must be seen as a cost fac-
tor that is part of the evaluation. the discussion in this subsection draws in-
spiration from a recent debate in computational economics where empiricist 
arguments like those from Scott Moss are counterattacked with arguments 
that favour simplicity against empirical adequacy. the main point is that 
good theories should be able to »explain much by little«, which is essentially 
a cost-benefit argument. the last subsection confronts the empiricist convic-
tions against a priori reasoning by giving examples of purely formal works 
that are uncontroversial parts of social science and, despite their aprioristic 
10 note that true and false refers merely to empirically correct/incorrect in the context 
of the discussion about truthlikeness.
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character, tell us something about the world: the impossibility theorems of 
social-choice theory are the most prominent examples of how purely formal 
reasoning can be relevant in practical contexts.
Section 2.4 presents case studies in order to relate the discussion more 
closely to actual practice in economics. the first case study is a longitudinal 
overview about the development of economic-growth theory. Starting with 
the classic Harrod-domar models, it is shown how the switch to the growth 
theory of robert Solow and succeeding innovations such as the »new theory 
of economic growth« and institutional-growth theory led to an increase in 
empirical content and predictive success without stepping away from a fun-
dament that has virtually no empirical content. the second case study picks 
up the recent debate between experimental economists and rational-choice 
theorists. the main results of this case study are the futility of trying to re-
fute the concept of the economic man, if it is understood merely as a heuris-
tic device and not as an empirical statement. Most experiments merely refute 
the notion of human beings as short-term-income maximisers, a notion that 
has been rejected for long by rational-choice theorists as well. on the other 
hand, this is not to deny that experiments in economics can hint at impor-
tant insights on how to refine economic models and which factors other than 
money-maximisation need to be integrated. So experimental economics has 
its merits, but despite its often-aggressive rhetoric, it offers no replacement 
for rational-choice methods.
Section 3 presents the next step in the methodology and philosophy of 
science, resulting directly from the problems of empiricist methodologies (as 
discussed in the previous chapter): postmodern relativism. In section 3.1 de-
velopments in the philosophy of science that led to postmodern, relativistic 
positions. Willard Van orman Quine was the first philosopher to have had 
considerable impact on the demise of classic empiricism and even if he surely 
was not a postmodern relativist, his ideas have been taken up and modified 
by later postmodern philosophers. His holistic conception as an alternative 
to foundationalist epistemology is laid out in more detail here than it was in 
section 2, where only the critical parts were stressed. nelson Goodman adds a 
far-reaching relativism to the antifoundationalist programme by stressing the 
constructive aspects of the way we perceive the world and hinting at possible 
alternatives. In contrast to Quine, Goodman does not grant science a privi-
leged role in the process of gaining knowledge. consistency and pragmatic 
usefulness for achieving the given tasks are, however, criteria that Goodman 
still defends. Paul Feyerabend defends the most radical relativism and argues 
for the abandonment of all standards by means of historical examples of sci-
entific advances that have been achieved by ingenious breaks of rules rather 
than sticking to standards. Feyerabend argues that even inconsistency is no 
legitimate argument against a scientific theory and illustrates this argument 
by pointing to inconsistencies in quantum theory.
Introduction16
Section 3.1.2 presents the two best-known postmodern positions in eco-
nomic methodology that clearly draw their inspiration from the philosoph-
ical movements described above: Bruce caldwell’s pluralism and deirdre 
Mccloskey’s rhetorical approach to economics. Both positions recommend 
refraining from normative issues and making the philosophy of economics a 
purely descriptive project. caldwell’s pluralism is an attempt to understand 
various methodologies on their own terms, and Mccloskey puts forward 
that there is much to be learned about the practice of economics through 
using the tools of literary criticism to analyse economic papers.
In section 3.2 I start with a critical evaluation of postmodernism. Mir-
roring the above structure, the most fundamental philosophical arguments 
come first. In subsection 3.2.1 I present and assess the arguments of three au-
thors who have attacked postmodernism from different perspectives. Paul 
Boghossian’s recent work »»against relativism« is a systematic approach to 
refute basic postmodern convictions. In my discussion, I show why his ar-
guments fail to hit the target. the main reason is that constructivism is an 
irrefutable position.11 the only way to refute it would be to demonstrate con-
vincingly that we can be sure to have true knowledge about something. As 
long as this can’t be done, it seems legitimate to replace »truth« with the no-
tion of »belief about truth«.
daniel dennett’s attacks against postmodernism suffer from a similar 
problem. All arguments in favour of science and against other belief sys-
tems (such as religious ones) are necessarily based on scientific premises. 
this is true for the evolutionary arguments dennett gives in favour of sci-
ence, as credible as they might sound to our ears. dennett even accepts that 
science cannot claim to have knowledge about what he calls global truth, but 
he is convinced that this has no bearing on the local truths it produces. For 
him, scientific truths are the only acceptable local truths. He takes the suc-
cess story of science as the main argument for this, but this is of course a cy-
clical argument: It may well be that science is so successful only because it is 
the ruling belief system today – then its success would of course be success 
only on its own terms. Again, the postmodern assumption about the radi-
cal description-dependence of truth may not sound plausible, but it is hard 
to refute.
the last argument against postmodernism does not attack the basic prem-
ises but aims to demonstrate the bad effects of postmodern thought by means 
of a hoax. Alan Sokal managed to publish an article that was packed with in-
tentional errors in the peer-reviewed postmodern journal Social text and 
claims that this proves that a postmodern, relativist attitude leads to a lack 
of standards. While this does not hurt postmodern methodology directly, it 
11 As an irrefutable position it could still be an absurd position such as solipsism. the 
arguments against Boghossian therefore do not show that constructivism is correct, 
they merely show that Boghossian did not refute it.
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suggests that the rejection of universal global standards can lead to a consid-
erable weakening of local ones. therefore, it may be the case that even an un-
justified belief in the existence of global truth is pragmatically preferable to 
postmodern relativism about truth.
Section 3.2.2 finally turns back to economic methodology. caldwell’s plu-
ralism suffers from the fact that he does not completely endorse the post-
modern premise of global relativism. this already shows up in the title of 
caldwell’s book Beyond Positivism – but a true pluralist cannot claim to 
be »beyond« anything. I also critique caldwell’s lack of clarity in evaluative 
standards, because some aspects of his work can be found, where he clearly 
allows for more than description or internal criticism, but remains unclear 
what the sources of his evaluations are. While the concept of pluralism may 
be irrefutable, caldwell’s specific elaboration obviously has internal prob-
lems. Mccloskey’s rhetorical analysis is a much more prominent case, but 
it is not free from problems, either. despite her plea for a purely descrip-
tive methodology, Mccloskey has loaded her books with recommendations 
for how economics has to change. this seems contradictory at first sight, 
but Mccloskey’s point can be defended by taking her recommendations as 
purely subjective and local ones: Her criticism of modernism does not nec-
essarily lead to the abandonment of normative voices, but it can lead to al-
lowing everyone to give prescriptions – because Mccloskey rejects the possi-
bility of being in possession of a privileged position. Even the fact that she 
doesn’t stick to her own standards of Sprachethik does not critically hurt her 
position, as this argument contains a tu quoque fallacy. While it is hard to 
refute Mccloskey’s postmodern view that economics should be evaluated 
not by its correspondence to external facts but rather by its rhetorical per-
suasiveness, her approach — using the devices of literary criticism to analyse 
economic papers — is not convincing even by her own standards. Even if her 
analyses are entertaining and insightful to read, she has as of yet failed to per-
suade economists or methodologists that persuasiveness is a good standard 
to adopt.
Section 3.3 sums up the results of chapter 3. It turns out that the postmod-
ern rejection of global truth cannot be refuted, but this does not necessarily 
lead to giving up prescriptions on a local level. When it comes to econom-
ics, however, the two most prominent postmodern authors fail to give useful 
and accepted advice even on a local level. they fail to achieve their self-set 
goal of improving the critical discussion of economic models.
the last major section tries to overcome the dichotomy of empiricist and 
postmodernist methodological positions by offering a pragmatic way out. 
Where postmodern methodologies are often based on their rejection of 
empiricist positions, there is no principal reason why empiricist arguments 
should play no role on a local level. the most promising way towards a use-
ful concept of theory evaluation seems to look first for a characterisation of 
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economics that economists can accept and then search for quality criteria 
that are in line with that description. this rules out fundamental criticism, 
of course, but if the aim of theory appraisal is improving a critical discussion 
about models, fundamentalism does not lead very far — rather, it is a rejec-
tion of its basic premises. A pragmatic point of view that focuses on evaluat-
ing the quality of solutions for given problems12 is much more likely to settle 
a discussion about models than are general methodological arguments de-
rived from philosophical positions such as empiricism.
Section 4.1.1 draws inspiration from daniel Hausman’s seminal book The 
Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, which gives a constructive charac-
terisation of the economic method and justifies the utility-maximisation as-
sumption as a legitimately used a priori principle. Hausman argues that the 
impossibility of controlling for disturbing factors in economics is the rea-
son why economics must be based on credible and pragmatically convenient 
assumptions about the relevant causal factors. this is contrary to empirical 
work on the basis of economics, but it also makes the falsification of the the-
oretical core impossible. Hausman argues that this core of economics is the 
reason why it is separate from the other social sciences — but it is also the 
source of its inexactness, as economic theory can only predict typical macro-
tendencies of behaviour and remains silent on the exceptions. Hausman of-
fers a first step out of the dichotomy of empiricists and postmodernists, be-
cause he normatively justifies the core of economics by its pragmatic values. 
However, his reconstruction offers little insight for the evaluation of eco-
nomic models.
Section 4.1.2 is essentially a pragmatic reinterpretation of Milton Fried-
man’s classic methodological paper and is a first step towards filling the gap 
that Hausman left concerning criteria for theory evaluation. In my reinter-
pretation I first argue against the common misunderstanding that Friedman 
believes the assumptions of theories to be irrelevant. Additionally, in contrast 
to a widespread view, Friedman is not arguing for an instrumentalist view of 
science that makes prediction the only goal for theories. rather, he offers a 
radically problem-oriented methodology that looks for the most efficient 
means to solve a given problem. Friedman’s idea is to justify economic mod-
els by means of abduction, i. e. the claim that they are the best explanation 
for an observable outcome. the best explanation is not the one that is based 
on the most descriptively accurate assumptions, because highly accurate mi-
cro-assumptions make fruitful theorising difficult. therefore, good assump-
tions have to be simple and lead to successful prediction of the phenomena 
12 note that I am using the term »problems« in its broadest sense, so that even philo-
sophical problems are »valid« problems. note however that there are problems where 
»the quality of solutions« cannot be assessed yet – in such cases, pragmatic theory 
evaluation must suspend judgement.
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under scrutiny. For Friedman, economic theorising is rational reconstruc-
tion, and good economic models explain much by little.
Section 4.1.3 takes a central idea of Friedman’s methodology to the next 
level: it argues for an economic assessment of economic theories.13 this leads 
to two separate developments that can contribute to a new, pragmatic way of 
normative reasoning in theory evaluation. the first idea is to apply the con-
cept of cost-benefit analysis to theory choice. Economic theories of science 
have rendered Friedman’s claim to explain much by little more precise by of-
fering a radically problem-dependent way of assessing theories. Economic 
science theory is completely pragmatic when it comes to theory evaluation: 
It accepts there is no single right criterion for judging science, and so the only 
evaluative question that makes sense is whether a theory is the best and most 
efficient means to solve the problem it set out to solve. this differs from em-
piricist methodologies as well as from the postmodern, relativist approaches.
the second idea taken from economics and applied to the evaluation of 
science argues that the institutional structure of a science is the best starting 
point for improving its quality. From this point of view, science is seen as 
a collective process in which individuals seek to maximise their reputation 
and do not necessarily care much about good theories. only via the invisible 
hand of the marketplace of ideas that is constrained by scientific institutions 
— such as the requirement to publish results, the higher recognition for work 
that has been anonymously peer-reviewed, and the winner-takes-all principle 
(among others) — can the selfish motives of individual scientists lead to epis-
temically desirable outcomes. this twist allows for accepting that various »ir-
rational« social factors are interfering with science while still arguing for an 
epistemic privilege of scientific knowledge. In such a way, normativity has 
shifted from individual theories to a meta-level of analysing and improving 
the organisational structure of science as a whole.14
the next major section (4.1.4) gives a rather scattered overview about argu-
ments that strengthen the pragmatic position.
First, I discuss more general arguments from Larry Laudan, Bas van 
Fraasen and the methodology of causal holism by thomas Boylan and Pas-
chal o’Gorman, which all offer methods of theory evaluation without fall-
ing back on the dogmatism of naïve empiricism.
In the next subsection I turn to pragmatic approaches to model build-
ing in economics. there is a detailed discussion about the justification of 
modelling practice in economics, accepting the pragmatic premise that nei-
13 this may sound cyclical at first, but I borrow an argument from Gerhard Vollmer to 
show why this circle is a virtuous rather than a vicious one.
14 Such a meta-analysis is neutral regarding the aims of science as it relies completely on 
means-ends rationality. In section 4.1.4.3 I discuss the status of some traditional cri-
teria that define what distinguishes science from other enterprises and that are rela-
tively stable over time.
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ther pure empiricism nor postmodern relativism is the end of the story, and 
that a problem-oriented, normative discussion of the right means for solving 
given problems is possible. I discuss approaches from several authors such 
as nancy cartwright, Marcel Boumans, Eric Schliesser, Hal Varian, Mary S. 
Morgan, Frank Hindriks, Anris Vilks, Karl Homan, Andreas Suchanek and 
others that give subtle arguments in favour of the radical abstraction of main-
stream economic models and, by this, help to develop quality criteria that are 
more fitting to economic models than the dogmatic demand for more em-
pirical work.
the last subsection gives an overview of different traditional criteria for 
theory evaluation and how they can be applied to economic theories.
Section 4.2 is devoted once more to strengthening the pragmatic approach. 
this is done through an attempt to refute its main opponent: scientific re-
alism. I start with a presentation of arguments in favour of scientific realism 
that are borrowed from the debate in general philosophy of science and then 
present the positions of the two best known realists in economic methodol-
ogy, uskali Mäki and tony Lawson. In this discussion I lay out arguments for 
why the pragmatic approach is not hurt by these positions. Most notably, I 
demonstrate why a pragmatic defence for realism is ill-conceived. In a more 
detailed analysis, it turns out that most of Mäki’s demands are compatible 
with the pragmatic approach that I endorse, while Lawson adopts a radical 
methodological realism that leads to problems similar to those faced by the 
empiricist methodologies (discussed in chapter 2).
Finally, chapter 4.3 takes stock of all of these arguments and tries to an-
swer the crucial question of what is left for theory evaluation. to be sure, rule-
based single-criterion methodologies are rejected, as methodologists are not 
in a privileged position to tell economists what to do. However, if they have 
some knowledge about economic methods, they can assess (just as well as 
economists) whether or not a model will genuinely contribute to solving the 
problem it set out to deal with. the criteria to judge this are often implicitly 
given by the description of the problem itself: E. g. if a model is meant to be 
useful for policy consulting, its predictions must be empirically validated; if 
it is merely a non-calibrated rational choice model, it can only claim to re-
construct long-run tendencies, though it may offer explanations for observ-
able correlations. Models can be best criticised by asking whether they keep 
the promises they make15: this radical problem orientation solves many dif-
ficulties of theory evaluation. For example, theory-ladenness is less of an 
obstacle when science is not supposed to deliver objective descriptions but 
rather answers to problems, because posing a problem already presupposes 
and accepts much theoretical background. So problem orientation accepts 
that science does not start in empty space but is always embedded in a con-
15 note again that this allows for purely theoretical models as well. However, it does not 
allow for making empirical conclusions out of purely theoretical models.
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text that defines problems, background knowledge and the actual aims of sci-
ence. However this does not lead to relativism but makes a discussion about 
the means for arriving at a given end possible in the first place.
In the concluding chapter 5 I give first an application of my methodologi-
cal position and then reflect on the role that is left for philosophers in meth-
odological discussions.
Section 5.1 discusses four cases of economic models and shows how a 
problem-focused discussion can point to problems and help to refine mod-
els. case 1 discusses the problem of inadequate assumptions leading to »as-
tonishing« results of a simulation without the authors’ noticing the source of 
error. the second case sheds light on the rather common phenomenon of 
over-interpretation, i. e. the fact that economists tend to make claims about 
real, causal factors when all they have delivered is a rational reconstruction 
by means of abduction. case 3 illustrates a milder form of problems with in-
terpretation, where careful authors hesitate to draw strong conclusions and 
so do not draw any conclusions at all, even if they promised to contribute to 
the solution of an empirical problem. this is due to the fact that many econ-
omists are unaware of the methodological status of their formal analyses. the 
fourth case finally shows a model that fails to solve its problem because it is 
neither descriptively adequate nor able to deliver predictions and therefore 
cannot be said to explain anything. the authors, however, seem unaware of 
all of this. these case studies show what fruitful criticism of economic mod-
els looks like in the problem-oriented, pragmatic framework I endorse.
the second conclusive section finally discusses the question of whether 
there can be a special role for philosophers in economic methodology. It 
should be clear that there is no justification for making philosophers the 
final judges in theory evaluation. this is, however, not necessary: Even with-
out being final judges, philosophers can play a substantive role in theory 
appraisal because of their institutional independence. In contrast to prac-
ticing economists, philosophers are free to discuss problems of interpre-
tation or fundamental difficulties of research programmes, as their liveli-
hood does not depend on the good impressions of their economic models. 
this does not mean that philosophers are forced to take a critical attitude 
against all scientific theorising. on the contrary, as I have shown through-
out chapter 4, philosophical reasoning can help to understand the method-
ological status of economic theories and thereby lead to better defences than 
the ones practitioners tend to give. In addition to their institutional inde-
pendence, philosophers of science are trained to carefully weigh arguments 
about methodological questions, and this can enhance their ability to stimu-
late a methodological discussion; in contrast, economists are mainly trained 
to build models within a given theoretical school.
In the last section I refute some counterarguments that may be raised 
against my pragmatic framework for theory evaluation.
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Finally, here is a list of the main theses of my work, providing the whole 
structure of this book at a glance:
1. traditional empiristic methodologies are ill-suited for giving prescrip-
tions to economists as well as assessing the quality of economic theo-
ries.
2. Postmodern relativism is irrefutable, but irrelevant for theory evalua-
tion.
3. A pragmatic approach to theory evaluation that is radically problem 
oriented can legitimately give local guidelines for theory evaluation by 
way of a means-ends analysis. It is not possible to achieve more than 
instrumental rationality in theory evaluation, as there is no objective 
point of view. this does not lead to an atheoretical instrumentalism, 
as it respects the crucial role of theory for long-run progress and expla-
nation.
4. Philosophers can play a special role in theory evaluation because of 
their institutional independence, which gives them time to study his-
tory and methods and enables them to critically discuss matters that 
practitioners must defend rather dogmatically if they want to be part of 
their scientific community.
2. EMPIrIcISM And FALSIFIcAtIonISM
In this section I will first give a short philosophical overview of the develop-
ment of logical positivism and falsificationism and then switch quickly to 
their application by several methodologists who have used these concepts for 
criticising economics. Logical positivism or verificationism suggests itself as 
a natural starting point, as it was the groundbreaking fundament of modern 
philosophy of science. Falsificationism can also best be understood against 
this backdrop, since Popper explicitly designed it to overcome the epistemic 
problems attached to logical positivism. As history has shown, Popper suc-
ceeded in this: falsificationism (and not verificationism) is now the bench-
mark from which one is expected to distinguish one’s own position. that is 
not to say that falsificationism is without problems or generally accepted, 
but it is still an important position in economic methodology. As the con-
cept is widely known, a brief introduction to the main philosophical ideas 
will suffice.
the specific applications to economics are of greater interest here and will 
thus be outlined in more detail: I will summarise the positions of four critics 
that have stressed the need for economics to become more empirical, start-
ing with the classic work of terence W. Hutchison and ending with a recent 
position by Scott Moss. the empiricist position in economic methodology 
is still the most influential one, even if its classic form is today mostly con-
sidered obsolete.
the most important and therefore longest subsection discusses problems 
of the empiricist criticism outlined at the beginning of this chapter. this anal-
ysis uses well-known concepts from philosophy of science and shows why 
criticising standard empiricist claims is the first step towards a new method-
ology. At the end of this section two case studies illustrate the shortcomings 
of the empiricist methodologies in economics with some palpable examples. 
the first case study is a longitudinal overview of modern economic-growth 
theory, and the second concentrates on the current quarrel between rational-
choice and experimental economists. Both case studies show the relation be-
tween theoretical and empirical work in economics and thereby give hints as 
to why some of the demands of the empirical methodologists are ill-argued.
2.1. From LogicaL Positivism to FaLsiFicationism
It is widely accepted that modern philosophy of science started in the 1920s 
with logical positivism. the so-called Vienna circle, including members 
such as carl Gustav Hempel, Moritz Schlick, otto neurath and rudolf car-
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nap, was the driving force behind the programme of logical positivism. In the 
crazy times between the two world wars this programme can be seen as an 
attempt to establish (or defend) conceptual clarity and academic standards 
against some of the fashionable nonsense of that time.
Inspired by the early Wittgenstein and the work of Bertrand russell, it was 
a basic assumption of the Vienna circle that synthetic judgements a priori 
are impossible, which means that we cannot know facts about the world by 
merely thinking about it, without digging into any empirical details. As a re-
sult, the main negative task of the Vienna circle was to criticize metaphysics 
as meaningless and finally abolish it from philosophy and science. What re-
mained for philosophy was the logical analysis of language and the somewhat 
utopian aim of building a unified science.
obviously, if metaphysics was to be criticized as meaningless, a criterion of 
meaning was needed.1 Logical positivism chose verifiability as the necessary 
criterion for a statement to be meaningful. In his seminal essay »Überwind-
ung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache«, rudolf carnap il-
lustrates with much clarity how the criterion of verifiability may be applied 
in order to exterminate meaningless metaphysics.2 He classifies meaningless 
statements into two classes:
1. Meaningless by semantics and
2. Meaningless by syntax.
A statement is meaningless by semantics if it contains predicates that are 
in no way reducible to basic empirical statements — the so-called »proto-
col statements«.3 carnap gives the example of the fictional predicate »babig« 
which is supposed to have no empirical content at all. thus, we have no way 
to detect if something is »babig« or not. For carnap it follows that such a 
predicate is meaningless and hence should be exterminated. carnap claims 
that there are many predicates in metaphysics which are meaningless4 and 
that there is no way out of this, since metaphysics tries to accomplish exactly 
1 note that strict meaninglessness is different from »nonsense«, i. e. statements that are 
simply wrong (all fish can fly) or practically irrelevant (the average height of persons 
whose name ends with the letter »h« is 1.78 m).
2 there is an ongoing discussion about whether carnap was indeed a verificationist. 
See e. g. creath (1982), richardson (1998) or Mormann (2000). the question may be 
interesting, but it is of no importance for my work, as carnap’s position can be inter-
preted as a prototype of a verificationist and is a traditional starting point for any form 
of verificationism.
3 See carnap (1931), p. 222. those protocol statements were later often referred to as 
»sense data«.
4 It does not need to be the case that those predicates are newly invented words. usual 
words can lose their original empirical meaning without gaining a new one. See car-
nap (1931), p. 224-225.
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what is, in his opinion, impossible: to ascertain non-empirical facts about 
the world.
the case of a statement’s being meaninglessness by syntax is more com-
plex. A statement can be meaningless even if it contains only meaningful 
terms, i. e. empirical terms in the sense explained above. this is the case if the 
words are combined in a way that makes no sense. there are two cases distin-
guished by carnap:
1. Errors in natural language syntax (»cesar is and«)
2. Errors in logical syntax (»cesar is a prime number«).
to sum up somewhat simplifying, a meaningful sentence must contain only 
meaningful (i. e. verifiable) elements that are combined in the correct way.
there is no need to dig further into the details of logical positivism here. 
In the end, the failure of the logical positivist project became clear even 
to its adherents: the harsh distinction between meaningful science on the 
one hand and meaningless metaphysics on the other was impossible to draw 
when it became clear how much of scientific thinking relied on »metaphysi-
cal« concepts that are not directly verifiable. It is today the standard view that 
we may learn the most from the Vienna circle’s programme by understand-
ing in detail why its approach failed.
Karl Popper was an early critic of the logical-positivist programme, and he 
tackled with a slightly different central question: He did not want to demar-
cate meaningful sentences from meaningless ones but tried to distinguish 
science from pseudo-science and metaphysics.5 Popper criticized the Vienna 
circle’s criterion of verifiability and the idea of constructing knowledge from 
the bottom up out of basic empirical statements, mainly because of the prob-
lem of induction: out of a finite number of observations it is impossible to 
logically derive the kind of general laws which are typical for science. Popper 
presented a radical criticism of the various attempts made to justify an in-
ductive way of gaining general knowledge — and this criticism has not been 
refuted until today.
According to Popper, all attempts to justify induction end up in an infi-
nite regress, because any »induction principle« must justify itself via induc-
tion again. Put more concretely: Let’s assume the induction principle states 
that after 1,000 successful tests of a scientific law we can accept the law as true. 
Such an induction principle cannot be true a priori, as that would be a syn-
thetic judgement a priori — and apriorism is ruled out by Popper, just as it was 
by the Vienna circle.6 If it is true a posteriori, this is the same as saying it is 
5 In this section I present only a small fraction of Popper’s early ideas. As with the sec-
tion on carnap, this part does not aim at a truthful reproduction of a philosopher’s 
work but is rather used for introducing important concepts.
6 See Popper (1934), p. XXIV, p. 5 et al.
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true by induction. therefore, we need another induction principle to justify 
the first one — and so on, and so on. this proves that there cannot be an in-
duction principle that does its job, for it can neither be true a priori nor jus-
tified empirically, as this leads to an infinite regress.7
the same kind of reasoning can be applied even when we try to assign only 
probabilities to the validity of a scientific law: If an assumed induction prin-
ciple would state that a law is »true with the probability of 0.9« after 1,000 
positive observations, there is still the need for another induction-principle 
to defend this claim. Popper therefore rejected induction as a method of jus-
tifying the validity of scientific laws.
In fact, he also rejected the idea that one could verify (in the sense of an 
unalienable truth) anything by empirical observation. For Popper the fallibil-
ity of all knowledge is a basic assumption; thus we cannot »verify« anything.8 
Popper’s famous »solution« of the induction problem is more a kind of cir-
cumvention: there is no way to gain true knowledge out of empirical obser-
vation, but true knowledge is not what science is all about! the scientific pro-
ject is much better characterised as a process of creating bold hypotheses and 
then trying to refute them. the origin of these hypotheses is quite irrelevant 
and leaves room for induction or any other metaphysical way of gaining in-
spiration for their discovery. But such methods can never provide a justifi-
cation for scientific theories. Popper’s analysis of the problem of induction 
is what turned the tables upside down, by establishing falsifiability instead 
of verifiability as necessary condition for a hypothesis to be »scientific«. the 
sufficient condition for a hypothesis to count as scientific law claims that the 
hypothesis must have survived many tests in different conditions — i. e. it 
could not be falsified even if every attempt was made to do just that.9 Popper 
is fully aware that he is making a decision by defining science in this way; to 
him, the methodological rules are conventions of the scientific game.10 the 
rules Popper sets out are tailored to maximise the falsifiability of theories, 
and therefore he forbids auxiliary assumptions that are made to save a the-
ory from falsification; auxiliary assumptions must always increase the falsifi-
ability of a theory.11
Upshot:
Popper’s approach is extremely relevant for economic methodology. It is 
likely that no economist had ever characterised his profession as construct-
7 See Popper (1934), p. 200.
8 An introduction of the given length may be an insult to Popperians, but as economic 
methodology is in focus many interesting problems will be dealt with in the follow-
ing subsections about falsificationist economic methodology.
9 the logical subtleties of verification and falsification are of minor importance here. 
Hempel (1965) gives an excellent overview.
10 See Popper (1959), p. 32.
11 See Popper (1959), p. 61 et sqq.
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ing a system of knowledge that is based on sense data, as logical positivism 
suggested. therefore, the Popperian reconstruction of science as an ongo-
ing test of bold hypotheses was easier to accept for most economists than 
was logical positivism. However, as stated earlier, economists never have not 
taken falsificationism seriously in their daily work, and changing this seems 
to have been the main impetus for many to become convinced empiricists 
in economic methodology. the next subsections present a reconstruction of 
important positions that argue for more empirical work in economics and 
which were clearly inspired by both logical positivism and Popper’s works.12
2.2. criticising Economics For its Lack oF EmPiricaL contEnt
It is a common criticism that neoclassical economics should take empirical 
findings more seriously. While early critics such as the economist terence W. 
Hutichson concentrated on demanding an increase in falsifiability and falsi-
fication of economic theories, the need to directly integrate empirical find-
ings into the foundations of economic theories has been increasingly stressed 
by succeeding economic methodologists. the methodological positions of 
Hutchison, Hans Albert, Mark Blaug and Scott Moss are used as illustrative 
examples for empiricist methodologies.
2.2.1. Economics must takE FaLsiFication morE sEriousLy
Shortly after Popper had written the »Logic of Scientific discovery«, terence 
W. Hutchison claimed the basic postulates of economic theory to be unfalsi-
fiable and thus tautological and practically irrelevant. His work »Significance 
and Basic Postulates of Economic theory« was an early plea for more empiri-
cal work in economics. In his later works he didn’t fundamentally change that 
position, but still argued against »empty formalism«.
the main impetus of Hutchison’s early work is to criticise apriorism and 
the connected believe that it is possible to gain insight into real world (eco-
nomic) relations by means of pure theory, i. e. analytical models and deduc-
tion.13 As those relations of pure theory are not falsifiable, they do not for-
12 Henceforth I will sometimes not distinguish explicitly between empiricist and falsifi-
cationist views, as falsificationism is an empiricist position.
13 As pseudo-sciences where flourishing in the first half of the 20th century, it was an im-
portant task for Hutchison to distinguish the »real« sciences from pseudo-science. 
Even if that demarcation is far from being finally settled (and most probably never 
will) it does not seem to be so pressing nowadays.
2. Empiricism and falsificationism28
bid »any conceivable occurrence«14 and are therefore devoid of empirical 
content.
Hutchison consequently attacks the view that holds the social sciences to 
be different in principle from the natural sciences, because they are concerned 
with »understanding the essence« of things. Similar to Popper, but without 
referring to him directly, Hutchison proposed falsifiability or simply testabil-
ity as a criterion of demarcation between science and non-science.15 In his 
early work there is much more optimism concerning the feasibility of clearly 
demarcating metaphysics from empirical sciences than in his newer works – 
nevertheless, Hutchison generally stuck to his empiricist position, and was 
even called »ultra-empiricist« by Fritz Machlup. 16 At the same time, Hutch-
ison pragmatically rejects Quine’s famous criticism of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction17, saying that its acceptance would lead to less clarity and a weak-
ening of academic standards.18
Hutchison believes the primary task of economics to be the providing of 
policy-relevant predictions, which in his opinion the empty formulas of pure 
theory cannot deliver. When arguing in favour of prediction, Hutchison is al-
ways aware of the special difficulties in predicting human behaviour.19 there-
fore he only asks for »predictions which, on the average, are slightly but sig-
nificantly less inaccurate and unreliable than would be forthcoming without 
their input of systematic, more or less disciplined economic knowledge.«20 
this is reminiscent of von Hayek’s »pattern prediction«21, but Hutchison is 
not very clear in his assessment of von Hayek, which he mentions only very 
rarely. concerning the means for obtaining better prediction, Hutchison 
clearly prefers econometric and statistical tools to standard economic the-
ory.22
If economists accept prediction as one of their aims, they usually re-
strict themselves to conditional predictions by incorporating ceteris paribus 
clauses into their theories. Hutchison argues against this, because ceteris par-
ibus clauses always lessen the falsifiability of a theory and hence its empirical 
content. He takes the law of consumer demand as an example, which he for-
mulates like this: »If the price at which a good is sold rises, ceteris paribus the 
amount of the demanded good declines.«23 According to Hutchison, the cet-
14 Hutchison (1938), p. 161.
15 See Hutchison (1938), p. 9.
16 See Machlup (1955), p. 8 (reference from Hart (2003), p. 357).
17 See section 2.3.1.4 and 3.1.1.1.
18 See Hutchison (1992), p. 63. Lacking clarity is the main critique he levels at the »anti-
positivists« like deidre Mccloskey.
19 See e. g. Hutchison (1977), p. 8–12.
20 Hutchison (1992), p. 81.
21 See Hayek (1974).
22 See Hutchison (1992), p. 86.
23 See Hutchison (1938), p. 41.
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eris paribus clause can be interpreted in at least two ways: Either it is a vague 
generalisation and encourages ad hoc immunising or it makes the statement 
purely analytical. In the latter case, one determines whether the ceteris paribus 
clause is true by checking if the proposed law was confirmed. In contrast to 
the natural sciences, economics requires one to make ceteris paribus assump-
tions that one knows to be untrue. In the natural sciences one can perform ex-
periments and control the boundary conditions, so the ceteris paribus clause 
can be legitimately said to have empirical content. In economics, a ceteris 
paribus clause means at best that the proposition one has made is true »in 
many cases«24. Hutchison acknowledges the need for ceteris paribus clauses, 
but demands more precision when formulating them: Instead of simply as-
serting that a condition holds ceteris paribus, economists should define ex-
actly the interactions they are expecting from disturbing factors.
Apart from his fundamental methodological criticisms, Hutchison pro-
vides a more sociological critique of economics as well. In his book Knowl-
edge and Ignorance in Economics he gives a detailed account of the devaluation 
debate in Great Britain.25 Hutchison comes to the conclusion that econo-
mists tend to »overplay their hands«26 and are wildly overoptimistic when as-
suming consensus among their colleagues.
Hutchison remains convinced that empirical testability remains the hall-
mark of good science and fiercely attacks any attempts to undermine this 
standard.27 He does not believe in the self-regulation of the »marketplace of 
ideas« and maintains that markets can go wrong.28 thus, he thinks it the task 
of methodologists to criticise and finally correct the going astray of econom-
ics.
Hans Albert’s work can be seen as an elaboration of Hutchison’s main 
ideas. Albert established the term »model-platonism« in the early 1960s.29 
this refers to an alleged tendency in economics to construct tautologic mod-
els and by this to evade empirical checks of economic theory. In order to 
draw a precise and clear picture of Albert’s criticism, I shall briefly sum up 
two of his examples.
Hans Albert analyses the empirical content of the law of falling demand30, 
which claims that the demanded amount of a good can be described – cet-
24 See Hutchison (1938), p. 44.
25 See Hutchison (1977), p. 98 et sqq.
26 See Hutchison (1992), p. 43.
27 As far as other economic methodologists are concerned, Hutchison believes that 
there is a trend towards »extreme permissiveness« that uses the term »positivism« 
merely as a dustbin for all different sorts of methodological sins. For a passionate 
pamphlet, see Hutchison (1992), p. 49 et sqq.
28 See Hutchison (1992), p. 92.
29 See Albert (1963), p. 331 et sqq. In Albert (1998), p. 182 et sqq. there is an updated ver-
sion of this discussion.
30 In the following I will use »law of demand« as a synonym.
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eris paribus – as a monotonously falling function of its price. the catch in 
this formulation is the ceteris paribus clause, as it can be used to immunize 
the law completely from empirical testing. According to Albert, the ceteris 
paribus clause is not a mere precautionary measure but a central part of the 
law of demand. the following list summarises three cases that Albert uses to 
suggest the problems that may arise from the employment of ceteris paribus 
clauses in the law of demand, sorted by an increasing amount of factors to 
be kept constant.
1. Constant preferences: Hans Albert rejects the assumption of constant 
preferences, because this would allow for »explaining« or rather excus-
ing every divergence from the law of demand by a spontaneous change 
in customers’ preferences (i. e. a deviation from the assumption of con-
stant preferences). When analysing open systems such as economic 
ones it is hard — if not impossible — to control for the stability of the 
elements under examination. According to Albert, this leads a fortiori 
to the empirical emptiness of the laws in question, which makes them 
practically inapplicable.31
2. Weak ceteris paribus clause: there are several ways for understanding a ce-
teris paribus clause. the general remark »the rest being equal« does not 
precisely specify which factors are to be kept constant. this leaves room 
for the ad hoc invention of any kind of disturbing factors which can 
made responsible for failing to confirm the law of demand in a specific 
experimental setting.
3. Strong ceteris paribus clause: In this context, »strong« means that every-
thing except the price of the examined good remains constant.32 If the 
ceteris paribus clause is interpreted in this way, the falling demand is 
no longer an empirical question but rather an analytical truth: If the 
consumption of all of the other goods, the saving rate and the money 
supply all remain constant, the consumption of the examined good is 
forced to fall, because there is simply no money left to maintain it at 
its former level. In this case, the law of demand becomes a logical truth 
and loses the information it is supposed to carry.
Albert claims that all three interpretations of the ceteris paribus clause lead to 
the immunisation of economic models against empirical counter-evidence.
the second of Albert’s examples I will present refers to the economic the-
ory of growth. According to Albert, there is a misunderstanding about the 
status of the central equations in economic growth theory: Growth models 
which claim to explain the conditions of balanced growth actually define the 
31 See Albert (1959), p. 379.
32 In Albert (1965) there is a detailed discussion concerning differently strong ceteris 
paribus-clauses.
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very conditions of what is to be understood as balanced growth.33 Because of 
this, the conditions of growth are identical to the concept of growth and there-
fore can tell us nothing about how to bring it about. Albert calls theories like 
this model »platonic«, as they do not put forward hypotheses that have em-
pirical content.
Albert underlines his reproach of model-platonism using the given exam-
ples and, of course, some others. In his view, economics is often concerned 
with purely formal deductions based on assumptions that are chosen at will 
and defended by vague plausibility considerations, instead of creating em-
pirically meaningful theories that can be tested. Empty rational-choice eco-
nomics runs the risk of building up a system that resembles an »astronomy 
of the movement of goods«34 and ignores the actually interesting features of 
the economy — which is why Albert calls it a »logic of planning«, 35 stressing 
the normative component of rational choice.
Albert admits, however, that while statements in economics are not always 
completely empty, often falsification is made impossible due to practical re-
strictions. the case of the weak ceteris paribus clause in the law of demand 
(see above) may be an example of this.
For Albert, the genesis of a model does not play a role in its appraisal. 
Methodological keywords such as »simplifying to the essential« belong to 
the context of discovery and cannot be used for justifying models.36 Albert’s 
position is similar to Hutchison’s plea against any way of trying to under-
stand the economic world out of a priori reasoning. For him, the creation of 
empirically testable hypotheses is necessary but lacking in mainstream eco-
nomics.
Mark Blaug is a more recent defender of a falsificationist position in eco-
nomics. He is an outspoken Popperian, but as an economist he concentrates 
more on the practical relevance of methodology than the more subtle philo-
sophical issues. Blaug defines himself as an »aggressive« methodologist, i. e. 
one who aims to change economics instead of defending it.37 Along with 
33 See Albert (1963), p. 349. Here and in Albert (1957), p. 385 et sqq. Albert seems to 
refer to Harrod-domar models. A more detailed discussion can be found in sec-
tion 2.4.1.
34 Albert (1963), p. 361. (translation by S.d.).
35 Albert (1961), p. 45. (translation by S.d.).
36 See Albert (1959), p. 375. Strangely though, one page later Albert argues in favour of 
»empirical fundaments« as a criterion for good models. For further discussion, see 
section 2.3.1.4. the distinction between context of discovery and context of justifica-
tion has itself been under attack for some time; see Hoyningen-Huene (1987). While 
there are ambiguities, I will continue to use the concept for pragmatic reasons. A sim-
ilar case can be made for attacks on the fact/value split. While there are no pure val-
ue-free facts of the matter, it is nonetheless helpful and feasible to separate facts from 
values, as the concepts can be grasped even without the existence of »pure« cases.
37 See Blaug (1990), p. 3.
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Hutchison and Albert, he harshly criticises purely formal models that have 
no reference to the real world at all. the main point of Blaug’s work is to 
urge economists to try more seriously to formulate truly discriminating tests. 
Blaug is well aware of the difficulties in doing this, but sees these as obsta-
cles to overcome rather than reasons to refrain from a falsificationist meth-
odology. (In order to avoid repeating arguments too much, the following 
section on Blaug is shorter than the preceding ones on Popper, Hutchinson, 
and Albert.)
Mark Blaug argues consistently against the reluctance of economists to 
»produce theories that yield unambiguously refutable implications«38 and 
their unwillingness to confront predictions with empirical data. In accord-
ance with terence Hutchison, Blaug is highly critical of the formalist revolu-
tion and claims that mathematical calculations serve mainly as an entry bar-
rier for new scientists, because they are hard to learn and relatively easy to 
check for consistency.39 Blaug employs many detailed case studies to show 
the doubtful connection between highly abstract theories and reality. He 
does not, however, accuse economic theories of being completely empiri-
cally empty. His point is rather that most models are much too simple and 
because of this cannot represent complicated facts. Instead of concentrating 
on better predictions, economists have engaged in a technical discourse of 
possibility theorems and mathematical proofs that do not promote progress 
(in the sense of a better understanding of real-world economic processes).
Blaug criticises (among others) growth theory, the theory of consumer de-
mand, the marginal productivity theory of wages or the Heckscher-ohlin 
theorem and, of course, general equilibrium theory for lacking empirical ad-
equacy.40 According to Blaug, all these and many other »advances« of eco-
nomic theory have done little to improve the predictive power of economics 
but mostly solve problems economists created for themselves.
on the other hand, Blaug acknowledges that there is empirical research 
going on in economics, but he condemns it as »playing tennis with the net 
down« because it is aimed at confirming the truth of economic theory in-
stead of challenging it.41 of course, economists do not officially admit such 
a methodology and claim to be testing their hypotheses, which is why Mark 
Blaug speaks of »innocuous falsificationism«. Blaug sees the only hope for 
better economics in taking falsification seriously and claims that new econo-
metric methods are needed to achieve this aim.
Blaug’s falsificationist position has been harshly attacked by many meth-
odologists as unattainable in the social sciences for reasons such as the im-
possibility of pursuing controlled experiments with real economies or the 
38 Blaug (1980), p. 238.
39 See Blaug (1998).
40 See Blaug (1980), p. 239.
41 See Blaug (1980), p. 241.
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openness and interdependence of economic systems, which makes the iso-
lated observation of causal relationships extremely difficult. Blaug answers 
these attacks with the request to »try harder« and aims to show by means 
of historical examples that falsification is possible and fruitful in econom-
ics, but happens too rarely and, more importantly, is not systematically pur-
sued.42
2.2.2. EmPiricaL Findings must bE intEgratEd into thE Foundations oF 
Economics
In addition to their arguments for taking falsification more seriously, many 
methodologists claim that the theoretical fundament of economics must be 
enriched by empirical research about human behaviour and step away from 
short-term maximisation of income as the only goal of its agents.
Hans Albert comes up with two proposals for better economic research: 
the introduction of sociological research and the systematic consideration 
of institutional settings. He is convinced that there are no separate economic 
problems:
there is […] no economic problem […] about which it is safe to say that it 
could be solved without recourse to social factors not yet considered.43
Albert argues that there is no »theoretical autonomy« of economics that can 
be attributed to its problems. In short: there is no such a thing as »pure 
economics«.44 As economics is concerned with exchange-acts of real per-
sons, Albert demands to integrate factors other than simple income-maximi-
sation into economic modelling and proposes social norms and institutions 
as promising candidates.45
translated into modern terms, Albert pleads for better foundations in eco-
nomics by making it an empirical science of human behaviour46 instead of a 
science of empirically empty rational-choice calculations.47
42 See Blaug (1980), p. xv.
43 Albert (1963), p. 360. (translation by S.d.).
44 See Albert (1960), p. 480.
45 See Albert (1963), p. 360. In Albert (1998) he still sticks to that position.
46 See Albert (1959), p. 380.
47 Albert has not changed his position fundamentally in his more recent publications, 
but there are some interesting changes concerning the points he stresses most. In 
some publications he acknowledges the role of economic theory as method of ex-
plaining social processes, and sometimes even seems to plead for an economisation 
of sociology rather than for a sociologisation of economics. See e. g. Albert (1978), 
p. 60. Albert clearly welcomes institutional economics, but he still feels the need for 
filling the »cognitive deficit« in economics. See Albert (1984), p. 59 et sqq. and Albert 
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one last fraction of methodologists deserves to be mentioned shortly in 
this section about empiricist methodologies: the advocates of the so-called 
KIdS (Keep It descriptive, Stupid!) approach for social simulations, who op-
pose the KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid!) community. Simulating social phe-
nomena is a relatively new branch of economic research that raises several 
highly interesting methodological issues to which I will come back later. At 
this point I shall only briefly sketch out the position of Scott Moss as a re-
searcher in the simulation field, who demands more empirical work when de-
signing economic simulations.
Scott Moss has been arguing for better micro-foundations and against 
general equilibrium theorising in economics since the early 1980s.48 By this 
he not only hopes to achieve better predictions but sticks to the idea that so-
cial science should offer theories for explaining social processes.49 He is con-
vinced that simulations should be based on a descriptively correct empirical 
basis in order to get useful results. By reconstructing some major scientific 
success stories, he tries to deliver evidence that good science is always based 
on empirical work, and comes to the following conclusion:
one is unlikely to get to the thin pinnacle without the laborious work of also 
building up a broad base that is more directly related to observation and evi-
dence – there is no ‘magic’ short cut (such as assuming people act collectively 
as if they were rational […] to obtain useful abstract social theory.50
In contrast to what the adherents of the KISS approach preach, simplicity is 
no end in itself for Moss. He puts forward several arguments against simplic-
ity as a criterion for good science:51
1. Simplicity can be useful when the task to be performed is known in ad-
vance. E. g. if the task is building a machine that serves a specified aim, 
it is sensible to build it as simply as possible. When scientific discovery 
is at issue we face a completely different situation, because we have to 
explore the outcome and cannot simplify in advance.
2. computing power has increased in such a tremendous way that there is 
no technical need for simplification in simulations anymore.
3. We are inclined to believe that the world is constituted on simple prin-
ciples, but there is no a priori reason for the truth of this belief.
(1985), p. 60 et sqq. Interestingly, he does not mention experimental economics even 
in his latest publications on the topic. See Albert (2002).
48 See Moss (1981).
49 See Moss/Edmonds (2005), p. 2.
50 Moss/Edmonds (2005), p. 4.
51 See Moss/Edmonds (2005), p. 1 et sqq.
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4. the fact that complex structures can emerge out of simple, basic prin-
ciples is not a sufficient proof that the found principles are causally re-
sponsible for the complexities of the world.
For Moss, simplification is only acceptable afterwards, i. e. when the relevant 
factors have been determined. His position includes the demand for »theory-
free« agents: According to Moss, modellers should not in any way assume be-
haviour for agents that is not based on prior empirical observation or does not 
correspond to what experts or participants of the respective field would ac-
cept as an appropriate description of their behaviour.
2.2.3. summary
the foregoing section presented the common criticism that neoclassical eco-
nomics needs to take empirical findings more seriously. Where Hutichson 
and Blaug concentrate on the demand for increasing falsifiability and fal-
sification of economic theories, the claim for directly integrating empirical 
findings into the foundations of economic theories has been most notably 
stressed by Albert and Moss.
2.3. ProbLEms oF EmPiricism and FaLsiFicationism
now that the empiricist criticism has been laid out in some detail, it is time 
to check its validity. In the following sections I discuss arguments that can 
be used for defending neoclassical economics against the empiricist charges. 
the aim of this chapter is two-fold: In the subsections under 2.3.1, I present 
philosophical positions that all deal with difficulties of defining »unprob-
lematic background knowledge« or a solid ground for research. the argu-
ments presented here can be used for explaining and justifying the fact, that 
neoclassical theory is still alive – despite the empiricist methodologists’ crit-
icism presented above. the subsections under 2.3.2 critically discuss the ap-
propriateness of empiricist criteria for theory appraisal.
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2.3.1. ProbLEms with thE dEFinition oF »unProbLEmatic background 
knowLEdgE«
All the positions considered here outline the difficulties of empirically test-
ing economic theories or basing them on empirical data. A common point 
of these positions is what is often called the »theory ladenness« of observa-
tion, which expresses the view that there is no such thing as pure observa-
tion — that all observation is necessarily affected by some theory. Stated oth-
erwise, this means that that testing and observing can only be meaningful 
when some beliefs are fixed as »unproblematic background knowledge« and 
thus are excluded from testing. While even the empiricist methodologists 
are probably aware of theory-ladenness, their normative prescriptions seem 
to largely ignore it (which may be the reason that some of the empiricists’ at-
tacks seem to be beside the point). Hence, the arguments presented in this 
section can be used to justify the fact that many economists have ignored the 
empiricist’s criticism presented above.
the following positions all deal with theory-ladenness in some way and 
are ordered by increasing radicalness: A rather introductory note is Popper’s 
quite vague acceptance of protecting the rationality principle against falsifi-
cation (section 2.3.1.1). I then continue with a presentation of the views of 
thomas S. Kuhn, who further developed the concept of theory-ladenness to 
show how it can lead to a complete separation of paradigms, which may ex-
plain why the empiricist claims were constantly rejected (section 2.3.1.2). In 
an exception to the ordering of this section, Imre Lakatos’ methodology did 
not further radicalise Kuhn’s views but rather tried to give a more rational 
justification for the rigidities that Kuhn observed. Lakatos’ views were openly 
welcomed by economists and have helped to justify their rejection of empiri-
cist demands (section 2.3.1.3). Finally, I present a synopsis of holism and co-
herentism as the concepts which most radically integrate theory-ladenness at 
their theoretical basis and by this point to theoretical weaknesses in the em-
piricist claims presented above.
2.3.1.1. Popper on the Rationality Principle
It may be surprising that Karl Popper is the first protagonist to be mentioned 
in this section, for he is usually seen as the inventor and defender of falsifica-
tionism. However, his ideas concerning the rationality principle demonstrate 
some of the central problems of naïve falsificationism and hint to possible 
answers that are discussed in detail in the following sections.
As the founder of critical rationalism, Karl Popper had a much more re-
laxed view on the rational-choice approach than his student Hans Albert has. 
In his essay »the rationality Principle«52, Popper argues that the assumption 
52 See Popper (1967).
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that people decide rationally can be useful even if it is unfalsifiable or already 
falsified.53 He asserts that the social sciences are not so much concerned with 
precisely predicting single behaviour but with the explanations »in princi-
ple« of typical situations. this is why we do not need to know what is ex-
actly going on »in the psyche« of all participating individuals; it is enough 
to assume that people decide appropriately, given their respective aims and 
knowledge. Popper acknowledges that such a formulation of the rationality 
principle is »nearly empty«.54 nonetheless, he calls it useful as a methodolog-
ical principle, because it encourages focusing on the analysis of modelling of 
situations and allows for ignoring the inconvenient details of human behav-
iour.55 this is the reason why models can never be accurate representations; 
according to Popper, they are necessarily oversimplifications in some sense.56 
this is a counter-position to empiricist methodologists, who demand inte-
grating behavioural observations directly into the behavioural foundations 
of economics in order to make it more realistic (as e. g. Hans Albert claimed). 
Popper, in contrast to Hans Albert, recommends changing the specification 
of the model (the situation), and not the underlying rationality assumption, 
if predictions contradict empirical data. He argues this to be the more fruit-
ful approach, since models are more interesting, more informative and easier 
to test than the rationality principle.57 Popper’s view is best interpreted as see-
ing the rationality principle as a »metaphysical« assumption for the social sci-
ences just as the causality assumption is one for the natural sciences.58 By this 
interpretation, one can avoid the alleged inconsistency to his falsificationist 
methodology that requires falsifiability for theoretical laws, because the ra-
tionality principle is now seen not as a theoretical law but rather a heuristic 
for observing and explaining the social world.
53 Popper declares the rationality principle to be false in a strict sense, because humans 
are irrational in some cases. In general, however, he considers it to be a good approx-
imation for human behaviour.
54 there is quite an extensive discussion about the meaning of the rationality principle 
being »nearly empty«. See for example nadeau (1993), Lagueux (1993), Salazar (2000) 
and Kirchgaessner (2004). I tend to read Popper as saying the rationality principle is 
untestable, but its applicability shows that human behaviour is at least not complete-
ly chaotic.
55 For a similar standpoint see e. g. Suchanek (1993). referring to Popper, Latsis (1972) 
coined the term »situational determinism«.
56 See Popper (1967), p. 361.
57 Some authors see this as a contradiction to falsificationism, which they presume to 
demand changes of the theory in the case of empirical contradictions. (See Köllmann 
(2001), p. 8-9.) Popper’s treatment of the rationality principle shows that he does not 
demand instantaneous falsification in the light of counterevidence, as this will imme-
diately kill many fruitful approaches.
58 For the role of »metaphysical assumptions» in Popper’s falsificationism see Popper 
(1934), p. 13. note that Popper does not consider metaphysics to be nonsense but 
rather sees it as valuable in guiding research.
2. Empiricism and falsificationism38
Upshot:
Popper accepts the purposeful ignorance of empirical facts in order to protect 
the rationality assumption as a basis for providing scientific explanations. Be-
cause he does not offer much argumentative support for his view, however, 
it remains nothing more than a value judgement. thus, the advocates of em-
piricism could still argue that the acceptance of the rationality principle is a 
sin rather than a virtue.
2.3.1.2. Arguments from Kuhn’s Methodology
thomas Kuhn is probably the most important critic of empiricist method-
ologies and therefore deserves a detailed introduction. His ideas deliver the 
key for understanding why empiricist demands for changing mainstream eco-
nomics theory have had little success. this does not mean that Kuhn offers 
rational reasons for this – instead, he stresses the irrational aspects of sci-
ence. offering a more descriptive analysis, Kuhn states several difficulties in 
Popper’s falsificationist programme. the most important features of Kuhn’s 
ideas will be outlined in the following section.59
the term »paradigm« is surely the most important notion in the work of 
thomas Kuhn.60 nonetheless, it is not easy to define. Margaret Masterman 
even distinguishes twenty-one different meanings of »paradigm«,61 clustered 
into three categories:62
1. Paradigms as metaphysical worldviews: Ideas that fundamentally affect 
the way we perceive the world and think about it.
2. Sociological paradigms: Accepted scientific results, institutions and 
methodological decisions.
3. constructed paradigms: textbooks, classical works, measuring instru-
ments etc. that influence scholars and thus determine the way a specific 
science is practised.
From this it becomes clear that paradigms are different from theories, be-
cause they are a kind of background conviction or a set of methodological 
rules for theories.63 Speaking in Kuhnian terms, one might say that all science 
is »paradigm-laden«. Paradigms cannot be defined in a precise and formal 
59 As much of this section is a summary of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
I will refer to exact pages only sparingly. For the sake of readability I will also skip the 
usual qualifications and present Kuhn’s position as if it were mine.
60 the Kuhnian term »paradigm shift« has today become a frequently abused buzzword.
61 See Masterman (1965), p. 61 et sqq.
62 In his postscript to the new edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn pro-
posed substituting »paradigm« with the term »disciplinary matrix«: See Kuhn (1962), 
p. 194 et sqq. I will stick to »paradigm«, as this is the much more common term.
63 the rationality principle is a good example, because it is the underlying principle of 
many methodological sets of rules and the guideline for the majority of economic 
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way, and as a result there are difficulties with comparing them on a purely ra-
tional basis. this is because the arguments in favour of one paradigm must 
always refer to the paradigm itself, as there is no neutral »meta-paradigm«.64 
this problem is labelled »the incommensurability of paradigms«.65 Partly be-
cause of this property, paradigms are, even in mature sciences, not easy to de-
scribe. they resemble religious beliefs that enforce themselves by being ap-
plied in daily routines.66
despite being difficult to define, paradigms are essential for science: With-
out paradigms, science could not exist, as without any rules there can be no 
games. But how is a paradigm established? this happens through a kind of 
evolutionary process: In the pre-paradigmatic phase of a science, random 
facts are collected without applying any theory (as far as that is possible) 
to them. therefore all facts have a priori the same relevance. different pre-
paradigmatic schools interpret the facts differently and enter into competi-
tion.67 If one school seems more successful than another in explaining nature 
consistently, it will attract more members, and the other pre-paradigmatic 
schools will lose influence. A paradigm gradually emerges from the remain-
ing school. At this point normal science can start developing precise and »es-
oteric« theories. A paradigm is especially attractive for scientists when it is 
sufficiently unprecedented and open-ended, so that a lot of research can be 
done. to sum up, a paradigm is a set of beliefs that determines the normal 
way of doing science: What counts as scientific in a specific branch is a result 
of past and currently established ways of doing science. 68
only when a paradigm is established can »normal science« begin. normal 
science is science under a paradigm, meaning that the basic assumptions of 
the paradigm are no longer questioned.69 In normal science it is fairly clear 
what counts as a problem and what a correct solution would look like. this 
makes science as a professional business possible: Very subtle and specific 
problems can be addressed in specialized journals, in which agreement to key 
ideas is assumed. those who are sceptical are simply excluded from the scien-
theories. note that some theories, such as newton’s mechanics, became exemplars of 
paradigms.
64 See Kuhn (1965), p. 258 et sqq.
65 See von dietze (2001), p. 47 et sqq. for an inspiring discussion of this problem.
66 See Kuhn (1962), p. 58 et sqq. A good description of this feature is »tacit knowledge«.
67 In this phase of research, the process seems well described by the Popperian term 
»critical guessing«.
68 See Kuhn (1962), p. 25 et sqq. for the whole subchapter.
69 this is probably why philosophy never really reached scientific status: there is no 
common paradigm. When a paradigm does emerge in a specific philosophical field, 
this field is often no longer regarded as philosophy but has become a science. thus, 
philosophy is doomed to stay in the pre-paradigmatic phase of competing schools.
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tific community and are thus forced to turn to philosophy, do historical re-
search or give up being scientists altogether.70
normal science can be well characterized as a puzzle-solving activity: It 
is a game with rules, one in which the solution of a problem can always be 
roughly anticipated. to put it clearly: Science is, for thomas Kuhn, not a 
critical quest for truth but rather a dogmatic operation serving the respec-
tive paradigm. there is a lot of mopping up to be done, in Kuhn’s words. 
the puzzle-solving, mopping-up work of normal science can be categorized 
as follows:
1. the gathering of facts, their interpretation and the postulation of rela-
tions between them so that they fit into the paradigm. through this the 
scope of the paradigm is constantly expanding, and the paradigm may 
be used in fields that are far removed from its original purpose.71 As 
more fitting facts are observed, the better theories under the paradigm 
become empirically confirmed.
2. the confirmation of predictions of the paradigm. As a paradigm is dif-
ferent from a theory, it does not predict anything by itself; predictions 
are made by those theories that are compatible with the paradigm. nor-
mal science runs well when many paradigm-compatible theories can be 
found which create valid predictions. If nature can somehow be forced 
into the paradigm, this delivers ongoing proof that the current para-
digm is right and fruitful.
3. Further specification of the paradigm. this is mainly the work of meth-
odologists who try to define what should count as good science and 
why. they remain inside the paradigm but make it more precise.
So if the results are mainly obvious, why do science at all? the challenge in 
science is always how to prove the paradigm; the ways found to do this can 
be very interesting and even surprising. In general, falsification is not the aim 
of science. Single hypotheses may well be discarded, but anomalies that sug-
gest the rejection of the whole paradigm are mostly ignored, or the research 
that led to them is regarded as a failure. obviously, normal science has sev-
eral defects:72
• normal science leads to a »one-track mind«. only problems that fall 
into the leading paradigm are seen, while other – possibly fruitful – ob-
servations and theories are generally neglected.
70 See Kuhn (1962), p. 33.
71 An example is Becker (1978) or Wible (1997), Wible (1998).
72 See Kuhn (1962), p. 38.
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• there is much intolerance against new thoughts or theories which do 
not fit into the paradigm. normal science does not search out novelty.73
But thomas Kuhn sees advantages to normal science, too:74
• detailed and precise research can only be possible through relying on 
some kind of standard that does not need to be questioned. Seemingly 
esoteric research into very specific problems is the actual strength of the 
scientific method. Simplification and a focused worldview are needed 
for fruitful science.75
• only when doing normal science can the boundary of a paradigm be 
detected. Scientists have to know the outcome of an experiment in ad-
vance in order to detect if something has gone wrong. the paradigm is 
pushed to its ultimate limits. But at some point, anomalies become nu-
merous and the paradigm is not able to keep its promise of success an-
ymore. A crisis of science comes into being.
If paradigms are so rigid and normal science does not search for novelty, how 
can a paradigm ever change? It will not change, as long as normal science is 
successful. But because normal science is so detailed, at some point nature 
will not fit into the paradigm anymore. Sometimes small refinements of the 
paradigm can help, but in other cases they do not.76 Anomalies are part of 
the daily work in normal science, and usually they are regarded as puzzles 
to solve. But eventually it becomes harder and harder to invent theories that 
match the empirical data under the leading paradigm. Science then enters 
into crisis: the paradigm now cannot keep its promise and loses adherents. 
And the game starts all over again: the field is now open for new ideas, ge-
nius and intuition.77 At some point one of these new ideas will lead to a new 
73 In saying this, Kuhn states the exact opposite of Popper. See Popper (1965).
74 See Kuhn (1962), p. 38-39. It is possible to interpret Kuhn’s methodology as an essen-
tially economic one, because he carefully weighs the costs and benefits of standards 
in science. See section 7.1 and deichsel (2007).
75 A classic example is a geographic map enabling orientation if and only if it delivers a 
simplified picture of reality. See robinson (1962), p. 33.
76 As an example, planetary movement under the geocentric paradigm was first depicted 
using circles. When loops in planetary movement were observed, they were explained 
by epicycles without rejecting the geocentric paradigm. the maturity of the paradigm 
also determines how easily that paradigm can be adjusted.
77 the Kuhnian term for this is »extraordinary science«. Extraordinary science can also 
happen by chance without prior crisis. See Kuhn Kuhn (1962), p. 96.
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paradigm. A revolution has taken place.78 By causing this process, normal sci-
ence is generating novelty without searching for it.
the shift from one paradigm to another can be a lengthy process. First of 
all, there is, of course, always resistance against changing the original para-
digm. Second, it can be difficult to view the same data from a different per-
spective. Kuhn even argues that such a gestalt-shift does not happen with in-
dividual persons:79 there must be a group that sees the world differently and 
attracts new members. thus the old paradigm slowly dies out.80 that does 
not mean it becomes useless: It has solved a lot of problems and created so-
lutions applicable in everyday situations – and these will endure even if a new 
paradigm comes to reign.81
one important aspect of paradigm-shift is that it cannot be enforced or 
fully rationally explained. Anomalies are a necessary but not a sufficient rea-
son for the rejection of a paradigm, because they always occur. A new para-
digm usually has even more counterevidence than an old one. So what has 
to be compared is the fruitfulness of the paradigms in question, and this 
question cannot be answered by reason alone. Hence we can only properly 
speak of progress when discussing normal science, for between two para-
digms there is no common truth-criterion. Kuhn is in fact critical of any ob-
jective truth-criterion. nonetheless, paradigm choice is not purely irrational. 
Kuhn provides classic criteria like precision, simplicity, generality and fruit-
fulness as guidelines – but even by means of these criteria one cannot choose 
a paradigm on a purely rational basis.82
For Kuhn, one may conclude, falsification is a destructive process, so 
much so that it should only be applied when there is little hope that it can 
be avoided. But even then, »falsification« of a paradigm will only happen (in 
the form of a revolution) when a promising alternative is at hand. For Kuhn, 
it is the small steps of normal science that constitute progress rather than the 
quasi-falsifying gestalt-shift of paradigm change.83
Upshot:
the Kuhnian view explains why the basis-empiricist criticism outlined in sec-
tion 2.2 was not successful in changing economics: the integration of empir-
ical knowledge about human behaviour would mean a paradigm change, as 
it would lead to a completely different type of science that could not even be 
78 the classical example for a scientific revolution is the paradigm-shift from newtoni-
an to relativistic physics.
79 See Kuhn (1962), p. 98.
80 See Kuhn (1962), p. 162.
81 See Kuhn (1962), p. 39. the shift from newtonian to relativistic physics is an exam-
ple again.
82 See Kuhn (1962), p. 156 et sqq.
83 there is still controversy about whether a Kuhnian can acknowledge progress be-
tween paradigms. there are passages in Kuhn’s work that say so, but they seem incon-
sistent with the general thrust of his work. See Klee (1997), p. 149.
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compared to neoclassical economics. the claims of the empiricist methodol-
ogists simply lay outside the dominating rational-choice paradigm and were 
hence ignored by the majority of scientists working under that paradigm. If 
one accepts Kuhn’s stance on incommensurability, it is impossible to de-
cide which paradigm is the better one.84 For Kuhn and his followers, progress 
is only possible within a paradigm - and even there it cannot be defined in 
a straightforward manner.85 unfortunately, normative methodological dis-
cussions always deal with the question whether a ruling paradigm needs to 
change. Kuhn’s approach can explain the persistence of neoclassical theory 
as well as why empiricist criticism of it is likely to be pointless, as long as one 
takes the problem of incommensurability seriously.86 What Kuhn cannot 
offer is an evaluation of paradigms. Imre Lakatos is a philosopher who has 
further developed Kuhn’s ideas and tries not only to explain persistence but 
to justify it as well. His methodology will be presented in the next section.
2.3.1.2. Arguments from Lakatos’ Methodology
Lakatos’s methodology can be interpreted as an integration of Kuhn’s objec-
tions into Popper’s falsificationism.87 By now it should be quite clear why the 
suggestions of the empiricist methodologists were blocked when it came to 
changing economics. Lakatos provides additional arguments explaining why 
falsifying the core of economic theory by empirical observation may not be 
as easy as some empiricist methodologists tend to think. Here is a summary 
of his main points:
1. direct observation is impossible. In order to test a theory we need in-
struments or statistical know-how. Scientific observations are thus de-
pendent on other theories.88
2. Even if we could clearly distinguish between theory and observation, 
there would be no way to gain certain knowledge out of observation 
in compliance with the assumptions of falsificationism, where certain 
84 According to Kuhn, one cannot test paradigms. this is particularly true of the ration-
al-choice paradigm, as any conduct whatsoever can be reconstructed as rational. due 
to this speciality the neoclassical paradigm cannot detect anomalies, and hence it is 
hard to see how the process of crisis, revolution and normal science could ever emerge 
in economics.
85 Kuhn suggests discussing progress criteria in a way similar to how we discuss ethical 
values. He asserts that rational discourse is still possible even if there are no clear-cut 
criteria. See Kuhn (1977), p. 111 et sqq.
86 Even without incommensurability, sociological reasons may prevent scientists from 
adopting external methodological advice. See the insightful study of Mackie (1998) 
that deals with sociological forces which led to a canonisation of economic theory.
87 See Backhouse (1997), p. 88 et sqq. and Lakatos (1970), p. 173.
88 See Lakatos (1970), p. 96-97.
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knowledge is only possible within the realm of logic.89 Hence, certain 
falsification is impossible.
3. Even if we had theory-free observation and certain knowledge from ob-
servation, it would not follow that a theory that runs into empirical dif-
ficulties is definitely falsified, because there is always room to alter an 
auxiliary hypothesis or postulate some disturbing interferences instead 
of questioning the theory.90
After stating the difficulties of falsification, Lakatos developed his own way 
to get out of them: Simplifying a bit, the Lakatosian term »scientific research 
programme« can be regarded as a watered-down version of the (quite radi-
cal) Kuhnian notion of a paradigm. Lakatos does not focus on incommen-
surability or the irrationality of paradigm choice but instead gives arguments 
for the rationality of ignoring empirical counter-evidence to theories. this is 
one reason why the Lakatosian approach is often labled the »rational recon-
struction« of theory-dynamics. Lakatos accepts many of Kuhn’s findings on 
the descriptive level, but in contrast to Kuhn, he tries to defend them norma-
tively as rational. According to Lakatos, scientific research programmes con-
sist in a »hard core« of basic convictions that are never changed and a set of 
assumptions that can be altered when empirical findings threaten the hard 
core, the so-called »protective belt«.91 Even critics of Lakatos admit the fruit-
fulness of this distinction for understanding the structure of economics,92 
and Lakatosian-inspired analysis of economic research programmes has been 
a major trend in economic methodology.93
Following Lakatos, a research programme is called progressive if and only 
if it is able to generate hypotheses that are at least partly empirically con-
firmed94 and can be used for the prediction of novel facts95 without losing 
89 See section 2.1 and Lakatos (1970), p. 97-98.
90 See Lakatos (1970), p. 98-100.
91 See Lakatos (1970), p. 133..
92 See Hands (2001), p. 296
93 See Latsis (1972) for the first work of this tradition; see Wong (1978) for another well-
known work. Hands (2001), p. 287 gives an impressive overview of this field.
94 note that by this definition it is quite easy for a research programme to be »pro-
gressive,« because only partial confirmation is demanded – and partial confirmation 
can be found for nearly anything. See footnote 102 in this chapter. Lakatos himself 
notes problems with the so-called tacking-paradox (See Lakatos (1970), p. 128.): Ac-
cording to his criterion, research programmes would become progressive simply by 
tacking any partially confirmed statement to a theory of the research programme. In 
total, Lakatos’ methodology is well suited for analysing the structure of research pro-
grammes, but it is now considered rather weak at appraising them.
95 note that novel facts do not necessarily lie in the future; they only have to be novel 
in the sense that they are different from the input data used and different from what 
a theory was designed to predict. See Lakatos (1970), p. 114 footnote 99.
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the well-established achievements of old theories96. older theories are only 
said to be falsified if such hypotheses are found, which is why Lakatos’s view 
is called »constructive falsificationism«: Falsification happens only when a 
better alternative is at hand.97
the textbook Neue Institutionenökonomik from Erlei/Leschke/Sauerland 
gives an elaborate definition of neoclassical (and institutional) economics in 
terms of a Lakatosian research programme. As it is a good and recent exam-
ple of how Lakatos’ methodology can be applied to economics, I will trans-
late large sections of it here. the authors define the hard core of (mainstream) 
economics through four propositions:98
• Hc1: the individual orients its action – while paying attention to rel-
evant restrictions – on its preferences and is the only source of values 
(principle of individuality).
• Hc2: the individual evaluates its options for action by means of a cost-
benefit calculus and decides for its relative advantage.
• Hc3: Social systems can be seen as decision units. However, all proper-
ties that are assumed for social systems (groups, societies, firms, house-
holds or other organisations) must be ultimately compatible to the 
properties and incentive structures of the individuals constituting the 
social system under consideration.
• Hc4: Economics does not make assertions about the behaviour of sin-
gle individuals. this is the domain of other sciences (e. g. psychology). 
Statements deduced from economic theory are always based on repre-
sentative behaviour.
After having defined the hard core of economics as shown above, the authors 
characterise the protective belt by the following eight statements:99
• PB1: In every point in time t the preferences of individuals are given 
and constant.
96 note the contrast to Kuhn in this point – Lakatos requires full commensurability.
97 Lakatos mentions, however, that it is not possible to decide ex ante if a research pro-
gramme remains progressive in the future which shows again why Lakatos’ framework 
delivers only weak criteria for appraising theories. See Lakatos (1970), p. 133.
98 See Erlei/Leschke/Sauerland (1999), p. 51-52. (translation by S.d.).
99 See Erlei/Leschke/Sauerland (1999), p. 52 (translation by S.d.). only PB7 and PB8 
are specific points that distinguish institutional economics from the mainstream.
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• PB2: the individual usually has only limited knowledge about objec-
tive facts.
• PB3: Knowledge and skills of individuals can change over time.
• PB4: Scarcity is universal and therefore (different sorts of opportunity-)
cost restrictions emerge.
• PB5: Market goods and collective goods as scarce goods create utility.
• PB6: Every voluntary exchange – considered in isolation – leads to an 
increase in net utility for the partners of exchange, respectively making 
none of them worse off.
• PB7: the equivalent of voluntary exchange on the market, regarding the 
choice of institutional arrangements, is the consensus principle as spe-
cial variant of the Pareto principle.
• PB8: the functioning of the market mechanism and the quality of the 
provision of collective goods depends on the design of institutions.
this formulation of an economic research programme shows, for example, 
that the assumption of constant preferences is part of the protective belt of 
neoclassical economic research. If empiricist methodologists demand the in-
tegration of theories about preference-change into the hard core, this request 
is outside the original research programme.100
Following Lakatos, science is no longer about creating falsifiable hypoth-
eses and rejecting them when they contradict empirical findings. rather, the 
hard core of a research programme is deliberately fixed101 with the aim of pre-
dicting novel facts in the sense explained above. Lakatos concentrates much 
more than Popper on the dynamics of science and is therefore much less de-
manding about features of single theories.102
100 At this point, I argue of course on a purely descriptive basis. normative reasons fol-
low in later sections.
101 Lakatos notes that the judgement of knowledge as problematic or unproblematic is 
always subjective. See Lakatos (1970), p. 23 et sqq. the reason is of course the prob-
lem of induction, which makes it impossible to gain secure knowledge about the fu-
ture out of observation in the past.
102 Feyerabend remarks that this deprives Lakatos of any normative bite. See Feyerabend 
(1965). Lakatos even allows for inconsistent theories: see Lakatos (1970), p. 176. this 
is one reason why Lakatos’ methodology is not well-suited for theory appraisal. See 
footnote 94 in this chapter.
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Upshot:
Lakatos’s methodology does not show that the demand for more empirical 
work in economics is inherently wrong. But Lakatos’ work delivers arguments 
explaining that a call for more falsification or empirical adequateness needs 
to be substantiated with good reasons why such a move would indeed lead 
to a progressive problem-shift.103 From a Lakatosian perspective, the fruitful-
ness of research programmes (their »progressivity«) is what counts and not 
the empirical status of single components of a theory. So if neoclassical eco-
nomics has domains in which it can be successfully applied and no superior 
alternative is available, it does not matter if the behavioural assumptions are 
descriptively accurate or if the theoretical core is unfalsifiable. For Lakatos, 
progress in science does not happen by following methodological prescrip-
tions of strict falsification or empirical research but by inventing and pursu-
ing fruitful research programmes. Empirical work in economics could be-
come such a research programme, but as of now it has not constructively 
falsified neoclassical economics. this conclusion shows again that Lakatos’ 
methodology is not well suited to decide strictly between competing research 
programmes – however (in addition to Kuhn’s descriptive analysis) it gives 
reasons why critics of a research programme must do more than pointing to 
empirical shortcomings of single components.
2.3.1.4. Holism and Coherentism
As we have seen, Lakatos’s methodology can give a good description of the 
structural composition of economics and by this deliver reasons for the re-
jection of some empirical counterevidence.
digging a bit deeper into epistemological issues, the concept of holism 
shows additional, fundamental problems of empiricism.104 rather than dis-
cussing problems of applicability or counter-arguments against the appli-
cation of empiricist claims (as in previous sections), this section will raise 
fundamental internal difficulties of empiricist positions. It is the last subsec-
tion dealing with the problem that for empiricist claims to make sense, some 
knowledge has to be fixed as unproblematic by convention.
Quine’s paper »two dogmas of Empiricism« is famous for having 
shown quite convincingly what its title promises and therefore becoming 
103 taking Lakatos’ criteria for progress literally (see above), it is highly probable that 
more empirical research would lead to a progressive problem-shift (if one manages 
not to contradict basic findings of the rational-choice approach), because the predic-
tions need only be partially confirmed. this leads to the paradoxical result that two 
competing research programmes can be progressive problem-shifts to each other.
104 note that Lakatos was aware of Quine’s holism. the presentation of the two positions 
has been separated here for the sake of clarity.
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a major threat to the classic empiricist programme. Here is the main line of 
argument:105
Empiricism is based on two dogmatic assumptions which are unjustifia-
ble. the first dogma consists in the clear separability between analytic (un-
informative of the world) statements and synthetic (empirically informative) 
ones. the second dogma, according to Quine, is reductionism, i. e. the belief 
that each meaningful statement must be reducible to a logical construction 
that consists only of terms which refer directly to experience.
Quine argues that the problems with the analytic-synthetic distinction rest 
on difficulties with clarifying the meaning of »analytic«. Without a precise 
understanding of synonymy there is no way of attributing »analytic« to any-
thing else than tautological truths like »all unmarried men are unmarried«. 
the difficulties start when we use synonyms and change the sentence to »all 
bachelors are unmarried«. In order to clarify why this sentence is analytic, we 
need an understanding of synonymy that does not refer to analyticity, and 
Quine aims to show by means of several examples why this is impossible.106
the second dogma, reductionism, falls apart together with the analytic-
synthetic dichotomy: If we cannot define »analytic« in a non-circular way, it 
does not make sense to separate meaning into factual and linguistic compo-
nents. As a result, the idea of reducing the meaning of single sentences to em-
pirical observations becomes absurd. Quine’s fundamental critique led to 
holism, which completely rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction.
Pierre duhem and Quine are among the earliest and best-known repre-
sentatives of holism in philosophy of science. their position is often roughly 
summed up as the »duhem-Quine thesis«,107 which states that it is impossi-
ble to test single components of a theory, because in every test it is always the 
whole theoretical body or even the totality of our beliefs that is at stake.108
A short formalization can clarify this point. the naïve falsificationist view 
can be stated as follows: Whenever a theory t falsely predicts an event E, this 
falsifies the theory. (Formally: (t→E; ~E  ~t)). the holistic view acknowl-
edges that that there are many components of a theory that can be the reason 
for error, such as laws (L), auxiliary hypotheses (H), boundary conditions (c) 
or background convictions (B). If a prediction is wrong, the whole bunch of 
components is falsified: ((L&H&c&B)→E; ~E  ~(L&H&c&B)). An exam-
105 See Quine (1951) for the original source and e. g. Hylton (2002) or nimtz (2003) for 
stimulating recent discussions.
106 the exact course of argumentation is too long to be repeated here. of course there are 
opposing views to Quine. See e. g. carnap (1955), Grice/Strawson (1956) for an inten-
sive discussion. For some newer reflections on the feasibility of the reductionist pro-
gramme, see Beckermann (2001), chapter 12.
107 See duhem (1906) for duhem’s classic article and Quine (1951) for Quine’s part.
108 duhem is refering only to hypotheses in physics, Quine to the whole framework of 
our knowledge. See Gillies (1993), p. 98-116 for a detailed comparison of the duhem 
and Quine theses.
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ple from economics is useful here to illustrate this point: Let’s say a group of 
economists predicts the GdP to grow 3% and instead it falls 3%. the wrong-
ful prediction gives no indication whatsoever regarding the source of error; 
usually, in this case, economists would defend themselves by claiming that 
the boundary conditions have changed from what they initially assumed.
Holism tells us that when a wrongful prediction is made, we cannot know 
if the laws (i. e. the theoretical core) are the source of the error or if we falsely 
assumed boundary conditions to be constant. Hence we are not forced to 
give up the whole theory but can tinker with different boundary conditions 
or auxiliary hypotheses. Quine goes as far as including a change of classical 
logic in the realm of possible alterations, because he is convicted that there 
is no knowledge a priori, not even knowledge about logic.109 If we accept that 
empirical findings cannot determine theory choice, does this mean there is 
no guideline at all how to react to counter-evidence? Quine’s own propos-
als are a bit vague, but supposedly this is the nature of such matters, because 
we cannot and should not expect precise methodological recommendations 
on a global level.110 Quine proposes to change theories in such a way that111
• the totality of our knowledge is only minimally affected and
• if possible is simplified.
the general impact of Quine’s position is the move from a foundationalist to 
a coherentist conception of knowledge, where theories are not seen as »rep-
resenting« some data, but the focus is only on the fit between data and the-
ories.
this means that any system of knowledge draws its plausibility only from 
the mutual support of its sentences and is not relying on anything external 
as a result of Quine’s general rejection of the possibility of a sound empirical 
fundament.112 From this perspective, the demand for more empirical work on 
the microfoundations that Hutchison, Albert and Moss are uttering is short-
sighted, because there is no independent way of knowing whether the mi-
crofoundations are correct: the quality of the microfoundations cannot be 
judged separatly from the outcomes of the (macro-)theory; it is only the co-
herence of the whole theory that can be judged.
109 See Quine (1951), p. 21. See Quine/ullian (1970) for a discussion of some more crite-
ria such as generality and refutability.
110 See especially section 3 for an elaboration of this point.
111 See Quine (1951), p. 25.
112 this leads to a certain circularity in the justification of theories. Gerhard Vollmer 
often speaks of virtuous circles compared to vicious ones. From this point of view, 
the right question was not, if the structure of neoclassical theory is circular, but if the 
circle is a virtuous or a vicious one. See Vollmer (1992), p. 159.
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Empiricist methodologists could defend their criticisms as propositions 
for a new economic theory that fits better into the totality of our knowledge. 
But if this were the case, they should not criticise neoclassical theory for lack-
ing empirical validity but instead check if a more empirical economics would 
be more coherent.113 When arguing for more empirical work, the critics seem 
to have had the outdated dn-model114 of explanation in mind. this model 
rests on the assumption that true scientific statements can be created only 
by correct deduction from true observational statements. this conviction 
may lead to the demand for more empirical work on the basis of economics. 
However, with this assumption of a clear separability of starting conditions 
(observational statements) from outcomes, the dn-model is not capable of 
modelling the complex, holistic structure of scientific theories that makes 
such a separation often impossible.
Upshot:
the duhem-Quine thesis and the resulting holistic conception suggest that 
the methodological discourse should not recommend increased empirical re-
search on the fundamentals but rather encourage fitting the results of theo-
ries into our system of knowledge and increasing their contribution to solv-
ing problems.115 From this perspective, there is no general justification for 
more empirical research at the basis of economics.
2.3.2. ProbLEms with thE EvaLuation oF thEoriEs
In the preceding sections I presented different approaches that deal with the-
ory ladenness as an obstacle to achieving better economic theory merely by 
intensifying empirical research or trying to falsify more thoroughly. In this 
section I shall set such considerations aside and will concentrate on other 
problems that arise in theory appraisal when empiricist criteria are applied.
2.3.2.1. Practical Problems with Empiricism and Falsification in Economics
Firstly and most notably, there are many practical problems with data acqui-
sition and interpretation in the social sciences. to call them »practical prob-
lems« is not to say they are less severe. Quite the contrary: In many cases 
these problems are the very source of subsequent methodological debates. 
113 For an evaluation of a more empirical economics see section 2.4.2.2. Because the 
experimental results are quite heterogeneous it is prima facie quite improbable that 
more coherence can be achieved by means of experimental economics.
114 »dn-model« is the abbreviation of »deductive-nomological model« and is alterna-
tively called Hempel-oppenheim Scheme. See Hempel/oppenheim (1948).
115 See Schröder (2003), p. 235-237 for a discussion employing examples from econom-
ics.
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I will list the most important difficulties with gathering data in economics 
here:116
1. It is impossible to pursue experiments in macroeconomics, therefore 
all empirical work that addresses macro-questions has to rely on statis-
tical analysis.
2. Economics is strongly connected with the behaviour of human beings 
and therefore its »laws« cannot be as robust as laws in the natural sci-
ences can be. Since humans are involved, experiments can be controlled 
to a far lesser degree in the social sciences than they can in the natural 
sciences.
3. Economics deals with complex and highly interdependent systems, 
therefore the »quest for causality« is very hard to pursue, as the ceteris 
paribus conditions are in fact never met and single ceteris paribus laws 
do not help very much for understanding an economy. the complexity 
and interdependence of economic systems make precise unconditioned 
predictions impossible.
Upshot:
It is safe to say that general problems with pursuing experiments, problems 
of controlling experiments properly and the complexity of economic systems 
are major obstacles for empirical results to be as precise in economics as they 
can be in some natural sciences.117 that said, we can turn to the more philo-
sophical arguments against the call for more empirical work in economics.
2.3.2.2. Truth, Verisimilitude and Progress – Semantic Problems
When comparing scientific theories or models it seems at first natural to state 
that the truer theory is the better one. But what does »truer« actually mean, 
if we accept that we can never reach absolute truth? Karl Popper introduced 
the concept of verisimilitude in order to be able to compare the truthlikeness 
of theories:
Given that the truth-content and the falsity-content of two theories t1 and 
t2 are comparable, t2 is said to be nearer to the truth if and only if either:
116 For a good overview of obstacles to falsification (not only »practical« ones) in eco-
nomics see caldwell (1982), p. 238 et sqq.
117 of course other social sciences have similar problems. remarkably, sociologists or 
psychologists already deal with »economic questions« in a way that resembles the de-
mands of the empiricst methodologists. one might say the demands have actually al-
ready been met – just in sciences other than economics. this fact hints at the conclu-
sion that empiricists‘ demands do not lead to a clearly superior way of dealing with 
economic questions.
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(a) the truth-content but not the falsity-content of t2 exceeds that of t1, 
or
(b) the falsity-content of t1, but not its truth-content, exceeds that of t2.
118
this method of computing verisimilitude was purposefully designed to show 
that a theory which has been already falsified can still be better than another 
false theory. In a way this provides an escape from Poppers radical anti-in-
ductivist stance, as good experimental corroboration can now be seen as an 
indication of high verisimilitude.
this view has several problems, though. In the 1970s a number of pa-
pers criticised technical defects in Popper’s definition of verisimilitude that 
emerge when two theories are compared that are known to be false.119 Miller 
and tychý proved that a false theory t2, which exceeds another false theory t1 
in content, is always excessive in both falsity-content and truth-content over 
t2. In such cases, Popper’s conditions can never be met. this is a particularly 
important criticism, as Popper designed his definition explicitly to deal with 
false theories:
ultimately, the idea of verisimilitude is most important in cases where 
we know that we have to work with theories which are at best approxi-
mations — that is to say, theories of which we know that they cannot be 
true. (this is often the case in the social sciences). In these cases we can 
still speak of better or worse approximations to the truth (and we there-
fore do not need to interpret these cases in an instrumentalist sense).120
After accepting the technical criticisms mentioned above, Popper eventually 
retreated to the notion that verisimilitude is better characterised as heuristic 
concept and does not necessarily need to be defined formally.121
there are other difficulties with the concept of verisimilitude, though. 
Firstly, it remains somehow dubious what is actually meant by »truth-con-
tent« by Popper, because truth exists for him only as a regulative idea that is 
never attainable. there seems to be only one way out of this: We take as truth-
content of a theory the predictions of the theory that have not yet been fal-
sified, i. e. the predictions that have been confirmed. the truth-content de-
fined in this sense is then the same as the »degree of corroboration«. Seen like 
this, claiming an increase in truth-content would be equivalent to demanding 
that economists must take falsification more seriously and build theories that 
are more successful in severe empirical tests (see section 2.2.1).
118 Popper (1963), p. 341 (translation by S. d.).
119 See Miller (1974) and tichy (1974). niiniluoto (1998) provides a survey of the discus-
sion that followed.
120 Popper (1953), Popper (1963), p. 343. (translation by S. d.).
121 See Popper (1972), p. 59.
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 But this seems a contradiction to the many assertions of Popper saying 
that corroboration is not to be confused with truth in any way. the radical 
anti-inductivism of Popper is not only an obstacle for talking about true state-
ments or theories – it makes comparison of theories by truth-content impos-
sible.122 A main point of falsificationism is that it discovers falsity and not 
truth, so Popper’s early motivation for developing falsificationism (avoiding 
any form of inductive reasoning) is undermined by the whole project of as-
signing different degrees of verisimilitude to theories.
Even if we neglect these problems for the moment, it is still doubtful 
whether a comparison of theories employing the notion of truth in the above 
sense can be helpful at all. As we have seen, thomas Kuhn offers arguments 
for the incommensurability of paradigms. these arguments can be extended 
to theories: At least in economics most theories are designed to solve a spe-
cific problem or to clarify only a certain part of the economic sphere. there-
fore, direct comparison of truth-content is usually not possible. How can we 
say that aggregate-demand theory has more truth-content or falsity-content 
than e. g. human-capital theory? there is simply no common baseline. di-
rect comparison without any component of choice is only possible with data 
that can be exhaustively described on a one-dimensional scale. certainly 
most scientific theories are not that simple.
Popper’s concept of verisimilitude delivers an unambiguous outcome only 
when the truth-content and the falsity-content of a theory are entirely clear, 
i. e. if and only if from two theories that aim to explain the same phenom-
ena and are equal in logical content, both have been tested on the same in-
stances and one theory succeeds in predicting facts correctly in more cases 
than the other. this raises the question whether increasing truth-likeness is 
the right aim at all.
due to the famous paper on economic methodology by Milton Fried-
man123 and especially Lawrence Boland’s124 interpretation of it, most econo-
mists are roughly familiar with the conception of instrumentalism. this view 
sees science not as a quest for truth but as a useful tool for solving prob-
lems.125 Here, the question of whether a theory is a correct deduction based 
on true premises, as presupposed in the dn-model of scientific explana-
tion, is not what theory appraisal is all about. For instrumentalists, it does 
122 See Grünbaum (1976).
123 See Friedman (1953).
124 See Boland (1979).
125 I take »instrumentalism» as the overarching concept that is defined by the refusal to 
speak about the truth-status of scientific theories or their elements. It includes more 
specific brands such as pragmatism, which defines science as the quest to solve prob-
lems.
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not make sense to speak about »true« premises.126 now, if the usefulness of 
theories for doing a specific job is what counts and not the ontological rela-
tion between reality and the elements of a theory, the discussion about ver-
isimilitude becomes pointless – and so does the demand to increase a theo-
ry’s »truth-content«.
the instrumentalist view is certainly appealing in some respects. For ex-
ample, it provides reasons against empirical work on the basis of economic 
theory: In this view, it does not really matter whether or not humans really 
behave rationally. Instrumentalism leaves the option for »as-if assumptions« 
viz., the assumption that people (on average, not individually) behave as if 
they were rationally deliberating.127 Such as-if assumptions are appraised not 
by their empirical adequacy or truth but by their contribution to the crea-
tion of theories that help to solve specific problems while staying as simple 
as possible. note that scientific explanation is still possible but loses its uni-
versal aspect, because an explanation is now only appraised in respect to a 
certain problem.
An example may serve to clarify this point: neoclassical economic theory 
can explain why prices are higher if markets have a monopolistic structure 
(compared to polypolistic markets). the theory states that it is rational for 
company owners to raise prices in monopolistic markets, because this max-
imises their returns – whereas in polypolistic markets it does not, because 
customers will buy the cheaper products of competitors. Here we have a ra-
tional-choice explanation for the observed behaviour. But there is no claim 
that this explanation firmly rests on empirically observed premises; it is sim-
ply an adequate explanation in relation to the problem in hand.128 the spe-
cific status of rational-choice explanations will be clarified in more detail in 
section 2.4.2.
Upshot:
the mechanical increase of »truthlikeness« is not a convincing methodolog-
ical recipe for economics. Instrumentalism offers an alternative view, which 
leads to good arguments against empiricist methodologies by showing why 
a (seemingly) truer (in the sense of being more empirically adequate) theory 
126 Interestingly, Hempel (as one of the creators of the dn-Model) notices that it is im-
possible to check the truth of single premises of a theory directly. See Hempel (1965), 
p. 112. It is difficult to see the use of the dn-Model once this concession is made.
127 note that the use of as-if assumptions is possible under a realist view of science, too. 
this is the case when as-if assumptions are used for pragmatic reasons and the formu-
la »as-if« expresses epistemic uncertainty, but the usefulness of questions concerning 
their truth is not denied in principle. See Mäki (1998b).
128 this is the point of Bas van Fraasen‘s theory of explanation. Van Fraasen takes into 
consideration that the same facts can demand for different explanations with respect 
to the problems we want to solve. See van Fraassen (1980), p. 143 et sqq. See also sec-
tion 4.1.4.1.
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is not automatically the better one.129 Instrumentalism focuses on problem 
solving and therefore rejects problem-independent assessments of theories. 
this is different from the approach adopted by the empiricist methodolo-
gists as outlined in section 2.2. All those authors make general demands for 
how economic theory has to change and do not allow for the possibility that 
different problems need different solutions. this is especially true for Scott 
Moss’ position, as he wants to build a new, more empirical economics from 
the bottom up.
Mark Blaug’s view could be made consistent with instrumentalism if he 
merely demanded more severe testing to establish how helpful a theory is 
in solving a given problem. But as he demands a general testing of all con-
sequences, and even components of theories, this interpretation is not pos-
sible.
Hans Albert’s position is situated somewhat strangely between those of 
Moss and Blaug, as he inconsistently argues that the way of discovering the 
basic components of a theory does not matter all if the theory is severely 
tested, yet only some pages later he demands an empirical foundation for 
economics.130 Apart from this inconsistency, Albert does not refer to specific 
problems but proposes a general cure for economics. As the arguments in this 
chapter showed, there are internal problems of such general argumentation, 
of which the debate about verisimilitude is only a special case.
2.3.2.3. Diagnosis of Progress – Pragmatic Problems
In addition to instrumentalist arguments, there are other pragmatic reasons 
why more empirical research or more falsification should not be defended 
dogmatically. Even if we could be sure that a more empirical economics 
would lead to better predictions, less empirical neoclassical economics could 
still be defended. this can be done if the instrumentalist view on science is 
pushed a bit farther: We stick to the notion that science is not a quest for 
truth but a quest for solving problems. If science is seen in this way, eco-
nomic reasoning can step in: If scientific theories are means for solving prob-
lems, we can perform something like a cost-benefit analysis when comparing 
theories. this is one main point of what is done in the so-called economics 
of scientific knowledge (ESK), which will be discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 4.1.3. Here it is merely used as a possible counter-argument against the 
empiricist methodologies.
129 note that instrumentalism does not dismiss empirical work in general, nor does it rec-
ommend any specific as-if assumption. It just leaves the question open and recom-
mends seeking the answer in the usefulness of the results of a theory. It’s all about the 
right theory, not the most descriptively correct theory.
130 Albert (1963), p. 375-376. the claim for an empirical basis is a contradiction to Hans 
Albert’s epistemological programme of critical rationalism, which harshly rejects in-
duction as a means of justification.
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From the perspective of the economics of scientific knowledge, the usage 
of a theory or model is seen as a cost factor for solving problems. of course, 
scientific theories do not solve problems directly but are rather the basic tools 
for creating more concrete tools that will then solve the problems.131 Seen 
this way, a theory that would traditionally be called an advancement to the 
established standard because it predicts more precisely is not necessarily so 
if economic problem-orientation replaces empirical success as a criterion: If 
the problem to solve is simple enough, the most advanced theories can be 
overly complex. Even if all scientists agree that Einstein’s theory of relativity 
predicts more precisely than newtonian physics, there still is plenty of use 
for the old, simple theory. the same may hold for the relation between ne-
oclassical economics and approaches based on empirical research.132 From 
an economic point of view it is always the relation of input to output or cost 
to benefit that is decisive. there are no better solutions in an absolute sense, 
but only more economic means for achieving given ends. note that this view 
can encourage fundamental research, even if in some cases it seems improb-
able that fundamental research directly leads to outcomes that help solving 
practical problems, in a similar vein as it is economically advisable to include 
high-risk stocks in a portfolio.133 Fundamental research is of high risk, but in 
rare cases the reward can be very high.
Upshot:
the empirical methodologists discussed above seem to completely ignore 
the economic aspects of scientific research. For them, comparing theories is 
all about the output without regard to the input – or even worse, they see the 
increased empirical adequacy of the input-side (the assumptions) as an end 
in itself. When the aim of science is not exclusively the growth of knowledge 
but the efficiency of promoting it as well, it is hard to reject theories across 
the board for their empirical shortcomings. the aim of »explaining much by 
little« does not seem to be an absurd demand, which is why economic argu-
ments in philosophy of science cannot be as easily neglected as one might 
think at first sight.
2.3.2.4. Problems with the Appraisal of Models
the empiricist methodologists are uncompromisingly arguing for more em-
pirical adequateness – be it directly via using an empirically grounded fun-
dament or indirectly via more serious testing. We have seen that instrumen-
talist and economic perspectives on science can deliver counter-arguments to 
this view. now we consider arguments in favour of unrealistically simple and 
even unfalsifiable models. Such positions can be found in the scientific com-
131 As an example, think of the relation between propositional logic, building a computer 
and using it to solve the problem of red-eye removal in photos.
132 Section 2.4.2 includes a discussion of case studies.
133 See Lütge (2001), p. 62 footnote 82.
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munity that performs computer simulation of social dynamics.134 In contrast 
to Scott Moss’s methodological position, most economists in this field take 
KISS (keep it simple, stupid!)135 as their methodological catchword. they see 
the complexities of descriptively more correct models not merely as disad-
vantageous because of their higher »costs« but because they doubt the basic 
premise that we can learn more in the social sciences if we head towards more 
descriptive adequacy right from the beginning.136 Advocates of the KISS ap-
proach claim that we have no other chance than to simplify radically if we 
want to understand at least some features of complex systems like economics.
thomas Schelling’s models of segregation are a good example to illustrate 
this.137 In these models black and white stones are distributed on a check-
erboard, symbolizing the black and white inhabitants of a (north-Ameri-
can) city. now a certain threshold-ratio of stones in the neighbourhood that 
have a different colour from the stone under consideration is defined. If this 
threshold-ratio is reached, the stone under consideration is said »to feel un-
comfortable« and moves away from its original position. the astonishing re-
sult of such a simplistic model was that even if the individual threshold-ratio 
requires only 30% of stones in the neighbourhood having the same colour, 
complete segregation of the colours is the result after a few rounds of mov-
ing stones.
Such basic effects can get easily be lost sight of if a much more accurate 
and less schematic model is applied. the main argument of the KISS advo-
cates points to the core of the idea of modelling: simplification is necessary 
for understanding. We make models in order to reduce the complexity of the 
real world, not to mirror it. of course, good models do not neglect the com-
plexities of the systems they try to represent, but striving towards high ac-
curacy in every aspect means nothing less than the rejection of theorising – 
which can result in a mere collection of facts that may be descriptively highly 
accurate but rarely help in explaining matters.138 this is an argument for why 
the call for more descriptive accuracy on the basis of economics cannot be 
sustained as per-se argument. the appropriate level of abstraction depends 
134 For a more detailed discussion see Pyka/deichsel (2009). See section 5.1.4 for a case 
study.
135 See e. g. Axelrod (1997), p. 5.
136 KISS advocates do not oppose the idea of adding more empirical details in later ver-
sions of a model. A nice example for this can be found in the literature about the evo-
lution of cooperation that started with a simple tit-for-tat model, which was thereaf-
ter refined in various respects. See Ball (2004), chapter 17-18 for an overview.
137 See Schelling (1971) for the now-classic article.
138 the term »explanation« is itself under philosophical discussion. the covering-law 
model of explanation is generally considered outdated due to several difficulties. I 
do not wish to enter into this philosophical discussion here, but refer to the above-
mentioned pragmatic approach to explanation of Bas van Fraassen, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail in section 4.1.4.1.
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on the aim of the model. the understanding of fundamental mechanisms is 
the aim, the KISS method still seems the approach of choice. Highly com-
plex models may (sometimes) accurately generate output, but they do not en-
able scientists to understand how it comes about, because complex models 
often develop their own life and produce artefacts that makes them difficult 
to interpret. A famous example is Sugarscape, which does not even aim to re-
produce a real society, but is more like a sandbox toolkit for social scientists. 
In an elaborate version the Sugarscape world becomes unpredictable and can 
lead to greatly differing outcomes at the macro-level, even when started with 
the same initial conditions.139
the neoclassical standard model of supply and demand is probably bet-
ter suited for analysing basic market structures than a model that tries to cap-
ture human behaviour with psychological methods. In many cases, however, 
approaches different from neoclassical theory might be much more useful. 
If institutional settings are at issue, some standard neoclassical models can 
hardly be used to make a point at all, because perfect competition is usually 
assumed. But the point here is not defending or attacking neoclassical theory 
but the plausibility of an uncompromising methodological call for less-ab-
stract models. It seems this criticism would lose its thrust if it would account 
more systematically for the problems that are actually addressed by neoclas-
sical models.140
All this suggests why it is not useful to talk about the »right« level of ab-
straction from a global point of view, and to consider that »everything de-
pends on the problem«. this claim leads to the obligation to specify in ad-
vance the domain of a model. this can help precluding over-interpretations 
of what may be little more than an artefact of the formal specialities of a 
model.
Even if it is accepted that high descriptive accuracy is not applicable to 
abstract models, the outcomes of models must be hooked somehow to the 
empirical data. take Schelling’s segregation model again as an example: It is 
tough to falsify the results of that simulation, since it is based on so many 
intentionally wrong assumptions: People do not live on checkerboards and 
their decision to move houses is most certainly influenced by far more (and 
more complex) reasons than what is assumed in the model. Hence it would 
not be very astonishing if the simulation predicted behaviour that is com-
pletely remote from what we see in actual north-American cities, e. g. no seg-
regation at all. When simulating social phenomena with the KISS approach, 
one is bound to a confirmationist methodology, developing simple models 
139 See Epstein/Axtell (1996), p. 92 footnote 32.
140 Many neoclassical models can be criticized for lacking honesty when it comes to the 
problems they are dealing with. See section 5.1. Looking more carefully at the possi-
ble misfit between the claims of a theory and their fulfilment seems a promising task 
for future methodological research.
592.3. Problems of empiricism and falsificationism
that reproduce stylised facts of the real world and offer a possible partial ex-
planation for them.141 critical testing steps in at another point, namely when 
confirmation is already achieved. only then it is possible to test the robust-
ness of the model by changing parameters like board-size, form of neigh-
bourhood, simultaneity of moving and the like. If the model survives such 
tests, further testing of the basic assumptions is not possible, as asking peo-
ple if they have certain racial-thresholds in mind when choosing houses does 
probably not lead to honest answers. Such restrictions hold for a large part of 
economic modelling, where often the postulation of »invisible hand mecha-
nisms« is the goal. In these cases it goes against the very point of the models 
to ask for empirical grounding of the basic assumptions.
Upshot:
If one accepts simulations following the KISS principle as scientifically use-
ful, neither falsificationist (like Blaug) nor basis-empiricist (like Moss) con-
victions can be kept up. these methodologists cannot deal with the explana-
tory status of KISS models, which merely aim at offering possible mechanisms 
for social dynamics. KISS models are on the one hand decidedly simple, and 
therefore far away from empirical adequacy, and on the other hand commit-
ted to reproduce stylised facts, which is adverse to any falsificationist meth-
odology.142
2.3.2.5. Difficulties with Assessing the Usefulness of A Priori Reasoning
the empiricist methodologies are unsuited not only for appraising abstract 
models but for the evaluation of a priori reasoning as well. these days it is 
widely accepted in science theory that there is no such a thing as synthetic 
knowledge a priori, i. e. there is no way of gaining knowledge about the world 
independently from empirical research.143 this is the main reason why the 
methodologists presented in section 2.2 are arguing for more empirical and 
less formal (mathematical) research. I shall not try to take on the heroic task 
of defending a true aprioristic methodology here. But even if I do not be-
lieve that it is possible to gain knowledge about the world by purely formal 
deductions, there may be other justifications for them. If these justifications 
are sufficiently convincing, this would be a substantial counter-argument to 
the empiricist point of view that uncompromisingly asks for more empirical 
research.
In fact, it seems quite reasonable to tone down the wholesale condem-
nation of »a-priori speculation« a bit. not everything that lacks empirical 
content is without any new meaning: If neoclassical economics is seen as 
an empty formal system, the theorems that can be proven in that system 
of course add nothing to that system; they are tautologies. Yet they may tell 
141 this line of argument will be filled with more detail in section 4.1.4.3.
142 See Arnold (2007).
143 A famous contrary position is held by Ludwig von Mises. See Mises (1933).
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us something which we did not know before. rejecting this view means re-
jecting the whole task of logics and mathematics and adopting the view that 
we need no theorems at all, because strictly speaking it’s all in the axioms – 
which would surely be an absurd position. Economics could be considered 
nothing else than economically interpretable mathematics and justified as 
such. And indeed, this seems to be a characterisation of economics that 
many economists would agree upon.144
the practical usefulness of formal deduction can go further than just ex-
ploring theorems from a set of axioms. the famous impossibility theorems 
of social-choice theory can be used to show which properties of electoral pro-
cedures cannot be implemented together at the same time. Here the logical 
impossibility has real practical relevance – and it does not matter how strict 
the rationality assumptions underlying the deductions are, because the more 
strict those assumptions are, the more generally applicable the impossibility 
theorems become.145
there is a third way of justifying »empty theorizing«: Mathematic the-
ories can provide an extremely useful structure for analysing data. Fisher’s 
equation of exchange is a good example for this: It is empirically completely 
empty, but surely provides a nice framework for collecting and sorting data.146
Upshot:
there are many ways to justify purely formal work, which shows that the em-
piricist methodologists of economics are unjustifiably dogmatic in their at-
tacks against it.
It must be emphasised that the reasons put forward here cannot be used 
to defend the view that we can learn something about the economy by look-
ing at empirically empty equations.147 It is certainly true that we need empir-
ical work for that, but it would be dishonest to claim that such work is not 
performed at all.148 As I will show in the succeeding section, there are already 
many researchers who are trying to overcome the empirical shortcomings of 
rational-choice models or are working on the integration of institutional set-
tings with neoclassical economics.
144 See Blaug (1998) and rosenberg (1992).
145 See Kelly (1988), p. 60.
146 See Morgan (1999), p. 359 et sqq. and Hausman (1992b), p. 26.
147 It is a different question if we can learn normatively from such models.
148 of course there is a lot of purely theoretical work in economics which cannot be test-
ed at all. But again, the question of a disproportion between empirical and theoret-
ical works cannot be decided a priori by methodological speculation. Where do the 
empiricist methodologists get their knowledge about the right way to do science? 
If they want to be consistent, they need empirical research for this as well. In sec-
tion 4.1.4.1 I will present Larry Laudan’s view that incorporates the above demand.
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2.4. ProgrEss in Economics – what roLE doEs EmPiricism PLay?
In the preceding sections we have observed some problems of the empiri-
cist positions outlined in section 2.2. now, given the passionate pleas against 
»empty formalism« in economics on the one hand and the difficulties to es-
tablish a truly empiricist methodology on the other, it is time to have a look 
at some case studies and see how the relation between theoretical works and 
empirical research manifests itself in the actual course of economic research 
in time. the first case study gives a longitudinal overview of economic-growth 
theory and its main line of progress during the last sixty years. the second 
case study presents two contrasting viewpoints on the rationality assumption 
in economics. In both case studies I will not give a full-blown description 
but will restrict myself to the level of detail that is necessary for a methodo-
logical discussion.
2.4.1. casE study macroEconomics: growth thEory
Economic growth is a central topic for macroeconomic research. today it is 
common to take the so-called Harrod-domar models as a starting point for 
modern growth theory.149 In these models investments are seen as the driv-
ing force for economic growth, as they generate additional demand via multi-
plying effects. of course, investments increase the capital stock as well, which 
enlarges the productive capacity of an economy. the whole trick of Harrod-
domar models is computing the rate at which income and consumption 
must grow for the capital stock to be working at full capacity, i. e. all produced 
goods can be sold at the market.150 As one can easily see, there is no explana-
tion for growth in these models; they merely define equilibrium conditions 
in a purely formal way.151
the next step in growth theory began with two seminal papers by robert 
Solow.152 technically speaking153, his model uses a cobb-douglas production 
function with labour and capital as production factors, plus an external neu-
tral technology variable. the assumption of perfect competition is used for 
149 See Harrod (1939) and domar (1946) for the classic articles. due to the structural sim-
ilarities of both concepts, the term »Harrod-domar models« was established. note, 
however, that the causal relations between investments and growth are different in the 
two papers.
150 For a short formal demonstration, see section 7.2.
151 this is exactly Albert’s claim; see Albert (1957), p. 387.
152 See Solow (1956) and Solow (1957).
153 readers which are uneasy with economic terminology may skip this paragraph; the 
essential point is summarised afterwards.
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estimating the production elasticity of the factors labour and capital: At per-
fect competition, standard microeconomic theory predicts a payment to the 
factors that is equal to their marginal productivity. Given that, one can use 
the proportion of interest rate to wage rate in order to estimate the produc-
tion elasticity of the factors. now, if the production elasticity of each factor 
plus the amount of economic growth in total and the growth of the factors 
labour and capital is known, the technology variable can be computed as re-
sidual.154 By doing exactly that, Solow has shown that the residual is responsi-
ble for 87.5% of economic growth.155
Speaking less technically, Solow’s theory tries to explain growth in output 
by growth of the factors labour and capital, both having decreasing returns, 
which is the reason why the residual in Solow’s model – which is called »tech-
nical knowledge« – is the decisive factor for economic growth in the long run.
As one can easily see, Solow’s theory does not have much empirical con-
tent either, as the biggest part of economic growth is »explained« by a resid-
ual factor. on the other hand, it clearly contradicts the Harrod-domar hy-
pothesis of the strong relation between investment and growth, because in 
the Solow model there are decreasing returns to capital growth.
If one assumes technical knowledge to be a public good, the Solow model 
is the basis for the so-called convergence hypothesis, which says that less-de-
veloped economies will tend to grow relatively faster than economies that 
have already accumulated a high level of capital because of the decreasing re-
turns on capital in the cobb-douglas production function. Even if we accept 
that the Solow model does not deliver an explanation for economic growth, 
it cannot be denied that its basic structure is still present in much of the re-
cent advances in growth theory that have tried to dig deeper into the mystery 
of the »Solow residual«.
the so-called »new Growth theory« was the next big thing in growth the-
ory.156 Here, human capital is considered a part of the factor of capital, which 
has increasing (instead of decreasing) marginal gains – thus making growth 
in the long run possible. Human capital is now seen as the main source for 
technical progress. Additionally, »spillover-effects« are said to boost growth: 
technical advances are rarely only useful for the aim they were originally de-
signed for, but often they can be used in circumstances the inventors did not 
think of. If this happens, knowledge can »spill« across industry sectors and 
countries and thereby may cause productivity gains that were not intended 
by the inventor, resulting in additional economic growth.157 those spillover-
154 For a brief formal demonstration see section 7.3.
155 See Solow (1957), p. 320.
156 See romer (1986) for a classic paper See Arnold (1995) for a good overview of subse-
quent developments.
157 Some recent publications are critical of the spillover claim when it is used too gener-
ally. See Pyka/Gilbert/Ahrweiler (2009).
632.4. Progress in economics – what role does empiricism play
effects lead on the other hand to an underinvestment into research and de-
velopment of private firms, because they make technical knowledge partly a 
public good. Still, the crucial element that makes new Growth theory differ-
ent from its predecessors is the integration of positive feedbacks that help es-
caping the decreasing returns of capital as postulated in Solow’s basic model. 
(those positive feedbacks were initially subjected to heavy criticism, because 
they can make economies inherently unstable.)
A further argument often put forward in new Growth theory stresses the 
differing preconditions across countries for the usage of specific technolo-
gies. this argument is headed against the assumption of technical know-how 
to be commonly usable knowledge and allows for different levels of techni-
cal progress in different countries. It offers an explanation for why the con-
vergence hypothesis does not hold generally: poorer economies might not be 
able to use the newest technical knowledge, because they don’t have the pre-
requisites to use it.
the most recent research in growth theory lifts the discussion about the 
applicability of knowledge in different countries to an even higher level. the 
approach is best characterised by the catchwords »social infrastructure« or 
»new institutional growth theory« and not only tries to explain the economic 
performance of a country by the amount of its capital, labour and technical 
knowledge but also takes the formal and informal institutional environment 
into account.158 Empirical studies confirm the hypothesis that institutions 
are impressively important for growth.159 Additionally, econometric studies 
show that Solow’s convergence hypothesis holds for countries with similar 
quality of institutions.160 the question of where »good institutions« that cre-
ate economic growth come from is tentatively answered in some recent stud-
ies, but it cannot be said (yet) that this really is the next big step in growth 
theory.161
2.4.1.1. Discussion
the development of growth theory is a nice example for discussing empiri-
cist methodologies. Hutchison, Albert, Blaug and Moss would all agree that 
Harrod-domar models are to be dismissed. So would economists today. But 
what does this tell us? After all, Harrod-domar models historically led to the 
Solow model, and the basic structure of this model still provides the back-
ground for recent developments that incorporate empirical research on in-
stitutions. this shows that it is not really helpful to »reject« certain models 
from a methodological point of view when there is no alternative offered: 
Solow’s early model was almost empirically empty but nonetheless provided 
158 See Jones (2002) for an excellent introduction.
159 See e. g. Leschke (2003).
160 See e. g. Knack (1996).
161 See e. g. Acemoglu/James (2006) and a discussion in section 5.1.2.
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a good structural basis for further research, which added empirical content 
by developing and testing theories about new factors and preconditions for 
economic growth. It is important to note that this did not happen due to the 
empiricist criticism of economics, which was largely ignored by economists. 
rather, the growth theorists noted by themselves that Solow’s basic model 
was not the end of the story and that more detailed research on the residual 
called »technical knowledge« seemed the most fruitful way to proceed. As 
shown above, they added empirical content to the Solow residual, but they 
did not do it in the way the empiricist methodologists suggested: they nei-
ther changed the basic behavioural assumptions nor tried to falsify old the-
ories by severe tests. rather, they devised new theories and searched for em-
pirical confirmation.
A similar development has been going on in other fields of economics 
as well. Mark Blaug presents several cases where economic models were ad-
justed to empirical findings.162 A good example for progress in this sense can 
be found in the debate about the Phillips curve. In its best-known form the 
Phillips curve establishes a fixed relation between unemployment and infla-
tion.163 due to theoretical criticism by Friedman and Phelps and its confirma-
tion during the times of stagflation in the seventies, the classic Philips curve is 
now considered falsified, at least for long-run relationships.164 But similar to 
growth theory, the Philips curve provided a useful basis for further research, 
as the observed short-run relationship between unemployment and infla-
tion called for theoretical clarification. this led to models of the labour mar-
ket that integrate variables such as power, information asymmetries, market 
rigidities, institutional variables, prospect formation and many more. How-
ever, the rationality postulate as theoretical foundation was only touched 
very rarely, and the old concept of the Philips curve provided the backdrop 
for much of the later research. this is similar to the development in growth 
theory in which the early Solow model still provides the basis for recent de-
velopments.
Upshot:
We can learn at minimum three things from this case study:
1. »Empty« models can provide a useful structure and analytical instru-
ments for further research; therefore it is often not helpful to reject 
them for their lack of empirical content.
2. Economists have been digging into the empirical details and changed 
their models thereafter. At least some former proposals are now consid-
ered to be falsified due to empirical research.
162 See Blaug (1990), p. 5.
163 See Samuelson/Solow (1960).
164 See Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968).
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3. In macroeconomics there seems to be no tendency to refrain from the 
rationality assumption, even if better descriptive accuracy is the aim.
these conclusions show that, on the one hand, accepting the basis-empiricist 
methodologies could have been harmful to economics, because this would 
have stopped the invention of models that now form the basis of whole re-
search programmes. on the other hand, one can see that economics is not 
as hopelessly non-empirical as some critics describe it. rather, by concen-
trating on the old, basic models the critics seem to forget later developments 
that, even if they are still based on the old framework, add empirical content 
in several ways.
the question of whether or not the reluctance of most economists to 
abandon the rationality assumption was a good move will be dealt with in 
the next section.
2.4.2. casE study microEconomics: thE status oF thE rationaLity 
assumPtion in Economics
the usage of the rationality assumption is an important issue when tack-
ling the question of how much attention economists pay to empirical ob-
servation. It is important to note that the rationality assumption can be un-
derstood in two fundamentally different ways: normative and descriptive. 
Both cases need further clarification of what is exactly meant by »rational-
ity«, as there is a wide range of possible interpretations. In economics, all in-
terpretations have in common that they define rationality as the capacity to 
choose the best means for a given end, which is often abbreviated as means-
ends rationality.165 the stereotypical picture of the economic man concen-
trates on the short-term maximisation of money. However, I am not aware of 
any economist who would defend this view of the economic man, neither as 
a normative nor as a descriptive model.166 If the rationality principle is inter-
preted normatively we cannot run into empirical problems, because what is has 
no bearing whatsoever on what ought to be.167 this is why the normative inter-
165 this view of rationality manifests itself most precisely in rational choice models that 
work with an explicit micro-calculus.
166 note that a strictly short-term maximising economic man isn’t even able to make in-
vestments. It seems this view of the economic man is nothing more than a straw man 
used by its critics.
167 of course it may be the case that a rationality criterion is normatively ill-suited for em-
pirical reasons – e. g. if it poses demands that are unachievable by human beings. this 
is, however, a discourse that is completely remote to the evaluation of economic mod-
els.
2. Empiricism and falsificationism66
pretation can be ignored in further lines of argument, because we are discuss-
ing theory evaluation of empirical scientific theories.168
Hence, the relevant quarrels take place on the descriptive side, where two 
opposed schools of thought are each claiming to have the superior concept. 
the first school tries to find rational explications for any kind of behaviour 
and so pushes rational choice to its very limits by accepting it to be an empir-
ically empty concept. the second school tries to establish basic behavioural 
principles by means of systematic and experimental observation of human 
conduct. the two opposed schools of thought are hence the perfect candi-
dates for a case study that tries to clarify the relationship between theory and 
empirical research in economics.
2.4.2.1. The Rational Choice Approach
Gary Becker became famous for assuming rational behaviour in circum-
stances where no one before him thought it could make sense. His work is a 
good example of how research can be based on an interpretation of the ra-
tionality principle that does not forbid any observable behaviour.169 Partic-
ularly interesting examples are Becker’s models of the family, where he of-
fers rational reconstructions of marriage, childbirth and even the education 
of children.170 In these models, families are represented as a kind of little fac-
tory – a multiperson unit producing basic goods such as meals, health, skills, 
children, self-esteem and others out of market goods plus time, skills and 
knowledge of its members.171 As there is a huge literature about Becker’s ap-
proach available172 I shall outline only one model and omit the technical de-
tails.
In this model, Becker explicitly concentrates on how parents form the 
preferences of their children – which is quite an unusual thing for an econo-
168 note, however, that a big share of work in economics is normative in nature, e. g. re-
form proposals that are based on libertarian convictions. James Buchanan justifies 
the usage of the economic man in his constitutional economics as a helpful worst-
case scenario and thereby escapes criticism of its empirical shortcomings. See e. g. 
Brennan/Buchanan (1985), p. 69.
169 Becker’s own terminology may be sometimes misleading in this respect. In the fa-
mous paper of Stigler and Becker »de Gustibus non Est disputandum« he states ex-
plicitly that humans act according to the principle of rational utility maximisation. 
See Stigler/Becker (1977), p. 76. this suggests the rationality principle to be observa-
ble by watching the actions of people, which is surely not what Becker intends to say.
170 A rather short sketch of the model must suffice here. After all, the basic idea and not 
the mind-boggling details are of interest for the question at issue. A detailed explo-
ration can be found in Becker (1991); a short introduction can be found in Becker 
(1992).
171 See e. g. Becker (1992), p. 38 et sqq.
172 See Pies (1998) for a detailed discussion.
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mist to do, as preferences are normally seen as given.173 the basic idea behind 
Becker’s model is pure common-sense thinking: the model builds on the 
idea that preferences are shaped in the early years of our life. thus, parents 
have the power to influence the preferences of their children and will ration-
ally try to teach them love and a sense of duty towards the parents, if parents 
think they may need support from their children later. If parents succeed in 
this, they can establish a very efficient solution to the problem of non-bind-
ing agreements in that domain.
With his model Becker offers an explanation for a part of preference for-
mation and additionally gives an argument that makes it easier to accommo-
date the altruistic behaviour of parents with the assumption of rational util-
ity maximisation.174 If parents believe in the bonds to their children, they will 
invest more into their education and spend less money on pension schemes. 
on the other hand, social security systems have big effects on family struc-
ture, as they fundamentally change the incentives to invest in the relationship 
to one’s children (and their education, health etc.).
Instead of going into further details, I will add a characterisation of Beck-
er’s general approach. Becker himself stresses more than once that it is the 
approach that distinguishes economics from other sciences and that there 
simply is no scope to which economic analysis can be restricted.175 For Gary 
Becker, economic analysis is equivalent to untangling the costs that guide 
aggregated human behaviour in specific contexts.176 By this, Becker offers a 
purely methodological justification of the rational-choice approach: He tries 
to reconstruct changes in aggregate rates as rational reaction to changes in 
restrictions (and not in preferences177) as they are perceived by the individ-
ual. this does not include the claim that real persons are rational or that their 
preferences do not change. Becker is merely committed to Popper’s view that 
protecting the rationality assumption from falsification is more fruitful for 
theoretical learning in the social sciences and that falsifying it would be easy, 
but pointless.178 Becker’s approach is imperialist in the sense that he deals 
with many problems that were traditionally dealt with in sociology, social-
173 In that sense, this approach is a turning away from Stigler/Becker (1977), too. See Pol-
lak (2003), p. 11. For an overview of the described model, see Becker (1992), p. 49.
174 Interestingly, the model leaves room for »real« altruism, which is specifically includ-
ed by the variable »a«. See Becker (1992), p. 53.
175 See e. g. Becker (1978), S. 3.
176 See Pies (1998), p. 16 et sqq.. note that in contrast to some critical views (See Law-
son (2004a)), this definition does not make economics a »theory of everything« be-
cause, firstly, it is highly dependent on other sciences for making adequate guesses 
about non-monetary costs; and, secondly, it can neither deal with all questions that 
concern individual behaviour nor deal with normative issues or structural questions.
177 note that the preferences of children in the model described above are actually re-
strictions imposed on the children by their parents.
178 For the best known manifesto of this view, see Stigler/Becker (1977).
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psychology or law, but it is not imperialist in the sense that it aims at occupy-
ing these fields of research: As noted above, for Becker there are no natural 
limits of scope for sciences, but sciences are rather defined by their methods.179
to sum up, one could say that for Becker the status of the rationality as-
sumption in the social sciences is equivalent to the status of the causality as-
sumption in the natural sciences. It is not an empirical sentence, but rather 
the basic assumption needed to talk about laws and build models that can 
help understanding social dynamics.180
I shall leave it at this small draft of Gary Becker’s work, since it is suffi-
cient to see the basic line of argument he is putting forward and how he is 
using shadow-prices, implicit market-mechanisms and the consideration of 
psychological factors in order to apply economic theory to new areas of re-
search.181 In the last twenty years it became clear that Becker’s imperialist 
use of the rational-choice approach has become an impressive success in the 
sense that it has attracted a critical mass of followers.182
2.4.2.1.1 Discussion
At first sight Gary Becker’s approach seems to be the exact opposite of what 
the empiricist methodologists are demanding, as it seems not to make eco-
nomics more empirical but rather protect it from all empirical disturbances. 
A more careful look reveals that this is not true: Becker in fact fulfils a cen-
tral claim of Hans Albert by his extension of economics to other subjects: He 
does not do »pure« economics, because he integrates factors other than goods 
and prices in his analysis; more precisely, he extends the concept of goods 
and prices, which allows him to apply it to non-monetary factors as well. All 
choice-problems can now be reconstructed as cost-benefit problems. With 
his economic imperialism, Gary Becker at the same time confirms and contra-
dicts Albert’s assertion that pure economics is to be rejected. He contradicts 
this thesis in that he turns every analysed situation into a purely economic 
one by converting it into a cost-benefit problem. this makes the core of eco-
nomic theory empirically empty in Popper’s sense, as it no longer forbids any 
kind of behaviour.183 But this is not true for specific models (as Becker pro-
179 See Becker (1978), p. 15. consequently, Becker firmly encourages other sciences to be 
imperialist in his sense as well, as this increases competition.
180 See Kirchgaessner (2004), p. 5.
181 Gary Becker analyses marriage, crime and even drug addiction as rational decision 
problems (among others). See Becker (1978).
182 Books like Freakonomics are clearly inspired by Becker’s approach and have become 
popular bestsellers in recent times. See Levitt/dubner (2005). Vromen (2009) gives a 
list of seven books of a similar nature, which proves the impact of Becker’s approach. 
Even a sub-discipline of sociology is now using rational-choice models. See Hed-
ström/Stern (2008).
183 As discussed in section 2.3.1.1 Popper allows for unfalsifiable or »metaphysical« as-
sumptions.
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vides them), which can predict outcomes very clearly and unambiguously 
(and possibly falsely) – when the postulated restrictions under which the eco-
nomic agents act in certain situations are precisely specified. contrary to the 
empiricist criticism, the success of available models using this methodology 
shows that the fruitfulness of a research programme does not depend on its 
empirical basis.184
If »pure« economics is considered to deal exclusively with market goods 
and their prices, Gary Becker confirms the thesis that pure economics would 
be poor economics. For Becker, economics cannot be a pure »astronomy of 
goods« but has to include factors other than monetary ones – such as time 
constraints or social norms – even if one aims at analysing classic economic 
situations.185
When discussing the appropriateness of rational-choice reasoning it is im-
portant to notice the status of this kind of modelling. Gary Becker does not 
promote the thesis that his models can yield predictions for single individ-
uals, nor does he claim that individuals can calculate in a perfectly rational 
way or would verbalise their reasons for acting in a way that corresponds to 
rational-choice models.186 the models merely refer to representative individ-
uals that serve for explaining changes in macro-rates. this is an important re-
striction, as the aggregate nature of those models only allows for analysing 
averages as talking about »representative individuals« – neglecting to con-
sider how macro-rates come about and what the distribution behind them 
looks like.187
the fact that rational-choice models refer only to changes in macro-rates 
and do not claim to represent the way actual humans decide gives an im-
portant hint as to why empiricist criteria are difficult to apply to rational-
choice models: the problems with the appraisal of models as discussed in 
section 2.3.2.4, with the example of thomas Schelling’s segregation models, 
arise immediately.
Upshot:
Becker’s models show how we can make sense of aggregate human behaviour 
using the rational-choice paradigm, even if the assumptions underlying some 
models may seem counterintuitive at first sight.188 If one takes current psy-
chological research as a standard, Becker’s models are easily falsified on an 
individual basis. But compared to most other neoclassical models, Becker’s 
184 I will discuss views that refuse to see any success in mainstream economic models 
later, in section 4.2.1.3.
185 See Becker (1992), p. 38.
186 See Becker (1978), p. 4.
187 If the data does not follow a normal distribution, but e. g. has two peaks, analyses 
using average data may be beside the point.
188 this, of course, leads to the fact that it is possible to derive absurd consequences from 
such models. See e. g. Bergmann (1995) or rogeberg (2004).
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models are closer to psychological research, as they extend the scope of ra-
tional choice to non-monetary factors that were previously only rarely taken 
into consideration. By this, additional factors can be integrated into the mod-
els even if they still contradict current psychological knowledge in some re-
spects. Such contradictions can be justified by the fact that every model is 
made to clarify one specific problem and cannot be applied outside this do-
main. Becker’s claim is not to be empirically accurate in every sense but to 
find systematic driving forces of specific situations by analysing how rational 
persons would react to them. Becker’s position is here very similar to Pop-
per’s concerning the rationality principle:189 taken literally it is false, but it is 
a very useful paradigm – and there seems to be no alternative of similar scope 
in the social sciences.190
2.4.2.2. The Experimental Approach
the experimental approach became widely accepted as a part of economic re-
search in 2002 (if not earlier), when Vernon Smith and daniel Kahnemann 
won the nobel prizes in economics.191 this approach was first introduced 
the 1950s, when Herbert Simon came up with the concept of »bounded ra-
tionality«, which models human beings not as maximisers but as satisfic-
ers. the response from neoclassical thinkers was, of course, to reinterpret Si-
mon’s satisficing as maximising under the computational restrictions of the 
human brain.192
Much of experimental economics is concerned with falsifying (or 
confirming!193) the assumption of the economic man as a rational short-term 
income maximiser.194 Additionally, experimental economists deal with the 
question of how humans really behave when confronted with several stand-
ardised choice situations and which motives drive them. these are the same 
questions that the empiricist methodologists in section 2.2 were concerned 
with. In order to make clear how experiments can be conducted in econom-
ics, it is convenient here to outline a game that has been the basis for many 
experiments in economics: the so-called ultimatum game.
189 See Popper (1967), p. 365.
190 See Becker (1992), p. 52. I shall pursue and intensify the discussion of whether or not 
he is justified in this in section 4.1.4.2.
191 Still, in 1998 Mark Blaug remarked on the difficulties experimental economics strug-
gled with. See Blaug (1998). A good textbook introduction to experimental econom-
ics is Kagel/roth (1995). A nice comparison between standard economics and exper-
imental economics can be found in Schoefer (2005).
192 See Simon (1955) and Simon (1987) for classic papers.
193 In recent times the criticism has arisen that much of the research in experimental eco-
nomics is merely an attempt to induce the expected rational behaviour under labora-
tory conditions. See Güth/Kliemt (2003).
194 note that in this section I am necessarily referring to a non-tautological view of the 
economic man or »rationality«.
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In this game, Player 1 has the task of dividing a given amount of money 
between himself and Player 2. Player 2’s only option is to accept the offer or 
reject it. If he dismisses the offer, neither player gets the money. now, accord-
ing to standard rational-choice theory – which focuses on short-term income 
maximisation – Player 2 will accept every offer that is greater than zero, be-
cause he gets an advantage from doing so. As Player 1 is able to anticipate 
such a reasoning, it seems rational for him to offer only the tiniest possible 
fraction to Player 2, because this maximises his expected income from the 
game.195
Experimental results showed, however, that real human behaviour dif-
fers substantially from what standard rational-choice theory predicts: Player 
1 claims on average only two thirds for himself196 and Player 2 rejects offers 
lower than 20% of the total sum with a probability of 0.5.197 results like these 
often lead to the conclusion that humans are not egoistic maximisers but 
have a preference for fair distributions. Several other games produced results 
that can be interpreted in a similar way.198 In every experiment some partic-
ipants clearly diverged from what rational-choice theory would predict, but 
a large part of the actions observed still could be interpreted as maximising 
the monetary output.199 It is important to stress the heterogeneity of the ob-
served behaviour here, which makes it hard to derive general conclusions 
about human behaviour from such experiments.200
Experimental economists offer various different explanations for behaviour 
that contradicts monetary maximisation, but most of them can be summa-
rised as follows:201
• Fairness/altruism: Humans do not maximise their own utility exclu-
sively but have genuine preferences for fair distributions or the well-be-
ing of others. Especially reciprocal behaviour often occurs in the exper-
iments and is seen as a key to the resolution of social dilemmas.202
• Intrinsic motivation: Material incentives are not the only sources of 
motivation for humans. Sometimes an act is performed »for its own 
195 Since this is played as a one-shot game, there is no reason to invest into future coop-
eration.
196 See Güth/Schmittberger/Schwarze (1982), p. 375 et sqq.
197 See Fehr/Schmidt (2001), p. 5.
198 See Schoefer (2005) section 4.3.1.2.
199 See Schoefer (2005), p. 42.
200 Parts of evolutionary economics focus on the heterogeneity of human behaviour as 
a necessary condition for evolutionary processes to start. However, those theories do 
not look for a general theory of human behaviour but focus on the effects of diversity 
on the results of evolutionary processes. See nelson/Winter (2002) for an overview.
201 See Frey/Benz (2001), p. 17 et sqq.
202 See e.g Bowles/Gintis (2002) and Falk (2003).
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reasons« if something is thought to be »right« completely separate from 
utility calculations.
Even if this short introduction neglects a large number of experiments and 
interpretations, it should suffice for grasping the way experimental econo-
mists do their research – which enables us to begin a methodological dis-
cussion.203
2.4.2.2.1 Discussion
It is easy to see that experimental economists are moving in the opposite di-
rection from Gary Becker and his notorious defence of rational choice: In-
stead of protecting the concept of the economic man from falsification by 
making it a tautological, heuristic principle, experimental economists try to 
confute it with their experiments.204 this leads to models that differ from the 
standard models e. g. by introducing fairness or intrinsic motivation as ad-
ditional preference. If such models are interpreted as confutation of the ra-
tional-choice approach, this view ignores the Beckerian interpretation of the 
rationality principle as a methodological rule and not an empirical state-
ment. In fact, Becker’s models (and those of his followers) are eager to inte-
grate new factors that influence human behaviour or offer explanations that 
provide egoistic reconstructions for what seems altruistic at first sight.205
A constructive refutation that respects the rational-choice methodology 
would consist in establishing a different behavioural assumption of similar 
generality. However, up to now experimental economics has mostly analysed 
human behaviour in certain precisely defined situations – and even then it 
has not discovered universally valid behavioural patterns but rather quite het-
erogeneous conduct. this shows once again how difficult it is to take empir-
203 note that experimental economics is not necessarily restricted to testing the micro-
foundations of human behaviour. Bruno S. Frey deals, for example, with macro-ef-
fects and constitutional economics in experimental settings. See e. g. Frey (1997). 
note also that experimental economics has reached a level of sophistication which 
makes a delineation of neuro-psychology and economics increasingly harder. »neu-
ro-economics« is all the rage in experimental economics. For an example, see Knoch, 
et al. (2006). For my methodological discussion, the differences between neuro-eco-
nomics and normal experimental economics are irrelevant. Be aware that don ross 
sees no contradiction between neoclassical economics and neuro-economics, be-
cause he deals with economics of the human brain as biological system. See e. g. ross 
(2008b).
204 the underlying cause for the methodological quarrels between the two schools may 
be a confusion that results in seeing the rationality principle as a rationality hypothe-
sis. See Vanberg (2002).
205 See Schoefer (2005) chapter 5 for a good summary of rational reconstruction.
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ical studies as a basis for building theories.206 It shows as well that it is prob-
lematic to call such theories »more realistic«.
the fundamental difference between the two schools of thought lies in 
the way they wish to explain the economic world. Experimental economists 
are interested in finding out what actually motivates humans, whereas Gary 
Becker and the rational-choice school try to understand various macro-phe-
nomena »in principle« by developing models that keep the homo-oeconomi-
cus structure.
the works of experimental economists are important and badly needed 
for showing when and how human behaviour diverges from standard as-
sumptions. However, it remains doubtful whether the introduction of ad-
ditional endogenous incentives like fairness is fruitful for economic research. 
Gary Becker argues in a famous paper that we learn more when preferences 
are considered constant and we take variables such as fairness as restrictions.207 
this is, however, more a simple twisting of words, as it does not really mat-
ter if additional factors are modelled as restrictions or as preferences as long 
as they can be measured and interpersonally compared and are constant over 
some time.208 If those restrictions are not met, postulating changes in pref-
erences or restrictions is completely ad hoc and does not explain anything.
If experimental economists could explain the success of the classic economic 
models and surpass them in some respects, we could clearly speak of progress. 
Experimental economics is undoubtedly of high value, as it can deliver badly 
needed data for economic research. However, if its main goal is gathering so-
cio-psychological data, it is only fair to ask in what sense experimental eco-
nomics can be legitimately called economics and whether it is not instead a 
branch of social-psychology.209 If experimental economists really try to build 
up a new science of economics out of the behaviour they observe, then »this 
206 Even if someone were to come up with an alternative general model, the usage of the 
economic man could still be justified as calculated pessimism when discussing nor-
mative questions. See Brennan/Buchanan (1985), p. 69. As noted above, because their 
focus is on constitutional analysis they argue it is more helpful to model human be-
ings as egoistic utility-maximisers than to assume benevolence. If all humans were be-
nevolent by nature, we would not need laws and constitutions. But a small group of 
egoists can force the majority to behave egoistically as well, if only as defence.
207 See Stigler/Becker (1977), p. 76.
208 See Schröder (2007), p. 56-57.
209 See Güth/Kliemt/napel (2003), p. 4. of course psychological research can be of high 
importance to economics, but that is not the question here. the question is wheth-
er or not experimental economics can be rightfully called »economics«. the astonish-
ing proximity of psychology to experimental economics can be seen in Knoch, et al. 
(2006). In the definition of the hard core of economics psychological questions are 
explicitly ruled out. See section 2.3.1.3.. Experimental economics is therefore a differ-
ent research programme – and as such to be embraced, of course, at least from a plu-
ralist point of view.
2. Empiricism and falsificationism74
methodology is naively reductionist and illegitimately assumes that econom-
ics should not do what all successful science does, namely, model abstract as-
pects of its target phenomena instead of would-be complete and fully ecolog-
ically situated facsimiles of them.«210
Upshot:
the methodological analysis of this case study has shown that a claim for 
more empirical work is naïve when it is seen as a way to overcome rational-
choice theory. If it aims at refuting the version of the economic man that 
concentrates merely on short-term income maximisation it has clearly won 
the war. But the question is, was there ever really an enemy to begin with – 
that is, has any economist ever really held this view? to be sure, using Beck-
er’s tautological interpretation of rational-choice theory, experimental results 
can be integrated into neoclassical reasoning and are no refutation of it. the 
empiricist methodologists seem to argue against a straw man when they op-
pose rational-choice models as empirically inadequate, because the basic ra-
tional-choice assumption is intentionally empirically empty and concrete 
models may be empirically inadequate in some results – but if they are, econ-
omists are eager to offer refined versions. So experimental economics is fine 
for calibrating and improving neoclassical economics, but it is neither a sub-
stitute for nor a refutation of it.
2.5. concLusions in bEtwEEn
this discussion of empirical methodologies and their problems should have 
made some points clear. Most importantly, I hope to have shown why it is 
not a useful methodological position to generally demand more falsifiability 
or more empirical research on the foundations of economics.
As the case studies showed, there has been (constructive) falsification and 
empirical progress in economics, and to claim more of the same is a moot 
point, as this presupposes knowledge about the optimal degree of empirical 
work. of course it may be the case that economists are engaging too much 
in the formal development of highly abstract models, but this can be judged 
only from a historically distinct perspective, as there is a lot of applied re-
search in economics as well.211
If there is a need to fight against the dominance of purely formal reason-
ing, experimental economics is on the right track and offers a much more se-
rious attack against the rational-choice school than does purely methodolog-
ical criticism, because its results force neoclassical economists to think about 
210 ross (2008c), p. 473. See Schröder (2008), p. 229 for a similar argument.
211 don ross argues that many philosophers and methodologists tend to overlook the 
vast amount of empirical work being done in economics. See ross (2008a), p. 308-
309. See also Fitzenberger (2009).
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the status and the range of their findings when they want to use their rational-
choice models. So even if experimental economics cannot falsify the rational 
choice approach in toto, it can indeed refute single models or show the lim-
its of their predictive power.
In the foregoing section I gave an account of various arguments that dem-
onstrate problems for empiricist methodologies, of which the first bunch 
concentrated on the difficulty of finding a solid basis for falsification and in-
ductive reasoning. Popper realised the advantages of protecting the ration-
ality principle from falsification, a position which eventually led to a prob-
lem-oriented conception of holism and coherentism. the second bunch of 
arguments showed the limits of empirical methodologies when it comes to 
assessing the quality of economic models.
of course these arguments are not the end of the discussion. Methodolog-
ical positions other than the ones presented at the beginning of this chap-
ter arose, trying to offer a solution for the obstacles faced by empirical meth-
odologies; I will deal with them in the next section.

3. Postmodern reactions
We have seen that the empiristic methodologies face several difficulties that 
cause them to be poorly suited for the evaluation of economic theories. 
Whereas the former section only intended to outline the problems of empir-
icist methodologies, i will now take the next step and present postmodern 
economic methodologies that have their basis in a philosophical school of 
thought which doubts many epistemological principles that are presupposed 
in empiristic methodology as well as in common-sense thinking. an impor-
tant underlying idea was already presented in section 2.3.1.4 and is well char-
acterised by the term »holism«, i. e. the rejection of the idea that anything can 
be justified by reducing it to some »fundamental« empirical elements that are 
beyond reasonable doubt. as the philosophical movement is of high impor-
tance for economic methodology, i will first present the development of phil-
osophical ideas and then show the implications they had on economic meth-
odology. the latter will be done through an exposition of Bruce caldwell’s 
and deirdre mccloskey’s methodologies, which are prominent examples for 
methodological thinking that is clearly inspired by postmodern currents in 
philosophy.
Following the exposition i will discuss whether postmodern methodology 
offers a way out of the problems we noted with empiricist positions and if it 
can be helpful for theory appraisal in economics.
3.1. The RelaTivisTic challenge
the commonality of the following positions is their relativistic attitude. rel-
ativism in its broadest sense is the thesis that there are no absolute judge-
ments – that all judgements can be valid only relative to some external stand-
ard. critics say this would lead to complete arbitrariness, as there are of 
course no absolute meta-standards for judging the standards. the detailed 
discussion of the consequences of relativism for philosophy of science and 
particularly for theory evaluation in economics follows in the next chapters.
all of the positions discussed below argue against the very notion of a 
somehow directly given external data and by this are principally opposed to 
a naïve form of foundationalist empiricism, thus opening the door for rela-
tivism.
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3.1.1. The PhilosoPhical BackgRound foR PosTmodeRn economic 
meThodology
i have selected three famous philosophers here in order to set the stage for 
postmodern economic methodology. it is important to note that only the 
last one, Paul Feyerabend, is usually called a »postmodern« philosopher. the 
other two, Willard Van orman Quine and nelson Goodman, are commonly 
regarded as analytic philosophers, but as i shall show, they developed cru-
cial arguments for postmodern thought. as a precise definition of »postmod-
ern« is not available, i shall define postmodern philosophy as the faction of 
philosophy that is opposed to talking about an externally given reality or a 
foundationalist philosophy and rather endorses a far-going relativist attitude.
i will start by introducing Quine, the classic author who inspired the epis-
temological turn away from reductionism; he will be followed by Goodman, 
an even more radical relativist; and finally, i will end with the anarchist phi-
losophy of science of Paul Feyerabend, in order to establish a direct connec-
tion to methodological questions.1 thomas Kuhn is surely of greatest impor-
tance and might be well called the father of postmodern methodology, but i 
will skip him here, because his methodology has already been laid out in de-
tail in section 2.3.1.2 as a rather descriptive criticism of empiricism and less 
a sketch of new epistemological ideas. as we are aiming only for an under-
standing of the philosophical movements that influenced economic meth-
odology, a short overview of the respective positions will suffice.
any discussion of epistemology has to start a fortiori with a reference to 
Kant and his copernican revolution in this field. since the days of his Cri-
tique of Pure Reason it is a common cliché that we cannot know anything 
about how things really are. in Kantian terms, the »thing-in-itself is unknow-
able«. accepting this, epistemology is reduced to the task of analysing the 
conditions of our capabilities for experiencing the world and is then more 
appropriately called transcendental philosophy. Kant attacked the simple 
empiristic view of the mind as a »tabula rasa« that becomes subsequently 
filled with experience data and in this way gains knowledge about the exter-
nal world.
We have seen in section 2.1 how rudolf carnap and the Vienna circle 
tried to rehash classic empiricism by making use of the tools of modern logic. 
it was up to Willard Van orman Quine to play the role of Kant again, attack 
some of the fundamental aspects of this philosophical school and switch 
1 of course there are many philosophers who would fit in this line, most notably Lud-
wig Wittgenstein and his change from Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations (see 
Wittgenstein (1921) and Wittgenstein (1953)), but a choice had to be made, and the 
discussion of additional positions would not have added much that would be useful 
for discussing economics.
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the main focus in epistemology to the detailed study of how we perceive the 
world.
3.1.1.1 Willard Van Orman Quine
even if it is usually very hard to specify the beginning of a new era in phi-
losophy, Quine’s »two dogmas of empiricism« clearly marks such a turning 
point. as the destructive force to empiricism of this paper has already been 
roughly illustrated in section 2.3.1.4 i will concentrate more on the parts of 
Quine’s philosophy that influenced later postmodernist, relativistic thinking 
in philosophy of science.2 the most important aspect in this regard is surely 
Quine’s holistic worldview, which is most clearly presented in his book The 
Web of Belief:
it is not the contemplated hypothesis alone that does the implying, but rather 
that hypothesis and a supporting chorus of background beliefs. nor is it usu-
ally a simple observation that is implied, but rather a conditional prediction 
that if a certain step is taken the observation will ensue.3
Using the example of the simple sentence »Water boils at 100° c«, Quine 
shows how many background convictions are present even in a seemingly 
simple case.4 as a result of this – which is most important for postmodern 
methodology – we can always readjust an incorrect theory by making changes 
that are drastic enough to make the theory compatible with the data. such 
changes can include even the rules of language or logic, as for Quine there is 
no knowledge a priori, which would be sacrosanct. of course, this has led to 
many objections, including a famous one stemming from adolf Grünbaum:
… if someone were to put forward the false empirical hypothesis H that ‘ordi-
nary Buttermilk is highly toxic to humans’, this hypothesis could be saved from 
refutation in the face of observed wholesomemess of ordinary buttermilk by 
making the following ‘drastic enough’ adjustment of our system: changing the 
rules of english usage so that the intension of the term ‘ordinary buttermilk’ is 
that of the term ‘arsenic’ in the customary usage.5
if this was all there was to say about theory adjustment, Quine’s thesis would 
be rather trivial, as everything could be saved from falsity by changing the 
meaning of words. But obviously it is not as easy as that. even if Quine ar-
gues that logic and language may change, as they are (like everything else) ul-
2 Quine’s works had even more impact on the philosophy of language, but this field is 
too far away from my topic to be discussed here separately.
3 Quine/Ullian (1970), p. 103.
4 Quine/Ullian (1970), p. 103 et sqq.
5 Grünbaum (1962), p. 20.
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timately empirically justified6, that does not mean they should be easily al-
tered, because they are the very fundaments of our knowledge. Quine’s idea is 
to repair a theory in such a way that other fields of established knowledge are 
only minimally affected by this change, or as he puts it, »not to rock the boat 
more than need be«.7 But still, systems of knowledge very different from the 
present scientific one are indeed conceivable (even if hard to imagine), and 
if they would make no use of classical logic at all, they could not be accused 
for that per se. this is a very liberal, one might even say relativistic view, com-
pared to traditional empiristic positions and clearly influenced postmodern 
economic methodologists.
another important point in Quine’s position is the empirical underdeter-
mination of theories, which means that the observable data is never sufficient 
for selecting a single theory as the right one. there are always other candi-
dates available that fit to the same data equally well. in his major work Word 
and Object, Quine shows that even logically incompatible theories can lead to 
the same empirically observable conclusions. Quine explains this by means 
of his famous example of a field linguist trying to learn a completely un-
known language just by observing how it is used.8 in the example, every time 
one of the natives sees a rabbit, she utters the word »gavagai«. according to 
Quine, the field linguist is not justified to conclude that »gavagai« means 
»rabbit«. it is perfectly consistent with the observed facts to conclude that 
»gavagai« means in fact not »rabbit« but »part of a rabbit«, »state of a rabbit«, 
»i like rabbits« or anything else that is consistent. there is no guarantee that a 
finite set of observations can identify the correct meaning of »gavagai«.
all this means that traditional empiristic criteria can provide much less 
guidance in theory appraisal than empiricists claimed, and this increases the 
space for radically different theories and methodologies. Like many of the 
postmodern philosophers after him, Quine argued strongly against the very 
idea of a »first philosophy«, an epistemology that tries to find firm grounds 
for our knowledge and argues for a radically modest ontology that culminates 
in the slogan »to be is to be the value of a bounded variable«9. as we will see 
in later sections, Quine’s arguments can be taken as a basis for pluralist or rel-
ativistic methodologies. Quine himself, however, took a different path and 
argued for the naturalisation of epistemology, meaning that the natural sci-
ences – and particularly psychology – should crowd out philosophy from 
this domain.10 in Quine’s holistic thinking, this can be justified by their rep-
6 this is not to be confused with a foundationalist empirical justification, as we are still 
speaking in holistic terms. in such a framework logic and language are justified via the 
working of the whole system they are the basis of.
7 Quine (1990), p. 15.
8 see Quine (1960), p. 29 et sqq. for the locus classicus of this example.
9 see Quine (1948) for the source of what later reduced to this slogan.
10 see Quine (1969), p. 75.
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utation in our world: the knowledge of the natural sciences is the role model 
for what we accept as knowledge11, which is of course a purely pragmatic rea-
son. However, this is a circular justification: We should trust in the natural 
sciences for finding out the truth, because we trust their results most. But a 
circularity of this kind cannot be avoided in a holistic system, because by def-
inition of holism there is no fixed foundation for any sentence; rather, the 
system gains its credibility by the way the parts of our web of belief mutually 
support each other.
in principle, again, there is no difference between metaphysics and science 
for Quine, as only the consistency of a system counts and a recourse to fixed 
foundations is no legitimate justification.12
accepting this, it was no big step to reach even more relativist views that 
reject Quine’s preference for the natural sciences. nelson Goodman presents 
a particularly attractive alternative and will be discussed in the next section.13
3.1.1.2. Nelson Goodman
nelson Goodman takes many of Quine’s arguments for granted but none-
theless draws radically different conclusions, particularly concerning the sta-
tus of scientific research. Quine initiated the raising of doubts about the fun-
damental differences between science and other forms of knowledge, but he 
ended up recommending scientific methods even for philosophical ques-
tions; Goodman openly advises a far-reaching relativism. this is another im-
portant step towards postmodern methodological positions.
Let me start by describing the basic features of Goodman’s framework in 
order to give some substance to the preceding assertions. Goodman has made 
many extraordinary claims, such as ‘worlds are rather made than found’ and 
‘truths conflict with each other’. the basis for these relativist convictions can 
be found in his first major book, The Structure of Appearance14, although his 
more recent work Ways of Worldmaking15 expresses many of his thoughts in a 
less technical way. Goodman denies that any property of a system is intrin-
sically basic – an important difference to the empiricist methodologists, who 
take observables to be the most basic properties. Goodman, however, sees the 
case of empiricism only as a methodological decision to take sense-data as the 
primitives of a system. this is by no way an error in itself, as Goodman be-
11 at least, it undoubtedly fits better than philosophical a priori speculation.
12 see Quine (1951), p1.
13 richard rorty could have been selected on equal grounds, but Goodman seems best 
suited for presenting an interim position in philosophy of science between Quine’s nat-
uralism and the even more relativist methodology of Paul Feyerabend. rorty’s point 
is primarily a destructive one, attacking the very possibility of any epistemology and 
reasoning about what »ultimately« may turn out as true.
14 see Goodman (1951).
15 see Goodman (1978).
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lieves that any primitives can be chosen to construct a system, as there are no 
things that are really basic – the question of whether something is »basic« or 
not can only be answered relative to a system. But without any reference sys-
tem we cannot express anything, Goodman says.16 Goodman harshly attacks 
the epistemic realist’s hope that there can be such a thing as »the one true sys-
tem« which allows us to see the world as it really is.17 the fact that there can be 
conflicting systems that are equally acceptable does not mean that our crite-
ria of acceptability are too weak. they are just different for different purposes. 
consequently, science is not a privileged way of exploring the world but just 
one system among many that are equally valid.
From this, it follows that »systems« and »worldviews« or simply »worlds« 
are made rather than found, in Goodman’s view.18 this is why even opposing 
views can be true, when they refer to different systems. one of the simplest 
examples for this is surely the view that the earth is resting fixed (mostly true 
in cartographical systems) which is opposed to the view that it rotates (true 
for current astronomy). But often there is no overlapping truth behind dif-
ferent truths in completely different systems, such as arts and physics. such 
systems can neither be reduced to a »deeper« system nor translated into each 
other. Yet they can be correct versions of the world for their own purposes. 
does that mean that anything is possible? in a way yes, everything is possible. 
But it does not follow that every version of the world is equally well suited 
for the same task, which is ultimately the reason for developing complicated 
theories (or making worlds) at all.19 Goodman insists that there are rigorous 
restraints for worldmaking, such as consistency, coherence, respect for appli-
cability etc.20
as foundationalist justifications are not possible in Goodman’s relativis-
tic view, the quality of systems can only be justified by a process called reflec-
tive equilibrium, i. e. the idea of using bidirectional adjustment between gen-
eral principles and specific results with the hope of arriving at an acceptable 
compromise between the two.21
even if Goodman’s relativism is quite far-reaching, he still subscribes to 
some principles of rightness and does not imply that all systems are equally 
valid for every task. Furthermore, he suggests preferring better »entrenched« 
predicates to less »entrenched« ones in his discussion of the problem of in-
16 see Goodman (1978), p. 18.
17 He frequently discusses optical illusions in order to support this claim. see e. g. 
Goodman (1978), chapter V.
18 the philosophical term for this is »constructivism» – the world is not a given but is 
rather formed by the way we perceive, talk, reason etc. in that sense one could say »to 
grasp something is to make it«.
19 see Goodman (1978), p. 36.
20 see Goodman (1978), p. 149 et sqq.
21 even if the term »reflective equilibrium« is usually associated with John rawls, it was 
coined much earlier by nelson Goodman. see Goodman (1955), p. 85.
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duction, which shows a certain amount of methodological conservatism.22 
this conservatism is overcome through the work of the next protagonist in 
our series of philosophers of science, Paul Feyerabend.
3.1.1.3. Paul Feyerabend
Paul Feyerabend is surely the most glamorous person in the history of philos-
ophy of science. during his lifetime he was constantly attacked for both his 
radical positions and his unorthodox behaviour in academia, but he none-
theless achieved important and highly paid university positions, and his 
work has become increasingly accepted as serious philosophy rather than 
mere provocation. His position is one of the most far-reaching relativistic 
conceptions imaginable; his central theme fights against any kind of fixed 
rules or standards.
Feyerabend started his career as an adept of the Popperian school of crit-
ical rationalism, but soon concentrated on the difficulties of separating the-
ory from observation, which led him to adopt the demand for theoretical 
pluralism quite early.23 in 1969 Feyerabend argued directly against the idea 
that any good science must be linked to observation data,24 and very soon 
his position radicalised into a general criticism of the dominance of reason 
as normative concept. For Feyerabend there are no sacrosanct standards at 
all, and science is not a privileged way to gain knowledge. in his first book 
Against Method25 Feyerabend aims to show that great progress in science very 
often is accompanied by complete and intentional ignorance of any so called 
»scientific method«, from which he concludes that dogmatically following 
accepted methods does not lead to progress. His attacks concentrate on the 
seemingly undogmatic method of critical rationalism, arguing it is self-con-
tradictory to establish (dogmatically) a set of rules when aiming at an open 
and undogmatic process of science.26
according to Feyerabend, the only way to get out of this paradox is to ac-
cept »anything goes« as methodological principle. this does not mean that 
no method can be chosen or argued for, but quite the opposite: any method 
can be argued for by its own standard, but it cannot be imposed on others or 
generalised. neither does »anything goes« entail the suggestion to do what-
ever one likes in science – it just means that no method is sacrosanct.27 Fey-
erabend called his position »methodological anarchism« or dadaism. Under-
22 see Goodman (1955), p. 121. For a discussion see e. g. Kahane (1965).
23 see Feyerabend (1960) and Feyerabend (1963).
24 see Feyerabend (1969).
25 see Feyerabend (1975).
26 this line of thought can be found in many works of Feyerabend because his fight 
against the Popperian tradition (and Popper personally) is a key issue in Feyerabend’s 
work. see e. g. Feyerabend (1987), p. 184 et sqq.
27 see Hoyningen-Huene (2002), p. 36-37.
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standably, such a position deprives the methodologist from the possibility 
of claiming his thoughts to be anything more than a personal opinion. of 
course this had an impact on Feyerabend’s writings themselves, which be-
come less structured and more poetic in later years. in which sense is Feyera-
bend an even more radical relativist28 than Goodman? Where Goodman still 
accepts consistency as an important criterion, Feyerabend argues that even 
the »minimal criterion« of consistency can be a hindrance to scientific pro-
gress:
… it has emerged that science is always full of lacunae and contradictions, that 
ignorance, pigheadedness, reliance on prejudice, lying, far from impeding the 
forward march of knowledge are essential presuppositions of it and that the tra-
ditional virtue of precision, consistency ‘honesty’, respect for facts, maximum 
knowledge under given circumstances, if practised with determination, may 
bring it to a standstill.29
in a similar vein, he attacks the commonly demanded conservatism in theory 
dynamics, i. e. the demand that a new theory should include the successful 
parts of a predecessor, or that more entrenched predicates are to be preferred 
to less entrenched ones. Why should a new theory be assessed on the stand-
ards of the old one, Feyerabend asks, seeing the demand for »conservative« 
progress as an unfair and unjustified advantage to established knowledge.30
now, after a short summary, let’s see how the described post-positivist 
movements in philosophy of science made their way to economic method-
ology.
3.1.1.4. Summing up
the chosen authors share the common conviction that there are no firm 
grounds upon which knowledge can be built.31 all the discussed approaches 
are anti-foundationalist in this sense and by this are opposed in principle to 
28 Feyerabend later often protested against this label and talks of a »so-called relativism« 
because in later years he realized that »relativism« is in fact a methodological pro-
gramme, something which he tried to avoid endorsing under all circumstances, as he 
believed that no one should give any kind of advice to others. see Feyerabend (1991), 
p. 116 et sqq.
29 Feyerabend (1975), p. 260.
30 see Feyerabend (1975), chapter 3.
31 it is of course an arbitrary decision which contribution to take as criticism of naïve 
empiricism or falsificationism and which one as a constructive contribution to post-
modernist thought. this is why Quine appears in both sections. a similar case could 
be made for the Lakatosian methodology of scientific research programmes, but Laka-
tos’s work is usually seen as a further development of falsificationism rather than a 
work of postmodernism, since it very much stresses the rationality of the research pro-
cess.
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methodologies that take empirical observation as their »gold standard«. Pop-
perian falsificationism is different from this, because even if it does not di-
rectly demand an empirical fundament for theories to qualify as scientific, it 
needs the conventional acceptance of stable background conditions in order 
to be able to specify the falsifying conditions of a theory. With his conse-
quent holism and his radical conclusion that even logic is finally founded in 
empirical observations, Quine’s naturalistic defence of the scientific method 
was different from classic empiricism. this opened the door to genuinely rel-
ativistic positions like those of nelson Goodman and, most radically, Paul 
Feyerabend. With these alternatives in hand, some economic methodologists 
were eager to leave the empiricist or falsificationist position behind and build 
their views on the new currents of philosophy.
3.1.2. PosTmodeRnism in economic meThodology
this section sketches out some of the major movements in postmodern eco-
nomic methodology that were inspired by the philosophical movements pre-
sented above.
3.1.2.1. Methodological Pluralism
in the early 1980s the number of economic methodologists began to grow 
rapidly, and what before was a field for some rare specialists became a vivid 
scientific community.32 one reason for this may be the rising awareness that 
methodology does not necessarily consist of »rational reconstruction« of sci-
entific research programmes or normative reasoning about the empirical con-
tent of economic theories. after the philosophical critiques of the notion 
of one overarching concept of rationality and the connected idea that there 
could be only one universally justifiable set of rules for the proper conduct of 
science trickled through to economic methodologists, they started working in 
a much more descriptive and historical way than before. many used a Laka-
tosian framework to clarify the underlying structure of economic schools of 
thought by reconstructing their methodological »hard core« and »protective 
belt«, but left out the component of appraisal, which is difficult to carry out 
with Lakatos’ philosophy.33 in his book Beyond Positivism Bruce caldwell was 
among the first to state explicitly the fall of the so-called »received View« 
of empiricism and falsificationism. He called his alternative to the old rule-
32 e. g. many of the now classic books were published in these times. see Blaug (1980), 
Boland (1982), caldwell (1982) and mccloskey (1985).
33 see Hands (2001), p. 287-288 for an impressive overview of Lakatosian works in eco-
nomic methodology.
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based and monistic methodologies »methodological pluralism«.34 i will skip 
most of the anti-empiricist part of his book because many of the arguments 
have been dealt with already in the above sections with a more direct connec-
tion to economics. a short summary helps nonetheless for understanding 
both caldwell’s and many other methodological positions. caldwell arrives 
at his methodological pluralism by sketching out the problems of various at-
tempts to define criteria for theory choice:35
1. confirmationism: this conception, started by the Vienna circle, prom-
ised to deliver clear-cut distinctions between good and bad science but 
got into problems by Popper’s criticism of inductive logic and several 
paradoxes of confirmation.
2. Falsificationism: in order to overcome the problem of induction by fal-
sifying wrong theories, a reliable set of falsifiers is needed. the empiri-
cal basis of falsificationism is seemingly based on facts, but Popper ad-
mits that it is a matter of convention which facts are regarded as basic.
3. Paul Feyerabend’s position is an attack against any rule-based method-
ology and prescription and argues that no theory whatsoever should be 
excluded. so he is against any definition of criteria for theory choice but 
argues in favour of the maximal proliferation of theories, which culmi-
nates in his anti-prescriptive slogan »anything goes«.
4. thomas Kuhn proposed to view some standard criteria (accuracy, con-
sistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness) as norms and values of the 
scientific game and let the players discuss them for themselves. it is 
doubtable if such a position can be really regarded prescriptive in any 
substantive sense, as Kuhn requests nothing more from practising sci-
entists than to find their criteria themselves.
5. Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes promises to 
combine the best of both worlds in being descriptively accurate and of-
fering criteria for deciding whether a programme is progressive or de-
generative. But looking more closely at Lakatos’s proposals, it becomes 
clear that there is no clear-cut rule at all for deciding this. a degener-
ative programme can turn progressive at any time, and we can only 
guess whether a certain field of research has come to an end. By stress-
ing the end of (Popperian) instant rationality without being able to de-
fine time restrictions for a slower version, Lakatos’s methodology fails 
to give proper advice for theory choice.36
34 of course there are now many pluralists in economic methodology, but for reasons of 
brevity and clarity i will stick to caldwell in this section. For an overview of plural-
ism in economics see salanti/screpanti (1997).
35 Quoted from caldwell (1982), p. 221 et sqq.
36 see Feyerabend (1965) for an early criticism of Lakatos along these lines.
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caldwell concludes from this that »no robust prescriptive algorithm of 
choice has been discovered by the […] philosophers«37 and continues by un-
derscoring the high importance of descriptive work for economic methodol-
ogy. in order to support his thesis of the unachievability of a single prescrip-
tive method, caldwell discusses problems of application of various criteria 
for theory choice in a confirmationist framework and the difficulties of fal-
sifying economic theories due to various uncheckable initial conditions, the 
absence of general laws and problems of data representation. in a later publi-
cation, caldwell briefly presents five problems of monistic methodologies:38
1. a single set of immutable standards for science is a chimera.
2. therefore, the claim that any set of (bad) standards is better than no 
standards at all is wrong.
3. monism fails to appreciate the richness of science.
4. monists try to tell scientists how to proceed correctly; this has led to a 
lot of resentment towards methodology in general.
5. monistic methodologies cannot keep the promise of providing defence 
against totalitarian standards; those are the duties of the »citizen-scien-
tist«, not the methodologist.
this discussion leads caldwell to his proposal of »methodological plural-
ism« and the recommendation for methodologists to withdraw from the 
search for a universal method for science. caldwell considers other tasks to 
be more fruitful and lists those:
[…] to foster an understanding of the scientific process among the members 
of hisprofession; to systematize jargon; to rationally reconstruct the methodo-
logicalcontent of various research programms; to promote an environment in 
which bothnovelty and criticism can operate freely.39
caldwell later characterised the idea behind his pluralism as »understanding 
what economics is all about and […] by doing so improv[ing] it.«40 He rec-
ommends starting a methodological analysis that is done by both the meth-
odologists and the practitioners of a specific field. When reconstructing a 
research programme, assuming a specific framework of analysis is unavoid-
able – which is why it must be explicitly stated.41 the next step consists of 
the critical assessment of the methodological core previously reconstructed. 
37 caldwell (1982), p. 228.
38 see caldwell (1984), p. 237 et sqq.
39 caldwell (1982), p. 245.
40 caldwell (1984), p. 234.
41 strangely, he speaks later of methodological pluralism as the »attempt to practice val-
ue-free evaluations«. see caldwell (1984), p. 241.
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the genuine task of methodology for caldwell seems to be meta-methodol-
ogy, which gives overviews of research programmes and puts their method-
ological hard cores under critical scrutiny. caldwell refrains from giving any 
methodological principles which could guide this criticism, but insists that 
that any programme should be criticised on its own terms.42 He openly admits 
the relativism intrinsic to his position and in principle subscribes to Feyer-
abend’s slogan »anything goes« in methodological terms.43 However, cald-
well’s rhetoric is less provocative than Feyerabend’s, and he tries to concili-
ate his readers by stating that methodological pluralism does not necessarily 
lead to methodological anarchism in economics, as caldwell assumes some 
substantive theoretical contributions to be taken seriously by any methodol-
ogist.44
He sees a possible threat to his position in the lack of points for criticism 
if everyone were to become a methodological pluralist, but argues that a con-
sistent pluralist cannot recommend pluralism for everyone, as this would 
amount to recommending a »single universalist nonmethodology«45. cald-
well pragmatically justifies his methodological pluralism as useful for meth-
odological discussions and offers neither an attack to theories of truth nor a 
connection to one of them, leaving this task to philosophers.46 this is differ-
ent with deirdre mccloskey, another important postmodern methodologist 
of economics, who explicitly argues against the notion of truth (with a capi-
tal t!) and will be dealt with in the next section.
3.1.2.2. The Rhetorical Turn in Economic Methodology
the so-called rhetorical analysis of economics has become one of the most 
influential strands in economic methodology. in cases like this it is usually 
not easy to find a definitive starting point, but here it was clearly deirdre mc-
closkey, who started the debate with the publication of »the rhetoric of eco-
nomics« in the Journal of Economic Literature in 1983 and the following book 
of the same name.47
to avoid confusion it is important to note that the word »rhetoric« is used 
here in the broadest sense and is attributed to any kind of disciplined conver-
sation. the aim of rhetorical analysis is not unmasking the »mere rhetoric« of 
economics in contrast to its substance but discovering how economists ac-
42 see caldwell (1982), p. 248-249. Later he allows the methodological pluralist to apply 
any criteria he likes. see caldwell (1984), p. 239.
43 see e. g. caldwell (1984), p. 242.
44 see caldwell (1982), p. 251.
45 caldwell (1984), p. 241. He does not offer arguments for the alleged inconsistency, 
but merely expresses his hope that the methodological discussion will continue.
46 see caldwell (1984), p. 242-243. He accepts that this deprives him of the possibility 
to speak of progress.
47 see mccloskey (1983) and mccloskey (1985). even if there are many others using the 
rhetorical approach i will stick to mccloskey for reasons of clarity and brevity.
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tually persuade each other about the rightness of their ideas. this does not 
imply that they are using cheap tricks; according to mccloskey, rhetoric is 
rather unavoidable, as all conversations are necessarily rhetorical.48 she is 
convinced that »economists do not follow the laws of enquiry their method-
ologies lay down«49 but thinks that this would be a good thing to do. many 
of her publications and books begin with a fundamental criticism of »mod-
ernist« (as she calls it) methodology and traditional epistemology in general. 
as a basis for this criticism mccloskey lists the ten commandments of mod-
ernist economic science as she sees them:50
1. Prediction and control is the point of science.
2. only the observable implications (or predictions) of a theory matter to 
its truth.
3. observability entails objective, reproducible experiments; mere ques-
tionnaires interrogating human subjects are useless, because humans 
might lie.
4. if and only if an experimental implication of a theory proves false is the 
theory proved false.
5. objectivity is to be treasured; subjective »observation« (introspection) 
is not scientific knowledge, because the objective and the subjective can-
not be linked.
6. Kelvin’s dictum: »When you cannot express it in numbers, your knowl-
edge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind« […]
7. introspection, metaphysical belief, aesthetics, and the like may well fig-
ure in the discovery of a hypothesis but cannot figure in its justification; 
justifications are timeless, and the surrounding community of science is 
irrelevant to their truth.
8. it is the business of methodology to demarcate scientific reasoning 
from non-scientific, positive from normative.
9. a scientific explanation of an event brings the event under a covering 
law.
10. scientists – for instance economic scientists – ought not to have any-
thing to say as scientists about the oughts of value, whether morality or 
art.
any philosopher of science will immediately recognise that this list was not 
made to represent the recent level of philosophical research but is rather a re-
construction of the modernist convictions of mainstream economists. How-
ever, mccloskey attacks not only these modernist convictions but any kind 
48 see e.g mccloskey (1994), p. 48. this leads to mccloskey’s rejection of any difference 
between style and substance.
49 Quoted from mccloskey (1983), p. 482.
50 Quoted from mccloskey (1985), p. 7-8.
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of rule-based methodology. Her arguments rely heavily on what has already 
been outlined in section 3.1.1, which is why a short summary shall suffice 
here. mccloskey draws a fundamental difference between »small m meth-
odologies« that give practical advice for everyday’s problems and »capital m 
methodologies« that claim to give universal prescriptions for the scientific 
method. For mccloskey, all »capital m methodologies« have failed to give 
us certain guidelines for good scientific research and how to separate it from 
useless speculation. one argument she gives is the self-defeating character of 
such methodologies: if they were to take their prescriptive (and often empir-
icist) standards seriously, they themselves would have to be the first to go.51 
mccloskey goes on to cite a great number of philosophers who are opposed 
to positivism in order to show that this kind of methodology is obsolete in 
philosophy. as far as economics goes, mccloskey shows – by referring with 
approval to Kuhn, Feyerabend, duhem and others – that falsification has it-
self been falsified by the history of science: neither the Keynsian revolution 
nor its monetarist counterpart would have been possible had the protago-
nists followed a modernist methodology as sketched out above.52 mcclos-
key draws additional support against modernist methodologies from the »if 
you’re so smart, why aren’t you rich« paradox, from which she concludes that 
prediction is impossible in economics.53 the paradox states that if prediction 
were possible at a significant level, economists would use their knowledge to 
make money and would not publish it for others to use.
From this »refutation« of old methodological(!) convictions mccloskey 
proceeds by stating that any attempt to save the prescriptive force is deemed 
to fail. she attacks any kind of speaking about the truth (with capital t) or 
what »ultimately« will turn out as true by means of two main arguments: 
First, we can never know anything about an ultimate truth; and second, we 
don’t even need to know ultimate truth for our practical work. this is not to 
deny the relevance of standards for scientific work, which mccloskey under-
lines by citing stanley Fish: »[t]here is no ‘standard or set of standards that 
operates independently of the institutional circumstances… which is not the 
same thing as saying there is no standard’«54. scientists must have a method-
ology, but no methodology.55 Putting forward hypothetical criteria or »some 
future tests« is nothing but covering up matters and is not helpful in any 
way – for mccloskey, the very idea of truth or a unified methodology »is 
a fifth wheel, inoperative except that it occasionally comes loose and hits a 
51 see mccloskey (1985), p. 12.
52 see mccloskey (1985), p. 17-18.
53 see mccloskey (1983), p. 487-488.
54 see Fish (1989), p. 164 cited from mccloskey (1994), p. 243. mccloskey also says that 
»anything goes« does not go in argument and refers to Feyerabend on this. see mcclo-
skey (1994), p. 186.
55 see e. g. mccloskey (1994), p. 184.
913.1. the relativistic challenge
bystander«56. mccloskey compares well-meaning methodologists to bureau-
crats who try to be helpful but ultimately impose useless rules on a system 
which would do better without them.57
in spite of all these arguments against traditional methodology, mcclos-
key tries to stress that she is not speaking in favour of »irrationalism«, in the 
sense that anything whatsoever is equally valid for economics. she defends 
herself at length against the common reproach of »tu quoque« against rela-
tivistic thinkers, which she sarcastically sums up: »You, oh relativist, in assert-
ing the truth of relativism must acknowledge a standard of truth. Gotcha.«58 
mccloskey dismisses this argument by the »’rhertorician’s tu quoque«, ar-
guing that philosopher’s attack is a rhetorical device that presupposes a safe 
metalinguistic level and by this begs the question. the relativist position can 
become non-self-contradictory easily, if it avoids assuming truth for itself.
on the other hand, it is often maintained (against relativistic positions) 
that a lack of a common methodology would lead to chaos and bad sci-
ence – i. e. mccloskey’s attacks against methodology are wrong for the re-
sults that their acceptance would lead to. mccloskey rejects this argument 
against her »irrationalism« as a strange, authoritarian one and thinks it »odd 
to hear intellectuals raising alarm against intellectual anarchy«.59 in her opin-
ion the only useful effect of looking for a clear demarcation between science 
and non-science could be the protection of scientific freedom in absolutist 
countries.
after this philosophical characterisation of mccloskey’s work, let’s finally 
turn to the actual course of action of the rhetorical analysis of economics: it 
is quite plainly the attempt to discern patterns and strategies by which econ-
omists persuade each other. there are several approaches that can be lumped 
together under the flag of »rhetorical« analysis in the way it is intended here. 
mccloskey started with a method that takes the term »rhetorical« quite liter-
ally: in her first publication she used tools of literary analysis on classic eco-
nomic texts.60 Her result was, as could be expected, that the use of rhetorical 
devices is widely spread in economics, supporting her claim that the image 
of rational discussion without irrational rhetorical ornaments does not hap-
pen and, additionally, is not possible.61 more concretely, mccloskey lists the 
following rhetorical devices used in the classics of economics she analysed:62
56 mccloskey (1985), p. 47.
57 see mäki (1995), p. 1311.
58 mccloskey (1994), p. 200.
59 see mccloskey (1985), p. 39.
60 in mccloskey (1983) she analyses only two pages from samuelson’s Foundations (see 
samuelson (1947)) as a »proof of method«.
61 mccloskey maintains that even the acceptance of what counts as a proof in mathe-
matics is based on the persuasion of the community and can change over time. see 
mccloskey (1994), p. xv, where she refers to Lakatos (1976), p. 29 footnote 1.
62 see mccloskey (1983), p. 500 et sqq.
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• demonstration of mathematical virtuosity as evidence of virtue.
• several appeals to authority.
• several appeals to the relaxation of assumptions.
• several appeals to hypothetical toy economies.
• one explicit appeal to analogy and use of metaphorical language.
the usage of rhetorical devices is a clear departure from the official mod-
ernist methodology, but mccloskey argues that there are good reasons for 
this, because intelligent persuasion is always based on such devices. many 
useful notions that are not testable had to be eliminated from economics if 
the prescriptions of the modernist methodology (as mccloskey depicts it) 
were taken seriously. examples are Fisher’s untestable equation of exchange 
(mV=Pt) or, more generally, the notion that the economy is basically com-
petitive. these are not empirical propositions but »simply an invitation to 
look at it this way«,63 which promises to deliver highly illuminating insights. 
mccloskey further analyses common phrases of persuasion such as »it is nat-
ural to assume« and the metaphorical character of talking about supply-and-
demand curves or the notion of »equilibrium«. But rhetorical analysis is not 
restricted to finding rhetorical devices in economic texts. in newer publica-
tions mccloskey counts philosophical argumentation theory and Kuhnian 
sociology of science as rhetorical approaches. even if i put aside any detailed 
report of a specific rhetorical analysis, the point of it seems fairly clear: it illu-
minates the way economists persuade each other and makes explicit diverse 
strategies of persuasion that economists were only dimly aware of before mc-
closkey’s work. For example, mccloskey is convinced that it was not due to 
its statistical tests but through »the sheer bulk of the book – the richness and 
intelligence of its arguments«64 that Friedman and schwartz convinced their 
readers in their book A Monetary History of the United States, 1867 — 1960 65. 
But still, one could ask what the value of mccloskey’s insights is.
mccloskey points out several advantages that could be gained by the 
study of the rhetoric of economics:66
• Better writing, by knowing more about rhetorics.
• Better teaching, by knowing how to express the tacitness of economic 
concepts.
• Better capability to explain economic concepts to non-economists.
• Better science by knowing the restrictions of economics and not recur-
ring to the seeming objectiveness of some methods and therefore being 
able to discuss papers more honestly and in a less bitter way, as values 
63 mccloskey (1983), p. 501.
64 mccloskey (1983), p. 498.
65 see Friedman/schwartz (1963).
66 see mccloskey (1983), p. 512.
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that where before dismissed as »unscientific« can now enter the discus-
sion.
it is easy to see that the main point of the rhetoric of economics is a thera-
peutic one. after being confronted with their use of rhetorical devices, econo-
mists are supposed to be able to discuss less dogmatically and more honestly 
about their respective positions. the methodology of the rhetorical turn is a 
completely descriptive one.67
3.2. cRiTicisms of PosTmodeRnism
at first sight, the views of postmodernist methodologists may seem persuad-
ing, but surely this is not enough to lead us to accept them. a critical discus-
sion is needed. as in the preceding chapters, i shall start with arguments that 
concentrate more generally on epistemology and philosophy of science and 
continue with a discussion that refers directly to mccloskey and caldwell as 
protagonists of postmodern economic methodology. throughout this sec-
tion i will not merely present the arguments but will evaluate their validity 
for the methodological questions under discussion.
3.2.1. some counTeR-PosiTions fRom PhilosoPhy
3.2.1.1. Paul Boghossian – in Defence of Knowledge
Paul Boghossian is one of the best-known enemies of postmodernist thought 
and has recently written a book summing up his arguments against postmod-
ernist relativism68 which is, after the preceding introduction to postmodern-
ist thought, a good basis for assessing the validity of either side’s positions. 
Primarily, Boghossian tries to show that there are inescapable inconsistencies 
in relativistic positions entailing the claim of the possibility of »equally valid« 
but contradictory views of the world.
Boghossian concedes that there can be equally valid but different ways 
of knowing the world as long as they do not contradict each other: an ac-
tive baseball player’s knowledge of the game is different from that of a sports 
journalist, but this causes no problem whatsoever. Boghossian employs a dif-
ferent example to point out a primary problem of relativism: according to 
the most widely accepted scientific knowledge, humans first entered amer-
ica from asia. By contrast, some cheyenne river sioux believe that humans 
67 see caldwell/coats (1984), p. 576.
68 see Boghossian (2006). For an article that can be considered a »light version« of the 
book see Boghossian (2001).
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in america have descended from »Buffalo people« and hence did not come 
from asia.69 Here we have two beliefs that cannot both be valid at the same 
time. For Boghossian this is the first hint that epistemic relativism is not a 
tenable position, as he takes the law of non-contradiction (~(P&~P)) for 
sacrosanct.70
after having set the stage by the above example, he develops more ad-
vanced attacks against relativism by arguing against constructivism as the 
philosophical position that often stands behind relativism, which states that 
there are no objective criteria to distinguish true knowledge from mere belief. 
more precisely, Boghossian argues against the full description dependence 
of facts the way Goodman adopts it. recall that Goodman’s constructivism 
is based on the idea that our worlds are composed of objects that are con-
structed by us via categorizing and grouping primitives, but that there are no 
primitives that can legitimately claim to be the only basic ones. our reasons 
for categorising them as »individuals« (see section 3.1.1.2) are purely prag-
matic, and the resulting worlds cannot claim to have any resemblance to the 
way things are in and of themselves – for there is no way to know how things 
are in and of themselves. the following passage presents Boghossian’s main 
arguments against this concept in short form and evaluates their force:
if our concepts are cutting lines into some basic wordly dough and thus im-
buing it with a structure it would otherwise not possess, doesn’t there have to 
be some worldly dough for them to work on, and mustn’t the basic proper-
ties of that dough be determined independently of all of this fact-constitut-
ing activity?71
admittedly this sounds like a good argument, but in fact the only thing it 
challenges is pure idealism. Goodman and the constructivists can easily es-
cape such a critique by admitting the existence of »something« without spec-
ifying it any further. so this argument of Boghossian does not destroy the 
main constructivist conviction that what we talk of as facts are highly con-
structed items.
Boghossian’s next argument in his attack against constructivism refers to 
the problem of backward causation.72 While we may easily talk about objects 
such as electrons, giraffes and mountains, the existence of these objects an-
tedates our own. Boghossian argues that we cannot meaningfully be said to 
construct our own past, i. e. giraffes cannot be objects constructed by us. the 
problem of this attack (and of Boghossian’s approach in general) is the pre-
sumption of some facts that a constructivist or relativist would deny. such a 
69 see Boghossian (2006), p. 1.
70 see Boghossian (2006), p. 40.
71 Boghossian (2006), p. 35.
72 see Boghossian (2006), p. 38.
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twist allows for criticism that seems quite striking but in reality attacks a straw 
man. Boghossian seems to assume that constructivists would claim that our 
talking about the genesis of giraffes makes them appear in a literal sense in 
a time before we could talk. this is surely absurd, but it does not refute con-
structivism, because constructivism does not entail such a view. constructiv-
ism merely states that our knowledge, our facts and our perception of the past 
are all dependent on ourselves; there are no »common-sense« facts, nor are 
there given facts about the past. i know of no version of social constructivism 
that entails the view that we could change »the real past« by backward cau-
sation if we were to construct the world in a different way. the past we have 
depends on us, but there is no backward causation of brute facts involved.
the following argument by Boghossian contains a similar error: he states 
that it is an intrinsic aspect of many concepts (such as mountains, electrons 
and giraffes) that they were not constructed by us.73 clearly mountains are not 
supposed to be built by humans. But as far as i know, no one claims that. it 
is not self-contradictory for constructivism that there exist concepts that were 
not consciously constructed. if that were the case, the whole project of con-
structivism must have seemed absurd from the beginning, as many of our 
concepts are generally thought to refer to things independent from ourselves. 
When talking about epistemic questions i find it rather natural to go beyond 
the standard idea of facts that are out there and we perceive them as they are. 
epistemology is about the way we come to know the world, and i fail to see 
the advantage of a theory stating that our worldview roughly – but somehow 
justly – corresponds to the real world.
Getting back to the earlier example of the two opposing views concern-
ing the origins of native americans, Boghossian attacks the relativist view 
that both could be true at the same time, as there are no absolute (sometimes 
called »global«) facts of the form »p«, but only relativistic (sometimes called 
»local«) ones of the form »according to a theory t (or worldview W), we ac-
cept p«. Boghossian rejects the traditional anti-relativistic argument that calls 
relativism self-refuting, by stating that if relativism were true, it could not 
consistently claim to be more than a report about what relativists find agree-
able to say, because true relativism must be applied to itself.74 instead, he puts 
forward a slightly different argument and tries to show relativism to end up 
in an infinite regress. Here is the essence of his argument: if relativism al-
lows only local truth, it follows that for every local fact there is a never-end-
ing chain of »according to a theory we accept, there is a theory we accept and 
according to this latter theory «p« is true.«75 Hence, there is no absolute jus-
tification for relativism. But do relativists need to claim that it is an absolute 
fact that there are no absolute facts? the way i interpret the postmodernists 
73 see Boghossian (2006), p. 39.
74 see Boghossian (2006), p. 52-54.
75 see Boghossian (2006), p. 56.
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is different: they hold that there are no facts, only opinions or worldviews. 
But if that is nothing more than an opinion (and not a fact!) as well, we eas-
ily return to a coherent position. the »traditional argument« against relativ-
ism can be used by relativists as a defence.76
Upshot:
of course my responses to Boghossian’s arguments do not show that con-
structivism is correct. rather, they show that constructivism is hard to refute. 
Boghossian’s attempt of refutation seems futile, as the weaknesses of the op-
posite view – namely epistemic realism and versions of the correspondence 
theory of truth – are banned into the footnotes and said to be of low impor-
tance for the argument.77 the main problem with Boghossian’s work is his at-
tempt to establish a fundamental difference between truth and beliefs about 
truth without being able to offer a viable criterion for truth. Boghossian’s fail-
ure to refute constructivism/relativism suggests that a reconciliation between 
the two frontiers is highly unlikely and that a shift of focus would probably 
be the best thing to deal with the controversy.78
it is not the purpose of my work to deliver a complete review of Boghos-
sian’s arguments, which is why the given examples shall suffice here.79 in 
order to gain a balanced view on the criticisms of postmodernism, it seems 
more promising to have a look at other opponents.
3.2.1.2. Daniel Dennett – Scienticism
daniel dennett is another well-known enemy of postmodernist thought, 
even if he did not publish his major works on that subject. in two (rather po-
lemic) publications, dennett explicitly attacks postmodernism and tries to 
defend »the scientific method« against it.80 daniel dennett argues that post-
modern science theory (e. g. mccloskey’s rhetorical analysis of economics) is 
wrong in assigning equal validity to scientific discoveries and any other kind 
of »narrative« and moreover that it is even harmful to science.81 dennett lo-
cates the danger of postmodern multiculturalism in equating the scientific 
method with Western imperialism and thus seeing science as oppressive and 
neglecting the liberating effects it can bring along. For dennett, if scientists 
are to be held responsible for what they say, postmodernism is utterly use-
76 see mccloskey (1994), p. 201.
77 see e. g. Boghossian (2006), p. 128, footnote 17.
78 i shall propose such a shift at the end of this section.
79 even if my short refutations seem to suggest otherwise, i highly appreciate Boghos-
sian’s work for the clearness of his arguments. His precise and simple style gives an ex-
cellent example of good, honest academic work that helps in clearing up many mis-
understandings, but on the other hand (and sadly for Boghossian) makes it easy to 
detect his own errors or unsupported presuppositions.
80 see dennett (1998) and dennett (2001).
81 see dennett (1998).
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less because of its denial of any fundamental standards – standards in which 
dennett firmly believes:
[…] this attitude passes as a sophisticated appreciation of the futility of proof 
andthe relativity of all knowledge claims. in fact this opinion, far from being 
sophisti cated, is the height of sheltered naiveté, made possible only by 
flatfooted ignoranceof the proven methods of scientific truth-seeking and their 
power. Like many another naif, these thinkers, reflecting on the manifest inabil-
ity of their methods oftruth-seeking to achieve stable and valuable results, in-
nocently generalize fromtheir own cases and conclude that nobody else knows 
how to discover the trutheither.82
But there is more to dennett’s arguments than just contradiction. He states 
that the postmodernist attack on »truth« (global truth) has no bearing at all 
on whether specific statements are true or false (local truth). in science it makes 
perfect sense to ask whether a theory (an observation, etc.) is true or not. 
dennett calls this a »vegetarian concept of truth« (in accordance with rorty), 
but he denies that acknowledging this step can be used for a relativisation of 
the »vegetarian truths«. His claim is supported by an evolutionary argument: 
all the life forms we know of are, consciously or not, heading towards truth, 
because it is useful for their survival. even the human capacity of doubt and 
reflection is helpful for this aim. culture, science and communication are, 
according to dennett, all to be seen as tools that help us in coming closer to 
truth and increasing our fitness. the whole point of life and its development 
is truth, and »we have created a technology of truth: science.«83 science is the 
most advanced way of finding truth and avoiding error, and controversial as 
it may often be, its results are, after some years of fighting, the most uncon-
troversial facts we have.
dennett concedes that science is not neutral but driven by our values and 
interests – and he insists that it should be. We cannot concentrate on every-
thing (or on everything in the same way), but this does not mean that the re-
sults of our interest and value-laden fields of research are less secure. dennett 
is using the classic argument of the separation between the context of discov-
ery and the context of justification here.84
dennett concludes that science has a privileged status to other ways of 
knowledge and claims that this is strongly supported by the weight we place 
82 see dennett (1998).
83 see dennett (1998).
84 He admits that there can be epistemic settings where lacking neutrality can lead to 
bad science, e. g. when medicaments tested on men only. He admits, too, that science 
can be misused and imposed with bad effects on societies that were not accustomed 
to the blessings of science before. But these are flaws of application, not of science it-
self, he states. see dennett (1998).
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on scientific arguments and the track record scientific reasoning has. even if 
science is not perfect, it is the best knowledge we have, and it is getting bet-
ter every day.
all in all, dennett is defending science and its truths from a scientific 
point of view. if one cares about scientific truth, science is the best way to 
achieve it – and if, e. g., religious leaders accept scientific truths that contra-
dict their own worldview, they are weakening their positions. they would 
have the option of denying the possibility of gaining truth by observation 
and rational thought. they could argue that to love and praise) god is the 
only valuable thing to strive for, and scientific truth does not matter. By tak-
ing such a completely incommensurable position, they would be able to pro-
tect themselves against scientific criticism. of course, people have the right 
to decide on their own which side they find more convincing; the majority 
in Western countries now seem to be in favour of scientific and not of reli-
gious truth.85
in a more recent paper86 dennett adds some arguments to the viability of 
comparing science with religion. dennett responds to the above counter-ar-
gument – which states that truth is to science what god is to religion – by as-
serting that faith in the truth unifies all believers. »truth-telling is, and must 
be, the background of all genuine communication, including lying. after all, 
deception only works when the would-be deceiver has a reputation for telling 
the truth.«87 Later on dennett concedes that an inflated concept of truth is 
not defensible and agrees that local truth can suffice. this sounds like an at-
tempt to reconcile postmodernism and modernism, but some sentences later 
dennett suggests that scientific truth is the only acceptable local truth, be-
cause all representatives of competing truth-systems eagerly refer to scientific 
support if there is any. He neglects that this could as well be explained by the 
fact that science is the ruling truth-system in our world.
after admitting that truth can hurt (which none of the postmodernists 
would deny) dennett asks why science and its technology are so persuasive 
to cultures that are not yet accustomed to it. if science was spread by West-
ern imperialist policy and was just another way of seeing the world, it would 
hardly be such a success. there is much to this argument, but note that it 
contains an ad populum fallacy: essentially, it states that if so many people 
believe in science, it must be true.
85 many don’t seem to see an inconsistency in adopting both. this short example can-
not depict the complexities of the debate but is merely meant to illustrate the possi-
bility of two radically contradicting worldviews and does not deny that there are pos-
sible overlaps between the two.
86 see dennett (2001).
87 see dennett (2001). as the rest of this section is referring to this text and as my source 
is a website which does not allow me to point to pages in a reproducible way, i shall 
skip further references to this text.
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at the end of his essay dennett concentrates more on arguments made 
against protecting other cultures from the bad effects of the »blessings »of sci-
ence, but that discussion can be separated completely from the question of 
whether or not scientific truth is the only acceptable local truth. this ques-
tion is rather a political one, and the answer seems clear: of course people 
should be well informed and able to decide freely if they want the blessings of 
science. But the fact that science is successful in convincing people does not 
settle the epistemological debate between postmodernists and their enemies 
about truth. note that neither dennett nor Boghossian are taking an anti-re-
alistic position – on the contrary, they argue that true knowledge is possible 
and necessary. in section 4 i will discuss positions which deny this but still 
do not adopt the relativism of postmodern positions.
Upshot:
While dennett’s arguments are surely not persuasive to postmodernist ears, 
they point to a fruitful shift of the question, as they lead away from the un-
productive discussion about the possibility of global truth and concentrate 
more on the desirability of effects that relativistic positions may have. the 
next section accepts this shift of focus as it reviews a different attack on post-
modernism, which does not focus on the question about t/truth but instead 
refers to the effects of postmodernism on scientific standards.
3.2.1.3. The Sokal Affair – Revealing the Lack of Standards in Postmodernism?
When it comes to discussing the critics of postmodernist thought, alan 
sokals famous hoax experiment cannot be excluded from the discussion. in 
1996 sokal managed to publish a nonsense article filled with postmodernist 
catchwords titled »transgressing the Boundaries: towards a transformative 
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity« in the leftist peer-reviewed academic 
journal Social Text.88 this of course shed bad light not only on the editors of 
Social Text but on the existence or effectiveness of academic standards in post-
modernist communities, and was intensely debated for quite some time.89
the details of the quarrels concerning sokal’s position are of minor impor-
tance here; more interesting is the question of how sokal’s successful hoax 
affects the question of the relativity of truth. alas, despite the paper’s signif-
icant impact, it does not seem to add much to the debate between postmod-
ernists and »modernists« – at least not after already discussing more recent 
arguments from Boghossian or dennett (which themselves drew much in-
spiration from the sokal debate). similar to Boghossian and dennett, sokal 
88 see sokal (1996).
89 an extensive list of contributions to the debate can be found at sokal’s website. see 
sokal (2007).
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affirms the notion that science is in principle capable of finding external, ob-
jective truth, which is exactly what his enemies deny.90
the more interesting aspect of the sokal affair is surely the questions it 
raises about academic standards. the whole point of submitting the article to 
Social Text was to show that postmodernists didn’t have any effective stand-
ards for distinguishing between nonsense and a genuine contribution to their 
field. this is a different kind of criticism, as it does not rely directly on the ex-
istence of objective global criteria but on the reliablity of local ones. By this it 
can hurt postmodernists like mccloskey who hold the view that local stand-
ards can be perfectly applicable even while denying the existence of global 
ones, because the hoax showed that Social Text did not seem to have any via-
ble local standards. However, even if the acceptance of the hoax text is an em-
barrassment to the editors of Social Text and the postmodernist community, 
more systematic research is needed if one aims at showing a robust connec-
tion between the rejection of global standards and the loosening up of local 
ones.91 and even if such a correlation were found, this would not be an argu-
ment in favour of an epistemology defending the notion of objective global 
truth but rather a completely pragmatic one: While a postmodern attitude 
may be harmful to scientific standards, this does not show it is wrong.
the sokal affair illustrates again that the fight between modernists and 
postmodernists is not likely to be settled soon – if ever. it also shows that 
there are more fruitful and interesting questions to pursue, e. g. questions 
about the appropriateness of standards for solving a specific task, which can 
be tackled by modernists and postmodernists in the same way. Before we 
come to those questions in section 4, let’s finally have a critical look at the 
postmodernist economic methodologists presented above.
90 at that point of the debate misunderstandings seemed to soar due to the linkage of 
the debate to political issues. the postmodernists whom sokal attacked were far more 
radical than e. g. mccloskey and sometimes concluded from their denial of the ex-
istence of objective truths to the inappropriateness of the scientific project in general. 
see e. g. chadha (1997). such radical positions may be the reason why the modernists 
feel the need for defending science and its methods on such a broad scope. see sokal 
(2000).
91 there are even commentators who argue that sokal’s hoax article is actually a good 
piece of science and if one takes a postmodern perspective such a position seems in-
deed defensible. the article may be full of (intentionally placed) errors concerning 
physical theory, but its philosophical argument of relating anti-foundationalist episte-
mology to new developments in quantum physics is not completely absurd. see Hor-
gan (1996). if you take sokal’s hoax as a decisive attack against postmodern philoso-
phy, consider the possibility of placing some philosophical nonsense referring to the 
newest (and correctly reported) trend in physics in a physical journal without the ed-
itors noticing the philosophical shortcomings of the text. that does not seem impossi-
ble, either, does it? and surely this would not be interpreted as being harmful to mod-
ern physics.
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3.2.2. cRiTicisms of PosTmodeRn economic meThodology
i will start with some criticisms that are directed against Bruce caldwell’s con-
ception of pluralism. the next section will deal with attacks against mcclo-
skey’s rhetorical analysis of economics.
3.2.2.1. Problems with Pluralism in Economics
it makes little sense to discuss monism here as a critique of pluralism, as that 
would probably not lead to much more than the presentation of two oppos-
ing and irreconcilable views. Where monists believe that there can be one 
method underlying all scientific reasoning, pluralists are denying exactly this 
claim. in his review of caldwell’s Beyond Positivism, abrahm Hirsch hints at 
more specific critical points, the first one being an inconsistency of caldwell’s 
position – which shows up in the title itself. »Beyond Positivism« is inconsist-
ent with Pluralism, as it implies that positivism can be overcome somehow, 
whereas »a true pluralist would not say that we are beyond anything«92. cald-
well replies to that point by saying that pluralism can consistently claim to 
be beyond positivism, but not in the sense that positivism itself has to abol-
ished as wrong method; however, its strongly prescriptive claims can be criti-
cised by a pluralist as pluralism, as opposed to prescribing single methods.93 
i think caldwell can escape quite easily from the charge of inconsistency, 
but when Hirsch asks for more prescriptive content and bemoans caldwell’s 
concentrating only on the critical part, caldwell as a pluralist cannot really 
reply but merely expresses his view that the lack of prescription is actually a 
strength of pluralism. a last point Hirsch makes against pluralism regards its 
justification: Pluralism is justified by the fact that philosophy of science has, 
up until now, failed to find a single universal methodology.94 But this fact 
does not justify pluralism. the fact that something has not yet been discov-
ered cannot justify giving up the quest. But in the case of methodology and 
the task of finding a unified method, i think there are strong indicators that 
the quest is not likely to come to an end soon – or ever. this may not justify 
pluralism as a settled position, but it gains plausibility as an interim-position, 
which is exactly how caldwell defines it.95
interestingly, whereas Hirsch criticises caldwell for being exclusively re-
stricted to internal criticism, Lawrence Boland points out that caldwell’s ac-
ceptance of external criticism is a flaw in his conception.96 indeed, caldwell 
does not completely abandon external criticism. Boland reproaches cald-
well for taking philosophers’ views as external standards when appraising eco-
92 see Hirsch (1985), p. 178.
93 see caldwell (1985), p. 192-193.
94 see Hirsch (1985), p. 184.
95 see caldwell (1984), p. 243.
96 see Boland (1997), p. 149 et sqq.
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nomic theories.97 there is surely some point to this argument, but it is not 
an argument against pluralism in general, only to the specific way in which 
caldwell chooses to defend it. refuting Pluralism as such is nearly impos-
sible, as this comes down to proving the correctness of a single methodol-
ogy. the biggest drawback of pluralism is its lack of power for providing any 
methodological advice.
mccloskey’s rhetorical analyses raised many more discussions than did 
caldwell’s pluralism, and due to her provocative style and clear positioning 
as a postmodernist methodologist she is even better suited to cast a critical 
eye on postmodernism in economic methodology.
3.2.2.2. Problems with the Rhetorical Turn in Economic Methodology
as noted above, there are many criticisms of mccloskey’s approach. i will 
discuss some of them, but as in the section about criticisms of pluralism i 
will skip the most basic attack, which is the attempt to defend a foundation-
alist view of objective science. this objection has already been dealt with in 
some detail in section 3.2.1; additionally, a discussion of this criticism is not 
likely to be fruitful.98
the first point i will discuss is, however, similarly fundamental. it ad-
dresses mccloskey’s claim that all (capital m)-methodology and any kind of 
prescription is a fifth wheel and unjustifiable. two concerns are raised against 
this assertion: Firstly (and understandably), many methodologists are not at 
all pleased by being told they are useless or should stick to pure descriptive 
analysis. even if they accept that positivism (or modernism) has failed, they 
want to retain some prescriptive part in their works and feel that they have 
found ways to justify it.99 in their view, an exclusively descriptive methodol-
ogy would cease to be methodology proper and would rather be history of 
science. and indeed, mccloskey herself is not sticking to her alleged credo of 
the abandonment of prescriptions. Her books and papers are full of recom-
97 i will come to Boland’s position in more detail in section 5.2, as he proposes a meth-
odology that aims at more than being purely descriptive but is highly critical of pre-
scriptive methodologies nonetheless.
98 i also do not know of any attempt to criticise mccloskey along these lines. since Pop-
per’s attack against the logical positivists this road has been seemingly blocked in phi-
losophy of science. note that many of the arguments given below can be used against 
any form of social constructivism or normatively turned Kuhnian strand of philoso-
phy. For the sake of clarity and precision i stick to mccloskey as the argumentative 
enemy here.
99 see caldwell (1982), p. 217. caldwell’s pluralism is not prescriptive, as it is a me-
ta-methodological position, but it encourages prescription and criticism on a local 
level.
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mendations on how economics has to change100 and why it is on the »wrong 
track«101.
Understandably, this has led to many attacks charging her with inconsist-
ency.102 How can mccloskey attack prescriptive methodology on the one 
hand and give prescriptions on the other? i think mccloskey can be de-
fended from these charges; she is only attacking capital m-methodology, 
which claims to offer a single prescriptive method valid for all problems and 
theories.103 on a local level, criticism and prescription is welcome even for 
mccloskey. stanley Fish gives an illustrative example when saying that there 
is no universal theory of baseball, but surely »useful practical advice how to 
throw strikes and keep them off the bases«.104 as a tribute to her provoca-
tive style, mccloskey’s formulations are sometimes unclear and thus lead to 
charges of inconsistency. concerning prescription, she could have avoided 
much confusion if she had explained more openly her evaluative standards 
(may they be taken from literary criticism or anywhere else). it should be 
clear that given her rejection of global standards, these local standards must 
finally rest in her subjective value judgements. all mccloskey can do is to 
persuade economists of the aptness of her own standards, but that would be 
perfectly consistent with her writings.105
other accusations of inconsistency include mccloskey’s claims about 
Sprachethik. she argues consistently that honest and herrschaftsfrei rhetoric 
would lead to an improvement of economics. on the other hand, her writ-
ing is full of personal attacks and ridiculing of critics.106 there is surely much 
to this point, but keep in mind that it rests on a tu quoque fallacy: even if 
mccloskey does not live up to her own standards, that does not mean per 
se that her proposals are wrong. But still, such findings weaken her position 
and lower the persuasive force of her work. in a similar vein, it is hard to de-
termine whether mccloskey is in general affirmative or critical of the state of 
economics.107 trying to salvage her position, one could argue that she thinks 
100 she claims, for example, that the neoclassicals should become »more feminine«. see 
mccloskey (1993), p. 76.
101 see e. g. mccloskey (2006).
102 see e. g. caldwell/coats (1984) and mäki (1995).
103 Falsificationism is often said to be a methodology of this kind, but i think it is wrong 
to attribute this view to Popper personally, as he noted the problem of justifying a pre-
scription as early as in the first edition of The Logic of Scientific Discovery and speaks of 
his methodological rules as conventions. admittedly, Popper intended these conven-
tions to define the scientific game. in later works, however, Popper developed his con-
cept of critical rationalism, which is highly critical of imposing any rules. see cald-
well (1991) for a nice comparison of the two Poppers.
104 see Fish (2003), p. 414.
105 that is at last how i read her own defence. seemccloskey (1994), p. 199.
106 see Backhouse (1995), p. 301.
107 see mäki (1995), part 7.
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that many achievements of economics would be acceptable, but she holds 
that the majority of economists are methodologically uninformed and stick 
to an unjustifiable version of modernism. But again, due to her provocative 
style her work is highly ambiguous, which makes it hard to tell what exactly 
mccloskey wants to say. i can’t help but consider this to be a downside of 
mccloskeys work108. sometimes it seems that she is not even trying to be clear 
about the status of a claim. in this sense, at least, the »received view« that mc-
closkey fights against was certainly superior, more honest and hence easier 
to attack as well.
Yet another criticism does not concentrate on alleged inconsistencies 
but rather accuses mccloskey of attacking a straw man in her plea against 
»modernism«.109 indeed, it is doubtful if any economists would subscribe to 
the list that mccloskey created in order to define modernism. not only do 
economists not follow these rules, they don’t even »officially subscribe« to 
them. Working economists know the muddles of practice too well to be able 
to accept phrases like »observability entails objective, reproducible experi-
ments;« as their official methodology. similarly, mccloskey’s attack against 
»methodology« completely ignores the post-positivist literature. taking her 
writing literally (and that should be acceptable for any scientific writer) mc-
closkey confuses capital m-methodology with logical positivism. this ex-
plains the fury that can be found in her attacks, but her criticism seems to be 
kicking a dead horse rather than being innovative or provocative. this shows 
up best in her remarks that economists are using untestable assumptions. For 
a logical positivist of the 1920s this might be problematic, but it certainly is 
not for any philosopher of science of our time.
Finally, mccloskey has convinced many that the rhetorical analysis of 
economics is an interesting and even entertaining approach. nevertheless, 
methodologists and economists alike have mostly not been convinced to 
adopt her approach. even if one accepts her findings of rhetorical devices 
in economic papers, one can still ask the simple but damaging question, »so 
what?« of course, mccloskey is at pains to give answers to this question; 
some of them have been listed in section 3.1.2.2. But it seems that her argu-
ments have not been persuasive, i. e. they are unsuccessful by her own stand-
ards. Why should we accept the standards of literary criticism when discuss-
ing economic models? Why should economists change their style of writing 
the way mccloskey wants it?110 But before pushing too hard in criticising mc-
closkey, let’s keep in mind that this is a problem virtually any methodologist 
has to face. Practising economists do not like being told what they should do, 
and other methodologists prefer to criticise the views of their colleagues in-
108 this is a downside which may go hand in hand with the pleasure of reading her works.
109 see caldwell (comment on mccloskey), p. 576
110 see Backhouse, p. 299.
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stead of adopting them.111 so the fact that rhetorical analysis has not reached 
practising economists and that other methodologists have found points to 
criticise is no good reason to reject it across-the-board. However, this does 
suggest that it is not very helpful for »improving the quality of the discussion 
of economic models« which is a primary goal of economic methodology. so 
far, mccloskey has not been persuasive in promoting her own standard of 
persuasiveness.
3.3. PosTmodeRn meThodology – a summaTion
it is time to step back and have a broader look at the extent to which post-
modernism changed economic methodology.
it should be clear now that the more radical authors of postmodernism 
did not aim to design an overarching philosophical system as Quine still did 
with his holistic empiricism; instead, they claimed that scattered local knowl-
edge is all we should aim for. the careless and often ambiguous style of some 
postmodernist authors offers much room for justified attack, but the general 
postmodern claim that there is no firm, single foundation for our beliefs is 
hard to reject after the death of positivism. in that sense postmodernism has 
won the day, with the exception of those postmodernists who try to defend 
the relativity of facts as something that is more than their personal belief, i. e. 
an objective fact itself.
 as we saw in chapter 2.3, empiricist methodologies face several difficul-
ties when applied to economics. methodological pluralism takes the post-
modernist movement seriously and proposes to allow for various different 
standards when discussing different theories. Postmodern works surely have 
an advantage over the very general writings of philosophy of science, since the 
postmodernists tend to deal very carefully with the peculiarities of the mod-
els and theories under consideration and hence do not adopt a »mickey-
mouse view« of science, as their modernist predecessors were often accused 
of doing. But »pluralism« cannot say anything meaningful about how to eval-
uate economic models, and the standards proposed by the advocates of mc-
closkey’s rhetorical approach do not seem to be convincing in many re-
spects. this is why the major strands of postmodern economic methodology 
are not of much use for my project of theory evaluation. it seems that the de-
bate about truth and relativism led away from improving the discussion of 
economic theories and was rather detached from the questions economists 
had.
111 it should be noted once again that the rhetoric approach has been a great success 
in economic methodology and mccloskey is far from being the only one who sub-
scribes to it. she is only the most prominent one.

4. Trying To overcome The DichoTomy 
of empiricism anD posTmoDernism: 
esTablishing a pragmaTic view on 
economic meThoDology
now we are in a position to make a fresh start and ask the central question 
of theory appraisal for economic theories: how can we assess economic the-
orising? in this chapter, i will discuss several approaches that escape the rela-
tivistic trend of postmodernism without ignoring or trying to refute the argu-
ments that i called irrefutable in the foregoing chapter, i. e. without searching 
for a firm fundament as the basis for prescriptions.
The aim of this chapter is to arrive at a methodological position that re-
tains evaluative standards without falling back on the dogmas of empiricism 
and falsificationism. The main constructive stance opposing radical relativ-
ism will be the diverging usefulness of different methods for contributing to 
the solution of specific problems.1
even when acknowledging that problems themselves may differ through-
out history or among cultures, the approach of taking the contribution of a 
theory or model for solving a specific problem as the evaluative basis for ap-
praising its usefulness in a specific context looks promising if we are aiming 
to escape the dichotomy of dogmatically empiristic positions and relativis-
tic views, as the notoriously confusing notion of truth is no longer in focus.2 
This restricts the sense in which i will use the term »pragmatic«: evaluative 
standards are constrained by the problem under consideration. more spe-
cifically: a pragmatic approach to theory evaluation is antifoundationalist, 
problem-oriented and does not presume knowledge of truth nor any other 
universal fundament.3 from this follows that the quality of theories shows 
up in whether or not they are actually used (be it in science or in other appli-
cations) in the process of solving a problem.4
1 note that i consider »problem« to be a very wide concept that is not restricted to 
»practical problems« but can include any sort of theoretical questions as well. if 
a problem is as abstract as the question, »how do we discover truth?« a problem-
oriented methodology must suspend judgement for competing theories, because 
there is no way to answer the question of which theory is better in solving this 
problem. for a detailed discussion see section 4.2.
2 even if problem-orientation is central to popper’s work, the second chap-
ter showed that either he or his followers did not take it really seriously.
3 i do not adopt a pragmatic theory of truth; rather, i avoid the notoriously mis-
leading term »truth« altogether.
4 note the similarity to richard rorty’s pragmatism, see e. g. rorty (1994), p. 61.
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4.1 Finding a new Balance
in the following section i will elaborate on some methodological concepts 
that circumvent the problems of empiricist positions but neither fall back on 
relativism nor take external standards as their evaluative basis. critically dis-
cussing each approach will finally lead to a methodological framework that 
is well suited for theory evaluation in economics.
4.1.1. an apt View oF an inexact Science
when discussing theory appraisal in economics it is most important to un-
derstand what economists actually do and what the status of their theories 
and models is. Daniel hausman was among the first to stress focusing on ac-
tual scientific practice in the philosophy of economics while still holding a 
normative stance. opposing falsificationist criticisms (especially of Terence 
hutchison5), he actually defends economics against claims that it is empiri-
cally empty due to the heavy usage of unspecified ceteris paribus clauses. in 
an introductory remark, hausman ironically refutes the conviction that un-
specified ceteris paribus clauses inevitably lead to complete empirical emp-
tiness: »it is certainly not the case that, ceteris paribus, we are all immortal 
or that ravens are pink«.6 contrary to hutchison and his empiricist follow-
ers, hausman sees the vast usage of ceteris paribus clauses in economics as 
justifiable and unavoidable. relying heavily on the philosophy of John stu-
art mill, hausman reconstructs economics as an inexact and separate science 
that legitimately uses an a priori method, which he characterises as follows:7
1 »Formulate credible (ceteris paribus) and pragmatically convenient gener-
alizations concerning the operation of relevant causal factors.
2. Deduce from these generalizations and statements of initial conditions, 
simplifications, etc., predictions concerning relevant phenomena.
3. Test the predictions.
4. if the predictions are correct, then regard the whole amalgam as con-
firmed. if the predictions are not correct, then compare alternative ac-
counts of the failure on the basis of explanatory success, empirical pro-
gress, and pragmatic usefulness.«
5 see section 2.2.1.
6 hausman (1992b), p. 41.
7 hausman (1992a), p. 222.
4.1 finding a new balance 109
while at first sight this characterisation may strikingly resemble a falsifica-
tionist picture, there are important differences: in the first step, hausman un-
derlines the importance of the prima facie credibility of basic generalisations 
and does not ask economists to make »bold conjectures« and take high risks 
in their predictions, as a falsificationist would do. The last step diverges from 
the popperian falsificationist account in the regard that it does not speak of 
falsification at all, even if the predictions are not confirmed.
These points need some additional elaboration: for hausman, economics 
is an inexact science. after rejecting several possible sources of inexactness, 
such as the probabilistic nature of economic laws or laws being only rules of 
thumb, he settles on a view that locates the source of inexactness in the im-
plicit qualification of economic laws.8 The laws by themselves are exact, but 
the complex and uncontrollable nature of the economic domain makes sta-
ble circumstances impossible, which rules out controlled testing of the basic 
laws.
an example may clarify this view: The law of demand states that consum-
ers buy more of a good when its price decreases. This law includes an im-
plicit ceteris paribus clause, and this is the reason why the law does not al-
ways hold. for example, in a recession the demand for catering-services may 
drop, even if the prices fall. several other disturbances can be easily imag-
ined: a scandal at the company, a decrease in quality or the emergence of a 
substitute product. so in many cases the demand for a product may fall even 
if its price is decreased.
Therefore, the status of economic laws cannot be justified by frequent em-
pirical confirmation. but how can these laws reasonably be said to be caus-
ally working when we do not see the results they suggest on a regular basis? To 
take the easiest example of consumer demand: why do we have reason to be-
lieve in the law of demand even if we frequently (but not usually!) see grow-
ing demand after rising prices? again referring to John stuart mill, hausman 
lists three conditions for a sentence s to count as a law even if it contains im-
plicit qualifications:9
1. s is lawlike. (hausman does not go into details here, but it seems safe 
to assume that lawlikeness includes the formal need for an universally 
quantified conditional and must semantically fulfil the criterion of 
making counterfactuals credibly true.10)
8 see hausman (1992b), p. 41 et sqq. or hausman (1992a), p. 132 et sqq.
9 see hausman (1992b), p. 42.
10 Take the example of the law of demand again: it is a universally quantified con-
ditional (for all products holds: if their price drops, then c.p. demand increases) 
and it makes credibly true the counterfactual »if the price of this products falls, 
demand will increase.« not all universally quantified conditionals satisfy the sec-
ond condition, particularly those that are only accidental generalisations and 
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2. when one removes the vague qualifications of s, s is in some »natural« 
class of cases often confirmed and seldom disconfirmed. »natural« re-
fers here to a range of cases that reflect the diversity found in the world 
and means to exclude biased testing.
3. scientists have some knowledge of the interfering factors that violate the 
ceteris paribus condition in s and can refine the law by specifying this 
knowledge in a non-ad hoc way.
in addition to this classificatory list, hausman provides more arguments for 
why many economics laws11 may be acceptable as scientific laws, even if they 
are in reality often contradicted. The main point is that these contradictions 
can be considered excusable because the ceteris paribus clauses are the weak 
link in the whole amalgam that is set to test. if the researchers have some 
knowledge about the interfering factors, they can give legitimate excuses why 
a prediction has not come true. finally, a law should be refinable, in the sense 
that this knowledge about interfering factors can be incorporated in order to 
make the law more reliable in the future.12
as shown in section 2.3.1.4, a disconfirmation never shows the source of 
error. a falsificationist would not allow assigning degrees of faith in certain 
premises, but hausman is convinced that economists are justified in believ-
ing that general economic assumptions such as utility maximisation (in its 
broadest sense) are less likely to be the source of error than the implicit cet-
eris paribus assumption.13
This leads directly to the a priori method hausman suggests: The set of 
premises is externally justified, be it by introspection, induction or just by 
the fact that it allows for explanations that employ a very familiar kind of 
folk-psychological reasoning. The following calculations gain their credibil-
ity primarily from these premises, and not mainly from their predictive suc-
cess. This may lead to modelling behaviour that appears to be very dogmatic. 
it would be dogmatic indeed if the basic premises were treated as sacrosanct 
against all new evidence.14 as said, there are good a priori reasons to believe 
in many economic laws, be it the law of demand, the gossen laws, or util-
ity maximisation. hausman writes: »without qualification and a margin of 
hence are not real laws. see e. g. goodman (1955), p. 75ff. for a congenial discus-
sion.
11 apart from the often quoted law of falling demand famous economic laws in-
clude the law of diminishing returns, the gossen laws or the law of supply.
12 see hausman (1992a), p. 141.
13 see hausman (1992a), p. 207.
14 if that was the case it would need at last explanation, how economics managed 
to exist for over 200 years, if one does not assume that it is based successfully on 
fraud.
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error, they are false, but, with these, they seem true.«15 additionally, eco-
nomic laws possess several pragmatic virtues, as they make economic theory 
tractable, consistent, determinate and formally complete. some of these laws 
have about their only justification in those pragmatic virtues, but their ac-
ceptance can be justified nonetheless: if economics were based on more »re-
alistic« premises, it would lose much of the simplicity or normative force it 
has.16 empirical adequacy is not the only aim of science, and this can provide 
reasons for economists to stick to their basic laws.17
hausman’s reconstruction of economics as an inexact science that legit-
imately employs an a priori method helps to defend much of what econo-
mists are doing from empiricist attacks, but hausman does not argue that 
everything economists do is scientifically legitimate. he discusses in detail 
cases in which sticking to standard economic theory was reasonable and oth-
ers in which this led to ignorantly rejecting evidence (using the example of 
preference reversals).18 for hausman, economists have reasons to try to pre-
serve standard economic theory, and they can defend the attempt to formu-
late unified and complete models against the piecemeal engineering of more 
psychologically grounded theories. by this, economics becomes a separate 
science with a distinctive method. however, economists are surely on the 
wrong track if they turn the defence of their method into an attack of others 
that have more direct links to empirical investigations.
The idea that empirical counterevidence is not sufficient for theory change 
is at least as old as Thomas Kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions. as a 
result of such »dogmatic« but justifiable behaviour, economics becomes a 
separate science. its basic premises may rest on a kind of folk psychology, 
but economics is best understood as clearly separated from psychology, as 
it does not care about actual individual motivations. explanations for many 
macro-phenomena can be given in the abstract language of economics and 
would not gain much from a deeper psychological analysis. again referring 
to mill, hausman postulates the causal factors of economics to be separate 
from other sciences: »one can separate the subject matter of political econ-
omy from other social phenomena as if the desire for wealth were virtually 
15 see hausman (1992a), p. 210.
16 note again that if economics is seen as a normative theory of rational behaviour, 
it cannot be based on empirically observed behaviour, because – as known since 
the days of hume – an »ought« cannot be derived from an »is«.
17 another, more indirect defence of much of the abstract reasoning economists 
perform can be given by hausman’s view of models. for hausman, a model in 
itself is neither true nor false but merely a kind of predicate that defines a system. 
by that definition, hausman allows for much unapplied conceptual exploration 
as is common in economics. of course, ultimately models must somehow fit to 
empirical data. see hausman (1992b), p. 25 et sqq.
18 see hausman (1992a), chapter 12.
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the only relevant causal factor«19. even if exact prediction will never be pos-
sible, there are separate causal factors at work, which are only visible in ten-
dencies of the economic system. The fact that there are interfering factors 
that often counteract classic economic forces does not deprive these forces 
of their causal status:20 hausman takes consumer demand as an example to 
show how there can be knowledge about the workings of several factors such 
as price, the price of substitutes, income and tastes and still exist no way to 
make precise predictions. here, a change in tastes would be an interfering 
factor that makes prediction impossible, but still the classic economic factors 
can be meaningfully said to have a causal status.
The isolation of factors makes economics unrealistic, but still the eco-
nomic factors describe an aspect of reality. in contrast to albert, hausman 
sees the vagueness in economics as justified, but similar to albert he pleads 
for more empirical work: even if economists can excuse the inexactness of 
their theories, excuses are not very helpful in the long run. Therefore, after 
justifying the general method of neoclassical economics against unjust at-
tacks, hausman criticises some orthodox economic research for its dogma-
tism and lack of empirical content. he states that while economists have 
reason to strive for a unified theory, they overemphasise this aspect. and 
while sticking to »economic« factors may be legitimate, an integration of 
other, more psychological factors would be helpful in many cases. haus-
man takes akerlof and Dickens’ »The economic consequences of cogni-
tive Dissonance«21 as an example.22 The main argument of this paper is that 
workers in risky jobs can improve their satisfaction with their jobs by under-
estimating the risks. The inclusion of non-pecuniary costs is a psychological 
factor that can be perfectly integrated in economic rational-choice models.
Upshot:
after having delivered many arguments justifying the practice of neoclassical 
economics, hausman claims that economists should be more open to inte-
grating other than pecuniary factors into their models and should shift prior-
ity from unifying theory to learning from empirical data, as difficult as that 
may seem.
19 hausman (1992a), p. 145. note that hausman is referring to a narrow interpre-
tation of the homo oeconomicus here that is only affected by the »desire for 
wealth«.
20 for an excellent elaboration on the concept of causation see mackie (1974), p. 59 
et sqq. The general idea is in short that »causes are insufficient but necessary 
components in sets of factors that are unnecessary but sufficient for the effect to 
occur« (hausman (1992a), p. 295.). of course, this does not solve the ontological 
question of whether causality exists as a form of power or is nothing more than 
an unexceptional succession of events in time that cannot be explained any fur-
ther. for a discussion of this point see esfeld (2007).
21 see akerlof/Dickens (1982).
22 see hausman (1992a), p. 258 et sqq.
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4.1.1.1. Critical Discussion
hausman surely depicts a convincing view of economics and its underlying 
methodology that has the advantage of being descriptively accurate without 
accusing economists of irrationality or gross dogmatism. but as convincing 
as this picture is, there are some deficits.
The first and most general is the normative vagueness of hausman’s work. 
he provides various pragmatic defences of economic practice and in the end 
argues for caring more about empirical data and less about a unified theory. 
he states that in general, economists are justified in their methodology, but 
sometimes they exaggerate. while this seems prima facie to be a correct dia-
gnosis, hausman fails to specify the exaggerations more precisely or to give 
substantive argumentative background to his normative claims. he writes 
that for economists, »piecemeal theorizing that relies on substantive gener-
alizations with limited applicability is apparently not worth considering. but 
such theorizing seems to be needed.«23 This is essentially the same plea that 
hans albert made in 1950s when he asked for a sociologisation of econom-
ics. but is it really astonishing that hausman asks for more such work, if he 
looks exclusively at neoclassical economics that is actually defined by a sep-
arate methodology of rational-choice theorising? hausman correctly identi-
fied neoclassical economics as being a separate science. his normative plea 
to give up on the separation a little is therefore not convincing. it would 
probably work better the other way round: why not ask psychologists and 
sociologists to apply their methods to economic problems than to ask econ-
omists to give up their (separate) methodology? if hausman’s prescriptions 
are promising, certainly other sciences should be interested in analysing eco-
nomic problems.
additionally, hausman’s picture of economics is clearly too narrow. even 
if he unmistakably states that he only deals with mainstream neoclassical 
economics, he even excludes models that use equilibrium theory but employ 
non-pecuniary costs. This is vital for his separation thesis to make sense, but 
it is doubtful if even mainstream economists would agree to such a character-
isation. at the latest since the works of gary becker, economists do not draw 
the demarcation-line to other sciences not in terms of the economic domain 
they discuss but merely by the rational-choice methodology they employ. 
even if, using this definition, economics is still separate and does not allow 
for irrational behaviour or true altruism, it is much less separate than haus-
man’s picture suggests, because it already integrates all sorts of costs.
next, hausman does not pay much attention to justifying his empiricist 
convictions. while they are undoubtedly convincing as far as scientific prac-
tice is concerned, one could expect more attention to the shortcomings of 
empiricist epistemology from a philosopher – citing John stuart mill will not 
23 hausman (1992a), p. 244.
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do for convincing the enemies of empiricism. This is especially true because 
hausman provides so much defence for neglecting empirical data and stick-
ing to an a priori-justified theory. hausman deals in a similarly pragmatic way 
with induction: he accepts it as an integral part of science that can increase 
the credibility of a hypothesis. again, for philosophers this might be prob-
lematic, but since hausman wrote his book in order to change economics,24 
it is probably more apt to avoid lengthy discussion of the problem of induc-
tion because they are not likely to solve it.25
There is another criticism of hausman by Uskali mäki, who says that in-
exactness and separateness – which are, according to hausman, the key con-
cepts for understanding economics – are not independent factors, and takes 
the view that economics’ being a separate science is one reason for its inexact-
ness.26 again, there is much to this point, and philosophically it hits haus-
man’s concept. but from a pragmatic point of view it does not matter very 
much, as the description of economics as a separate and inexact science is 
not affected by the dependency of these two main characteristics.
one could summarise most of the criticisms of hausman by saying that 
while his picture is brilliant on the descriptive side, it leads at best to norma-
tive vagueness. if theory appraisal is the goal, something must be added to 
hausman’s still-impressive work.
4.1.1.2. Lessons Learned
in which sense is hausman’s work a pragmatic solution to the dichotomy of 
empiricism and relativism?
it is one, because it shows how vagueness and tendency-statements in 
economics can be justified without referring to an empirical basis and why 
claiming more severe falsification is probably not helpful for the advance of 
economics. hausman shows why employing an a priori method is not un-
scientific if there are pragmatic reasons for the a priori statements. so haus-
man is clearly neither a falsificationist nor a classic empiricist. but he is not 
a relativist, either: not everything that economists do is justified. hausman 
criticises in particular their unwillingness to import central findings of neigh-
bour sciences into economics if that would force them to give up the equi-
librium reasoning.
24 see hausman (1992a), p. 262.
25 There are, in fact, some newer philosophical discussions aiming at re-establishing 
induction as a valid method. for an overview see rosenthal (2007). while haus-
man does not offer a solution to the problem of induction, he argues at length 
that using induction is unavoidable by showing how it slips in even within pop-
per’s radically anti-inductivist philosophy – and how popper’s views become en-
tirely relativist if he does not admit this. see hausman (1992a), p. 200 et sqq.
26 see mäki (1998a).
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his justification of neoclassical economics is not relativist, either. here 
hausman argues in favour of scientific values such as simplicity, generality, 
tractability and even theoretical beauty. many of his justifications use ex-
plicit pragmatic reasoning (the word »pragmatic« can be found 29 times in 
his book compared to just 2 times in mark blaug’s 1982 classic).
finally, hausman’s characterisation of models as predicates that are nei-
ther true nor false by themselves allows him to take a less grim view on »for-
malism« than empiricist methodologists usually adopt. note that hausman 
does not argue that the best methodology will prevail automatically as the 
result of competition in the marketplace of ideas. he defends a normative 
methodology that avoids many of the shortcomings of classic empiricist po-
sitions, the main problem with his position being that there is no »epis-
temic meat on the normative bones«27, meaning that his normative claims 
are somewhat underargued. i will try to fill that gap in the following sections.
4.1.2. a pragmatic interpretation oF milton Friedman’S methodology
milton friedman’s seminal 1953 essay on economic methodology has dom-
inated the discussion among economic methodologists in many ways. as 
far as practicing economists are concerned, it is the only piece of methodol-
ogy that a large number of them are aware of.28 in economic methodology, it 
is surely the most highly debated statement ever made. in general, the more 
philosophically inclined methodologists have been highly critical of fried-
man’s position, calling it unclear or even self-contradictory and false.29 i will 
not repeat many of these criticisms here, but will rather present a new read-
ing of the essay that has emerged only recently. This reading stresses the prag-
matic aspects of friedman’s methodology and can hence help for finding a 
methodology that avoids both the empiricist and the relativist sins described 
in the preceding chapters.
The most commonly held view reduces friedman’s essay to the point that 
the assumptions of a theory do not matter because all we should expect from 
27 hands (2001), p. 310.
28 see hausman (1992a), p. 162.
29 for some important discussion see e. g. musgrave (1981), rotwein (1959), sam-
uelson (1963), boland (1979), musgrave (1981) or mäki (2009) for a recent book 
collecting several papers on f53 (short for friedman (1953)). i will not deliver an 
introductory summary of friedman’s essay here, as it is hard to summarize it in 
a neutral way due to the huge amount of different interpretations available in the 
literature. The pragmatic interpretation which i will develop here is therefore not 
the only one consistent with the text. of course, in my view, it is the one that fits 
best friedman’s general point, even if it has to live with some inconsistencies.
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economics is good predictions. This is a grossly misleading interpretation, as 
i will show.30
before presenting the new interpretation, i shall discuss Daniel hausman’s 
arguments against friedman, because they are typical for a large class of ac-
cusations made against friedman’s essay. interestingly hausman calls fried-
man’s methodology »pragmatic instrumentalism«31, but as we shall see, haus-
man himself does not take this label seriously.
according to hausman, friedman claims that the assumptions underlying 
a model are irrelevant and all that is relevant is predictive success.32 hausman 
tries to spot an error in this claim by providing an analogy: suppose you want 
to buy a used car. friedman would say that the only relevant test for assess-
ing the quality of the car is checking whether the car drives safely, econom-
ically and comfortably. looking under the hood and checking the status of 
the components is not necessary. hausman claims it is obvious that no one 
would buy a car without looking under the hood. similarly, we should check 
the assumptions of theories as well and not merely rely on predictive success 
as the only criterion. hausman takes this to be an argument against fried-
man’s position.
This critique is typical for a class of accusations made against friedman’s 
case. such accusations, however, are attacking a straw man, because a more 
thorough reading of friedman’s essay easily shows that he does not hold the 
position that the assumptions of a theory are irrelevant.
when hausman writes »what is relevant is not whether the assumptions 
are perfectly true, but whether they are adequate approximations and whether 
their falsehood is likely to matter for particular purposes«,33 this is meant as 
an attack against friedman – but ironically it is rather a reformulation of his 
position. as friedman says, »To put this point less paradoxically, the relevant 
question to ask about the ›assumptions‹ of a theory is not whether they are 
descriptively ›realistic,‹ for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently 
good approximations for the purpose in hand.«34 reading the foregoing 
quote it becomes clear that friedman does not claim that the assumptions 
of a theory do not matter, but quite the opposite: it is crucial for a theory 
30 see schliesser (2005), schröder (2004) and hoover (2004) for some other recent 
interpretations of friedman’s classic that agree on this point.
31 hausman (1992a), p. 162. This is due to the fact the friedman takes predictive 
success as a criterion only for the phenomena a theory is intend to explain.
32 see hausman (1992b), p. 71.
33 hausman (1992b), p. 72. This quote points to an inconsistency in hausman’s at-
tack, who on the one hand claims that assumptions should be adequate »for par-
ticular purposes« and on the other hand says that wide (not narrow) predictive 
success should be used for judging the adequateness of assumptions. friedman is 
more consistently asking for narrow predictive success.
34 friedman (1953), p. 15.
4.1 finding a new balance 117
whether the assumptions are sufficiently rightly chosen! similar to haus-
man, friedman claims that realisticness35 is the wrong criterion by which to 
judge assumptions. he tries to show this by a reductio ad absurdum: »a com-
pletely ‘realistic’ theory of the wheat market would have to include not only 
the conditions directly underlying the supply and demand for wheat but also 
the kind of coins or credit instruments used to make exchanges; the personal 
characteristics of wheat-traders such as the color of each trader’s hair and 
eyes […]«36. The recent discussion of friedman eventually acknowledges that 
friedman does not encourage ignoring the assumptions but demands to look 
for pragmatically usefully assumptions instead of mechanically trying to im-
prove their realisticness.37
The above arguments should make it clear that friedman does not con-
sider the assumptions of a theory to be irrelevant; rather, he points to the 
deficits of the naïve demand for more realistic assumptions in economics. 
friedman takes a contrary position to this view: model building necessarily 
requires simplification, and good models can »explain much by little«.38 This 
is why interesting models must rely on assumptions which are descriptively 
unrealistic – and making them more realistic does not lead automatically to 
better models. modelling is different from mere abstraction; it necessarily in-
volves construction and is not just a matter of extracting parts from reality. 
These are all well-accepted arguments supporting the view that it can be rea-
sonable to use unrealistic abstractions. what neither the above arguments nor 
friedman imply is that all unrealistic assumptions lead to good models.39 his 
point is rather that some unrealism is necessary, and it is even an advantage 
if it is unrealism of the right kind.
35 note that friedman equates »realistic» assumptions with descriptively accurate 
ones. Therefore, his thesis is not an ontological but a methodological one. »re-
alisticness« is a term introduced by Uskali mäki that distinguishes descriptively 
accurate (realistic) assumptions from the philosophical position of realism (the 
relation of theories to the world). see e. g. mäki (1998b)
36 friedman (1953), p. 32.
37 friedman notes that it is not all clear per se what counts as assumption and what 
counts as implication, because it depends on the aim of modeling if a statement 
like »firms maximise profits« is used as a basic assumption or if it is an implica-
tion. see friedman (1953), p. 8 and p. 26-27.
38 friedman (1953), p. 14. see bornholdt (2005) for a recent statement of this meth-
odological credo even in the natural sciences.
39 sometimes it seems that this view is attributed to friedman, even if it is obvi-
ously absurd. (see e. g. samuelson (1963), p. 233.) such critics seem to forget that 
friedman accepts only those assumptions that lead to correct predictions. be-
sides that, it is a simple logical error to conclude from friedman’s statement »the 
more significant a theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions« that unrealistic 
assumptions imply significant theories.
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when looking for a new interpretation it is »[…] necessary to detach one-
self from the technicalities of the argument and to ask quite naively what it is 
all about.«40 i. e. even if many critics validly find inconsistencies in f5241, it is 
still possible they misunderstand friedman’s main point which is why their 
criticisms are not particularly convincing. besides that, even philosophically 
problematic methodological advice can be helpful for practitioners – and it 
is clear that friedman wrote his text for economists and not for professional 
philosophers.42 The pioneering publications that gave the discussion of f53 
its pragmatic turn were hirsch/Demarchi 1990 and mayer 1993.43 in the fol-
lowing, i present a personal summary of a pragmatic reading of friedman’s 
methodological position:
1. it is important to note that f53 was written at a time when popper was 
unknown to most economists. f53 is best understood as a plea against 
the unproductive methodological quarrels between empiricists, who ar-
gued in favour of gathering data for deriving a more descriptively ac-
curate economic science, and the neoclassical school, which seemed to 
advocate an a priori method of blackboard economics and did not care 
much about the empirics at all.44 friedman’s position lies in the mid-
dle of the two extremes, as he demands empirical adequacy in the out-
comes but not at the foundations of economic theories.
2. friedman’s much-criticised credo »the more significant the theory, the 
more unrealistic the assumptions«45 and its even more counterintuitive 
inversion »the more realistic the assumptions, the less significant the 
theory« can be salvaged: at this point of his argumentation, friedman 
is merely advocating to »explain much by little«46. The examples fried-
man employs (recall the quote about a realistic representation of the 
wheat market above) to show why it is of no use to dogmatically insist 
on more realistic assumptions support this view. it is doubtful whether 
friedman licensed the formalist revolution by this, as he clearly stresses 
40 mayer (1993), p. 213.
41 from this point on, f53 is used as an abbreviation for friedman (1953).
42 see e. g. hammond (1992), p. 229.
43 other important contributions to this new line of interpretation include e. g. 
boumans (2003), hoover (2004), schröder (2004) and schliesser (2005). hoover 
is probably the most extreme case, as he even attributes causal realism to fried-
man.
44 The most prominent case of a methodological debate around this question is the 
so-called ältere methodenstreit between gustav schmoller and carl menger at 
the end of the twentieth century. it is doubtful, however, if the protagonists re-
ally held the extreme positions that are nowadays attributed to them. see back-
haus/hansen (2000).
45 friedman (1953), p. 14.
46 friedman (1953), p. 14.
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the need for testable predictions.47 he is pleading not for unrealistic as-
sumptions but for evaluating the quality of assumptions only indirectly 
by their ability to create useful and empirically valid models for solving 
given problems.48 This does not differ in principle from a popperian ac-
count of science as critical guessing, where all theories are nothing but 
hypotheses. in short, again: what matters is the adequacy of assump-
tions, not their »truth«.
3. friedman’s position includes explanation as a valid aim of science and 
is not restricted to prediction or merely finding correlations. contrary 
to a widely accepted interpretation, friedman does not see prediction 
as the only aim of science. rather, the way he uses the term »prediction« 
includes explanation – he explicitly notes that prediction, in the sense he 
uses it, is not restricted to future or novel facts.49 accepting this, fried-
man is not an instrumentalist who cares only about prediction. rather, 
his views can be interpreted as a pragmatic type of critical rationalism, 
since he advocates falsifying theories by empirical test but allows for in-
ductive reasoning more openly than popper does.50
4. f53 is an early piece of methodology advocating the economics of sci-
ence approach, which will be discussed in section 4.1.3. The economic 
approach to methodology may be the underlying reason for the suc-
cess f53 had. one quote from f53 shall suffice here for substantiating 
the claim:51 »The gains from greater accuracy, which depend on the pur-
pose in mind, must then be balanced against the costs of achieving it.«52
5. as hirsch/Demarchi conclude in their extensive study, friedman’s 
methodology is founded in american pragmatism and is therefore 
placed in the middle ground between empiricism and relativism53 that 
i am exploring in this chapter.54 friedman is taking problem-solving in 
the centre of theory evaluation. Therefore, classic criteria such as logical 
47 see hands (2003) for a discussion.
48 friedman’s strong focus on problems is the reason why he opts against the search 
for realistic assumptions. e. g., if preferences are better seen as constant or not de-
pends on the problem one tackles and not on the »nature« of preferences.
49 see friedman (1953), p. 9. additionally, he uses the word »explain« 23 times in 
his essay, but only sets it cautiously in quotation marks 3 times – which shows 
that friedman does not in general have a problem with the term.
50 recall the discussion about verisimilitude and corroboration in section 2.3.2.2 
where it was shown that popper cannot avoid inductive reasoning completely.
51 a more thorough analysis can be found in schröder (2004), p. 190 et sqq.
52 friedman (1953), p. 17.
53 actually, they rather see friedman as being in the middleground between empir-
icism and apriorism, but as friedman firmly expresses normative claims, he can 
surely be seen as an opponent of relativism, too.
54 see hirsch/Demarchi (1990).
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consistency and even truth do not matter per se but only when they are 
relevant for the problem in hand.55
presented like this, friedman’s position sounds rather acceptable, but – as in-
tense as the discussion centred around friedman’s essay still is – a defence of 
this reading is surely needed. in the following i will defend friedman’s cen-
tral argument in favour of unrealistic assumptions and present in greater de-
tail the pragmatic aspects of his methodology.
when accepting the pragmatic interpretation of f53, it is important not 
to confuse the notion of »pragmatism« with a pragmatist theory of truth or 
a kind of anti-theoretical conviction. pragmatism here is to be understood 
as the conviction that it is important whether or not a theory »works« – and 
that this is independent from whether or not it is a true representation of the 
world.
i will start the defence of my pragmatic reading with the most provocative 
point of friedman’s methodology, which is surely his position concerning 
the value of realistic assumptions. common sense and orthodox methodol-
ogy56 hold the view that good economic theory must be based on realistic as-
sumptions. friedman, however, seems to argue backward, from the corrobo-
ration of the implications to the quality of the assumptions. in a strict logical 
sense, this is of course erroneous: if a i holds, it is wrong to conclude from 
that i a. but friedman does not argue like this; his reasoning is more com-
plex. he recommends starting an analysis by carefully examining the empir-
ical situation one aims to study, i. e. to start with a study of the implications 
of a theory.57 Then he advises to try to rationalise these findings by building 
a model based on assumptions.
This model is tested against the empirical data, mostly by trying to retro-
dict historical data. if this procedure is successful, this counts as a confirma-
tion of a model. contrary to popper, friedman allows for induction here, i. e. 
the more a model is confirmed (=not falsified) by empirical testing, the more 
reason we have to believe in it.58
now, in what sense are the assumptions of a model unrealistic? There is 
more than one line of interpretation, as friedman seems to use the term »un-
55 friedman takes problem-orientation much more seriously than did popper, who 
conceived of science as a quest for truth (and truth is a concept that is problem-
indepdendent by definition). This allows friedman to accept some economic 
theories that popper must reject, because they have counter-instances outside the 
domain of problems they were made to help solve.
56 e. g. hausman and samuelson (1963) argue along these lines.
57 see e. g. hirsch/Demarchi (1990), p. 103.
58 see friedman (1953), p. 29. similar to hausman, friedman avoids a detailed dis-
cussion of the problem of induction, probably because he believes that no solu-
tion is available.
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realistic/realistic« in various ways.59 first, as noted above, assumptions are 
false in the trivial sense that they are never complete. but friedman wants to 
state more than that. for him, modelling includes not only abstraction, i. e. 
omitting details from reality, but to go beyond the data and create assump-
tions about causality via abduction60, as the mechanisms that the researcher 
postulates are usually empirically unobservable. if this is granted, assump-
tions will be unrealistic in a sense that is different from descriptive incom-
pleteness; they are »unrealistic« because they contain more than what is ob-
servable.61 in a third sense, assumptions may be unrealistic because they are 
directly opposed to observation or contradict common knowledge.62 This is 
a type of unrealism that can be attributed to many assumptions in economic 
theory. all three of the above cases show that it is possible for assumptions to 
be unrealistic in some sense and yet useful for a specific purpose.
but again, friedman’s claims go further: he argues that realisticness is 
not a criterion for assumptions at all.63 now, usually economic assumptions 
(such as utility maximisation) are defended in terms of their realisticness, 
which probably means that they describe the motives of human behaviour in 
a plausible way. but how can we judge if the seemingly plausible assumptions 
are realistic? This can be done only by looking at the implications they yield. 
This is the core of friedman’s argument: if one tries to defend assumptions 
independently from their implications, one is restricted to vague and conven-
tionalist plausibility-considerations, which cannot deliver a solid basis for re-
search.64 according to friedman, plausibility considerations are even harm-
ful to scientific reasoning: appearances are often deceiving, and relying too 
much on what seems plausible hinders creative progress in model building – 
our plausibility assessments can change radically when a seemingly implausi-
59 see hirsch/Demarchi (1990), p. 15 et sqq.
60 abduction is a technical term coined by charles sanders peirce and simply 
means »studying the facts and devising a theory to explain them.« peirce (1867), 
5, p. 145.
61 This statement does not touch the philosophical position of scientific realism, 
which is a theory about the truth-status of causal connections in scientific theo-
ries. The above argument is headed against a more naïve form of realism, which 
identifies realism with a one-to-one correspondence to observation.
62 friedman does not actually make these distinctions, which led to many ambigu-
ities concerning his position. see section 4.1.2.1 for a discussion.
63 see e. g. friedman (1953), p. 41.
64 see hirsch/Demarchi (1990), p. 16. mäki points out that even if there is no di-
rect test for assumptions, they can still be tested in other contexts and hence at-
tributed a certain degree of realisticness before they are applied in a new model. 
see mäki (2005b), p. 9. friedman attributes this kind of reasoning to the utility-
maximisation assumption. see friedman (1953), p. 28.
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ble model yields good results and becomes more and more accepted.65 one 
of the best examples for this is surely Darwin’s theory of evolution, which is 
based on assumptions that seemed strongly implausible at time the theory 
was developed.
To sum up, friedman starts with the implications and cares about the as-
sumptions afterwards, but this is not to say the assumptions are irrelevant; 
quite the opposite! first, of course the assumptions must lead to implica-
tions, which fit the observable world at least roughly in the relevant aspects. 
second, they should be of a kind that encourages further research, i. e. they 
should be general, simple and adoptable to new applications (this is what 
friedman calls »fruitfulness«). Third, they should be as simple as possible, 
but not simpler.66
as should become clear from the foregoing discussion about assumptions, 
the process of enquiry is of high importance in friedman’s methodology. 
in contrast to popper he is not very interested in justifying theories as »sci-
entific« – friedman’s point is more about a what the process of finding, dis-
cussing and improving theories should look like – with the provocative re-
sult that the »realisticness« of an assumption is not per se a valid point of 
criticism, nor is the realisticness of an assumption a helpful aim for practic-
ing researchers. This view can be labeled »instrumentalist«, but it is certainly 
not atheoretical. one additional remark should be made to clarify this: even 
if friedman argues against realistic assumptions, this does not imply that he 
favours absurd assumptions.67 when we think of assumptions we aim at ex-
plaining phenomena, therefore we must be able to imagine some causal con-
nection between the assumptions and the implications they are made to 
explain. otherwise any correlation between assumptions and implications 
would count as a theory, which is clearly not friedman’s position.68
it is clear that friedman sees predictive success as the main criterion for 
theory evaluation. but if friedman stresses the predictive success so much, 
how can he allow for abstract theorising that does not make concrete predic-
tions at all? again, there is a pragmatic solution for this: friedman sees ab-
stract theory as a language that can serve as a »filing system«69 and can help 
to organise data without making predictions, but ultimately the theory has 
65 besides this, many defences relying on plausibility certainly lack plausibility for 
non-economists, again the notion of a fully rational economic man being the 
most prominent example. if economists try to defend their models by predictive 
or explanatory success in reply, they confirm friedman’s view.
66 see friedman (1953), p. 10.
67 as mäki points out, »the required degree of approximation is not simply to be 
maximized [or minimized!] but is relative to the purposes that the theory is sup-
posed to serve«. mäki (2005b), p. 7.
68 see hirsch/Demarchi (1990), p. 153 et sqq.
69 see friedman (1953), p. 7.
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to be helpful, even if in some very distinct sense, for the purpose of predic-
tion. The picture is similar to Quine’s view of logic and mathematics, which 
in Quine’s opinion are ultimately justified by empirical confirmation, as they 
are on the very basis of many theories that are well corroborated.70 seen like 
this, friedman acknowledges the role of theory and seeks to establish a kind 
of reflective equilibrium between empirical data and well-established prin-
ciples of economic theory. To sum up: pure theoretical and at first empir-
ically empty reasoning is useful, because it eventually leads to better pre-
dictions than theory-free correlation processing ever will.71 scientific proof, 
however, is unattainable. as said before, the backward reasoning from ef-
fects to causes is deemed to deliver uncertain and tentative knowledge. but 
in opposite to those who want to set science on solid ground, friedman sees 
science as a process:72 we can never be sure if a particular theory lists real or 
false causes for a certain effect, but the more support that can be indepen-
dently found for it, the more we reasonably become convicted of it.73 fried-
man admits that there is much subjective choice involved in his theorising, 
and hence the assumptions he makes are probably tailored to strengthen his 
convictions rather than refute them. again similar to Quine, friedman’s idea 
of a good theory is best characterised as a web of beliefs, which draws its per-
suasive power from its internal and external coherence: The emerging picture 
is by no means conclusive, but it sets an argumentative level for potential 
opponents. of course, when we adopt such a view of science, crucial exper-
iments and falsification seem to drop away.74 after having laid out the prag-
matic reading of friedman’s methodological position, let’s see how it can 
deal with some recent criticism.
4.1.2.1. Critical Discussion
Taking into consideration the huge number of different interpretations fried-
man’s methodological work has received, the problem first and foremost is 
certainly the terminological vagueness of f53. as i tried to show above, it 
70 see section. 3.1.1.1.
71 This view is supported by the fact that even the most abstract and seemingly ab-
surd theoretical constructions, such as a calculus with irrational numbers, is used 
in substantive and well-confirmed theories like quantum physics, which is surely 
preferable to a purely statistical science. This imaginary construct of a »purely sta-
tistical science« shows how absurd a far-going atheoretical position would look.
72 see hirsch/Demarchi (1990), p. 135 for more on this.
73 all this reasoning is pragmatic, of course, and it neglects difficulties such as 
goodman’s new riddle of induction (see goodman (1955), 89 et sqq.). but if we 
took paradoxes seriously all the time, empirical progress would certainly be unat-
tainable.
74 schliesser (2005) concludes that for friedman the »major purpose behind predic-
tion and testing is … not confirmation or refutation, but the generation of infor-
mation to improve theory.« (schliesser (2005), p. 72).
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is nonetheless possible to distil a coherent methodological position from 
it, but due to the ambiguities of f53 there is room for doubt if this is really 
friedman’s position.
as many standard criticisms have been implicitly or explicitly75 dealt with 
in the above section, it makes little sense to present those criticisms here in 
detail again. instead, i will concentrate on two contributions that deserve 
separate discussion, because they are generally sympathetic to f53 but offer 
some suggestions for clarification: first, musgrave’s famous distinction of 
different types of assumptions and second, mäki’s recent comments to f53.
alan musgrave distinguishes between three classes of assumptions and ac-
cuses friedman of making the error of lumping them all together. The classes 
of assumptions are defined as follows:76
1. negligibility assumptions: These are assumptions about properties of 
the world that do not affect the hypothesis in question. an example 
found in friedman’s essay would be the assumption that the colour of 
the traders’ eyes is negligible.
2. Domain assumptions: if the negligibility assumption is true only for a 
certain domain, the scientist can still stick to it by transforming it into a 
domain assumption. a property of the world is negligible within a cer-
tain domain of phenomena. again, the colour of the traders’ eyes is neg-
ligible – not in general but within the domain of models for finance 
markets.
3. heuristic assumptions: if it turns out that there is no domain where 
a factor that is assumed away in a model is negligible (i. e. if there is 
no domain assumption applicable), the scientist can still proceed and 
transform the domain assumption into a mere heuristic assumption, 
i. e. a rule for simplification when building the basic components of the 
theory, excused by the promise of dealing with the disturbing factors at 
a later stage of model building.77
according to musgrave, implicit negligibility assumptions do not lead to 
»descriptively false« models when they are essentially correct: The colours of 
75 recall e. g. the discussion of hausman’s point in the beginning of section 4.1.2., 
which was taken as a representative for the bulk of criticisms that directly oppose 
the »f-Twist«.
76 see musgrave (1981), p. 278-382.
77 a nice example from economics is the rational-choice approach, which heuristi-
cally looks for »rational« (i. e. »explicable by maximising behaviour«) explanations 
of human behaviour without holding the thesis that irrational behaviour is neg-
ligible nor assuming that economic explanations can exist only in the realm of 
purely rational decisions This makes the heuristic assumption of rational choice 
untestable, of course.
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the traders’ eyes are indeed negligible in an economic context, and hence a 
model that implicitly makes such a negligibility assumption and ignores the 
colour is not descriptively false but rather realistic. however, making wrong 
negligibility assumptions is nothing but an error of theory; therefore fried-
man’s credo »the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the as-
sumptions« does not hold here.
musgrave’s argument against friedman’s case is similar with domain as-
sumptions: if a theory makes false domain assumptions, this is a clear disad-
vantage of the theory.78
The discussion of heuristic assumption is the final clue to clearing up 
the misunderstandings between friedman’s and musgrave’s position. mus-
grave states »at any rate, his central thesis ‘the more significant the theory, 
the more unrealistic the assumptions’ is not true of ‘heuristic assumptions’ 
either.«79 it is hard to see how musgrave wants to judge the realitsticness of 
a heuristic assumption if he accepts that they are untestable.80 The ques-
tion is not whether heuristic assumptions are true or false but whether or 
not they are able to generate fruitful fields of research.81 musgrave’s distinc-
tion between three classes of assumptions is certainly a brilliant addition to 
the assumption-debate, but it does not refute friedman’s position, as it fails 
to show why seemingly implausible heuristic assumptions such as rational 
choice are nothing but an error of a theory. as far as the two other types of 
assumptions go, it seems that musgrave is attacking a straw man rather than 
friedman’s position (at last in the pragmatic interpretation): nowhere does 
friedman say that making false negligibility or domain assumptions helps 
to generate significant theories. he says that significant theories are mostly 
based on unrealistic assumptions, not that any unrealistic assumption cre-
ates a significant theory! when musgrave stresses that wrong negligibility 
and domain assumptions usually lead to bad theories, this can be inter-
preted as stressing friedman’s point that the empirical correctness of the 
implications is relevant for judging assumptions: as soon as wrong negligi-
bility and domain assumptions lead to wrong predictions (which they most 
probably do instantaneously), they are immediately ruled out. if one takes 
the ability to predict seriously, one cannot come up with wrong negligibility 
78 The acceptance of domain assumptions is probably the main point of misunder-
standing between friedman and many critics (take hausman (1992b) again as an 
example): friedman recommends evaluating the assumptions only for specific 
purposes, whereas many of his critics aim at broad predictive success. The ques-
tion is, however, if broad predictive success is achievable at all. friedman holds 
the view that it is not – there is no »theory of everything«, so narrowing the do-
main of theories is always necessary.
79 musgrave (1981), p. 385.
80 see footnote 77 in this chapter.
81 see mäki (2000), p. 326.
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or domain assumptions.82 The case is different with heuristic assumptions, as 
they are neither directly comparable to reality nor lead directly to empirical 
implications. here it seems still correct to allow for assumptions that seem 
prima facie implausible or unrealistic. musgrave has done a great job at clar-
ifying what friedman cannot mean by unrealistic assumptions; but as i see it, 
he has failed to refute my pragmatic reading of f53.
now let’s have a look at Uskali mäki’s recent discussion of f53. mäki has 
written dozens of contributions to the f53 debate, and i shall discuss only 
the most recent here, as there is a continuous development in his writing and 
the older ideas reappear in his newer works as well. mäki’s comments to f53 
are particularly interesting, because they do not reject its main thesis out of 
hand but deliver clarifying suggestions for ambiguous points of the essay and 
the debate around it.
first, there is a terminological point Uskali mäki has continuously raised 
and which i have adopted in my writing: he argues that it is better to speak of 
the »realisticness« of assumptions than of their »reality« or »realism«, because 
even false assumptions have reality (once made, they exist and are hence 
»real«) but a low degree of realisticness.83 The philosophical position of real-
ism does not depend on the use of realistic assumptions:84 The belief that iso-
lating the main causal factors may depend on the omission of others and on 
the introduction of false idealising assumptions is perfectly compatible with 
the philosophical position of realism.85
in a recent overview article, mäki presents a »map of multiple perspec-
tives« on f53, which shows the huge variety of possible approaches to the 
essay from realist to instrumentalist and even social constructivist.86 This 
leaves two possible conclusions: either the essay is hopelessly vague and am-
biguous and therefore has no message at all, or the philosophical attributes 
attached to it are hopelessly useless for labelling the essay and understand-
ing friedman’s points. while the ambiguities are certainly a problem for the 
philosophical discussion of f53, they are not necessarily a problem for econ-
omists, because the different labels may not make a difference for the lessons 
to be learned from friedman. f53 does certainly not promote a single coher-
ent methodological position, but still many arguments it puts forward are 
worth considering.87 one could argue that friedman delivers a »best-of« mix 
82 marcel boumans adds that friedman encourages empirically exploring the do-
main of a negligibility assumption. see boumans (2003), p. 320.
83 see mäki (1989). where realism is a theory of theories, realisticness is a property 
of them, mäki suggests. i have adopted this terminology in this chapter.
84 see mäki (2005b), p. 18 et sqq.
85 see mäki (2005b), p. 11 and p. 20.
86 see mäki (2005a)
87 Thinking in bigger terms, this calls for a discussion of how to assess consistency 
as a quality criterion at all.
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of central insights that mostly became known in philosophy of science only 
decades after the publication of f53.88 here is a list of concepts that were al-
ready being discussed by friedman in 1953 – at a time when popper’s »logic 
of scientific Discovery« had not yet been translated into english.89
1. Kuhnian aspects in theory-choice: friedman describes in detail why 
subjective judgement is involved at several levels of theory choice and 
how social factors of science influence the stabilization of paradigms.90
2. Underdetermination and holism: friedman states that »observed facts 
are necessarily finite in number; possible hypotheses infinite. if there is 
one hypothesis that is consistent with the available evidence, there are 
always an infinite number that are.«91 later he gives a detailed discus-
sion of the interchangeability of assumptions and implications.92
3. Theory-ladenness: friedman states that »even when a test can be made, 
the background of the scientists is not irrelevant to the judgements they 
reach.«93
4. constructive falsificationism: friedman states: »here there are two im-
portant external standards of comparison. one is the accuracy achiev-
able by an alternative theory with which this theory is being compared 
and which is equally acceptable on all other grounds.«94
5. economics of scientific theories: right after the preceding quote, fried-
man continues: »The other arises when there exists a theory that is 
known to yield better predictions but only at a greater cost. The gains 
from greater accuracy, which depend on the purpose in mind, must 
then be balanced against the costs of achieving it.«95
6. pragmatism and eclecticism: The pragmatic aspects of f53 have been 
pointed out above. one could easily go a step further and call the some-
what inconsistent mix of methodological insights an early piece of post-
modern eclecticism.
it is one thing that f53 is hard to label and presents a somewhat inconsistent 
mix of methodological positions. however, there are internal inconsistencies 
and fallacies of reasoning, too. The most prominent is, again, friedman’s ar-
88 mäki calls this the f-mix rather than the f-Twist; see mäki (2005b), p. 2.
89 when a short quote is available in f53, i included it as a short »proof« in the list. 
note, however, that all of the listed items appears more than once in f53.
90 see friedman (1953), p. 22-23 and p. 30.
91 friedman (1953), p. 9.
92 see friedman (1953), p. 27-28.
93 friedman (1953), p. 30.
94 friedman (1953), p. 17.
95 friedman (1953), p. 17. if you think this is an over-interpretation, read schröder 
(2004).
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gumentation about unrealistic assumptions. mäki argues that f53 does not 
distinguish between »falsehood proper« and »incompleteness« – in both 
cases friedman speaks of unrealistic assumptions. This leads friedman to 
the argument that perfectly realistic assumptions are unattainable, and there-
fore all attacks against unrealistic assumptions are wrongheaded. even if we 
grant friedman’s point that the unrealism of assumptions is not a valid point 
of criticism, his thesis is not well argued: »one cannot justify false assump-
tions by citing the trivial fact that all theories are necessarily incomplete.«96
mäki tries to reconstruct f53 as a realist statement and uses, similar to 
musgrave, a paraphrasing technique in order to show that most of the seem-
ingly unrealistic as-if assumptions can be read as formulating the ceteris pari-
bus conditions needed for isolating the main hypothesis in question.97 i will 
discuss the question of whether a good methodology for economics should 
be realistic or instrumentalistic in section 4.2, for it should be clear now that 
this is a question that cannot be settled by an interpretation of friedman’s 
methodology alone; it is a separate matter.
4.1.2.2. Lessons Learned
even if f53 is terribly unclear in some respects and even has some internal 
problems, there are a lot of lessons to be learned from it. The main thesis that 
a theory should not be judged by the realisticness of its assumptions holds 
even after critical discussions. surely, f53 did not perform very well at deliv-
ering this message to economic methodologists, but in economics, it did the 
job rather well.98
hausman and friedman are often considered antagonists in economic 
methodology, because hausman insists on the need for credible assumptions 
as a foundation for good economic theories, while friedman argues precisely 
against this.99 nonetheless, their positions have much in common:
1. They both stress the importance of empirical research and take a stance 
against blackboard economics.
2. They both stress the need for tacit expert-knowledge when judging 
whether data rejects or supports a hypothesis.
3. They are both interested in finding mechanisms that link causes and ef-
fects.
96 mäki (2005b), p. 11.
97 see mäki (2005b), p. 16 et sqq.
98 see mayer (2004).
99 note that hausman takes »credibility« as criterion for the assumptions, so that 
mäki’s claim that the as-if assumptions are in fact meant to be true ceteris pari-
bus claims does not help here to reconcile the positions. friedman’s stance is di-
rectly opposed to »credibility«, as shown above.
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4. mäki’s reconstruction of as-if explanations is very close to hausman’s 
view. according to this view, friedman is not advocating the postula-
tion of »unrealistic« driving forces in economic models, but only their 
unrealistic isolation.
5. similar to hausman, friedman sees economic models not as true or 
false by themselves, but rather as a language – or in hausman’s terms, as 
a set of predicates that can fit or not fit to the observations.
6. friedman believes in induction, similar to hausman, and recommends 
the use of theories that worked before in different circumstances.100
The analysis of friedman’s methodology and its comparison to hausman’s 
is a crucial step towards a pragmatic methodology that lies in between radi-
cal empirical positions and purely theoretical ones. friedman is concerned 
with solving problems and finding adequate theories for that task. he con-
vincingly showed why seemingly more realistic assumptions are not always 
preferable. additionally, he has many insights to offer that reappeared in 
postmodern methodology; however, friedman does not use them to estab-
lish relativism but takes a pragmatic stance that focuses on solving problems. 
The major disadvantage of f53 is the huge variety of readings that are pos-
sible, but as i am primarily concerned with finding a pragmatic balance be-
tween positivist and relativistic positions and not with interpreting f53, this 
is only a minor drawback for my project.
4.1.3. taking pragmatiSm SeriouSly: economicS oF ScientiFic knowledge
The basic idea behind the economics of scientific Knowledge (esK) has al-
ready appeared several times in this work. for example, in section 2.3.2.3 i 
employed economic cost-benefit reasoning in order to point to some of the 
shortcomings of positivist positions.101 in this chapter, esK reappears as a 
radically pragmatic position. it connects well to the foregoing pragmatic in-
terpretation of friedman’s methodology and presents a way out of many 
»empiricist vs. relativist« quarrels.
The basic idea of esK is using economic reasoning for tackling problems of 
philosophy of science. i will discuss two fundamentally different approaches:
The first approach is similar to my pragmatic interpretation of f53, as it 
puts the problem-solving capacity of theories in focus and encourages cost-
100 again, friedman does not recommend ignoring the assumptions or, as hausman 
puts it, not »looking under the hood«.
101 remember e. g. the argument saying that newtonian physics can still be accept-
able for solving some problems even if it is constructively falsified by einstein’s 
theory of relativity, because it is much simpler to use and therefore has lower 
»costs«.
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benefit analyses of the respective theories for helping to solve specific prob-
lems. as said earlier, theories that are less precise may have pragmatic (and 
epistemic) advantages of tractability and are therefore preferable in some 
contexts.102 costs and benefits are of course not restricted to monetary values 
but include epistemic and pragmatic costs and benefits. Therefore, cost-ben-
efit analysis is a very general heuristic for evaluation.103
The main twist of the second approach of esK is to see scientists not as 
seekers of truth but as actors pursuing their own interests. while the search 
for truth may still be a major driving force for scientists, within an economic 
interpretation of science, truth is at least not the only driving force or even 
the most relevant one.104 such a view renders any methodology that tries to 
define rational criteria for choosing theories futile when it fails to explain 
why using the criteria is in the interest of an individual scientist. Therefore, 
this part of esK concentrates on the institutional aspects of science that can 
channel egoistic individual behaviour into epistemically desirable outcomes.
i will start with a discussion of the cost-benefit approach: such an analy-
sis encourages thinking in alternatives: as lakatos noticed, one cannot assess 
theories independently but must compare them to relevant alternatives. sci-
entists might then very well choose a theory that is e. g. less precise but sim-
pler.105 it depends on what they want to do with the theory: explaining basic 
structures, in many cases, requires a different theory than does predicting fu-
ture events.106 by including efficiency as a factor in philosophical consider-
ations about science, many classic paradoxes can be solved. Take the raven 
paradox as an example:107 The problem behind this paradox is the logical 
equivalence of the statements »all ravens are black« and »all non-black ob-
jects are non-ravens«. if you agree that a black raven is a confirmation for the 
thesis that all ravens are black, than logic forces you to accept that every non-
black object that is not a raven confirms the same thesis. however, neither in 
daily life nor in science we would count the finding of a white shoe as a valid 
confirmation for the thesis that all ravens are black. nicholas rescher has 
provided an economic explanation for this:108 as the set of non-black objects 
is much bigger than the set of ravens, it is much more efficient to look directly 
102 remember the discussion of the KiDs vs. Kiss methodologies for agent-based 
modelling, where i argued that with increased descriptive accuracy some basic ef-
fects can be overlooked. see section 2.3.2.4.
103 see hansjürgens (2004), p. 343.
104 note that the relativist’s arguments against the very concept of »Truth« are set 
aside for the sake of simplicity here.
105 This acknowledges Kuhn’s (and friedman’s) view that theory choice can never be 
a fully rational process but has to include personal judgement.
106 again, see section 2.3.2.4 for a comparison of the KiDs and Kiss approaches.
107 see hempel (1945), p. 11 for the locus classicus.
108 see rescher (1989), p. 109-113.
4.1 finding a new balance 131
for black ravens. because of the relative rareness of ravens compared to non-
black objects, the observation of a black raven confirms the thesis »all ravens 
are black« to a much higher degree than every non-black non-raven does.
if such efficiency considerations are quite new in philosophy of science, 
the second approach of esK might even be shocking to traditional philos-
ophers of science. esK does not only acknowledge that scientists do not al-
ways look for truth, but states that they might not even look after the prag-
matically best theory for solving a given problem. in some models of esK, 
scientists try instead to maximise their income and their reputation without 
caring much about good theories at all!
such a view undoubtedly will cause mistrust in many readers: if scientists 
do not rationally seek truth, but rather pursue their own interests – doesn’t 
that lead to the demise of the whole scientific project? not necessarily. This 
is where economic reasoning kicks in: in pretty much the same way in which 
economists are eager to show that for socially desirable outcomes one does 
not need to rely on well-meaning motives of the members of a society, they 
try to show that scientists do not need to look after truth individually, but 
nonetheless may discover it collectively. in other words109, it might be the case 
that an invisible hand is working in the way science is organised, one that can 
turn selfish motives of scientists into epistemically desirable outcomes. sci-
ence is supposed to be similar to the market-system in central aspects, so that 
adam smith’s claim about individual egoism leading to collectively prefera-
ble results does hold here as well (on average, of course).
if this is the case, two previously antagonistic claims can be brought to-
gether: first, science is influenced by »irrational« social factors – which means 
that it is not as clean and rational as the positivists would like it to be – and 
second, its results are nonetheless epistemically distinct and hence rationally 
defensible. Defending such a claim makes it necessary to dig into the insti-
tutional organisation of science. The twist of esK consists of shifting the dis-
cussion of scientific rationality away from single scientists and their theories 
to an overall view of the scientific process. even if we cannot define purely ra-
tional criteria for theory choice, there is still plenty to say about how science 
should be rationally organised. This means that esK builds heavily on the 
insights gained by Thomas Kuhn and the sociological approach, as it grants 
the social nature of science. on an individual level even the slogan »any-
thing goes« is acceptable for esK, as economic theories (and hence esK) do 
not care about the behaviour of single individuals but only about the average 
quality of outcomes. so esK can accept anything the positivists were fight-
ing against, but still offers a defence of their view of science as a rational en-
terprise.
109 note that the notoriously dubious term »truth« is carefully avoided now.
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in order to show how esK arrives at normative conclusions, it is conveni-
ent to look at some more concrete examples.110
philipp Kitcher was among the first to use economic models for analys-
ing science, and one of his normative results favours pluralism: »intuitively, 
a community that is prepared to hedge its bets when the situation is unclear 
is likely to do better than a community that moves quickly to a state of uni-
form opinion.«111 in a rather formal way, Kitcher provides an argument for 
the possibility of the cognitive division of labour in science.112 in his model, 
cognitive division of labour comes about as a collective result of each scien-
tist selfishly promoting the goal of being the first in delivering a theory that 
her community will eventually accept. The idea behind the proof is that even 
theories which do not seem very promising can attract expectation-maxim-
ising scientists if there is e. g. low competition from other scientists. by this 
mechanism, an equilibrium emerges between promising theories with high 
competition and less promising ones with lower competition. This is clearly 
an invisible-hand argument, even if Kitcher does not actually use the term. 
while the argument does not offer criteria for good economic theories, it of-
fers useful information for social planners who want to promote the efficient 
collective achievement of scientific results. like many economic arguments it 
is normative by providing arguments for self-regulation of complex systems.
economists have engaged with esK as well. paul a. David is a prominent 
example that i will use in order to extend the given picture a little.113 David 
starts from the assumption that science is somehow epistemically privileged, 
but this speciality does not result from the superior rationality of the scien-
tists but hinges rather on the special way in which academic science is organ-
ised. referring to the nobel laureate Douglas c. north, David’s approach 
can be characterised as looking for »the connecting links between institu-
tional structures … and incentives to acquire pure knowledge.«114 The most 
distinguishing characteristic of academia, according to David, is its »open-
ness«: results are made public as quickly as possible and are then available 
for everyone to study and to criticise. The economic twist is here, again, to 
analyse the way in which this institutional characteristic turns self-interest 
into scientifically (and socially) desirable behaviour: if scientists want to be 
rewarded for their work, they are forced to publish it and to accept criticism. 
This leads to a high reliability of scientific results, as scientists lose their rep-
110 important works include e. g. hull (1988), rescher (1989), Kitcher (1993), Das-
gupta/David (1994), laudan (1996), wible (1997), lütge (2001), albert (2002) 
and many others. esK has recently become a major trend in philosophy of sci-
ence. see stephan (1996) and hands (2001) chapter 8 for overviews.
111 see Kitcher (1993), p. 344.
112 see section 7.4 for the formal proof.
113 see Dasgupta/David (1994) and David (1998).
114 north (1990), p. 75.
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at the very least it creates sharp debates and pushes each paradigm to its very 
limits, thereby fostering progress in the long run.120
 parts of esK obviously overlap with sociological studies of science, the 
main difference being the normative nature of the economic analysis. econ-
omists are not only interested in how people behave, but they assume self-in-
terested rational behaviour and try to deduce the results of this assumption 
under specific constraints. after such an analysis they recommend reforms 
of the institutional settings. and of course, even if the arguments of Kitcher 
and David are principally in favour of science as it is organised today, this is 
a normative position.121
christoph lütge is the last author that i will present in this overview of 
esK. his work is particularly interesting for two reasons: first, he delivers nice 
reconstructions of classic criteria for theory choice in economic language;122 
and second, he utilizes James buchanan’s arguments in order to move be-
yond the classic picture of welfare economics that he claims to be the under-
lying normative principle of the approaches of Kitcher, wible and laudan.123
Until now, it was assumed that science (on average) brings about socially 
or scientifically desirable outcomes. as it turns out, however, it is hard to de-
fine what is desirable for a society and even for science as a whole. Tradition-
ally, economists took pareto optimality as their normative ideal: a social 
optimum is achieved if nobody’s well-being can be improved without dimin-
ishing the well-being of someone else. James buchanan has been critical of 
this normative ideal, for at least two reasons: first, the criterion uses an un-
achievable ideal that is not helpful as an evaluative standard for real situa-
tions; and second, it is an external-efficiency criterion that ignores the wishes 
of the people.124 buchanan replaces the pareto criterion by a contractarian 
120 Kuhn has already seen this. see Kuhn (1962), p. 38-39. of course, there are costs 
of dogmatic behaviour, too. most notably, these are higher transaction costs be-
tween paradigms, problems with incommensurability and reluctance to accept 
refutations.
121 more critical approaches are also available, of course – for example, there is an 
intense discussion about the effects of the economic power of certain publish-
ing houses and their quality control mechanisms. i have omitted this discussion 
here, because it would lead too deeply into details and is likely to cause confu-
sion about the meaning of the term »economic« here, as it suggests a too-narrow 
use of the term.
122 i do not present a summary or an example here, as lütge’s method does not dif-
fer in principle from Kitcher’s or David’s in this part. see e. g. lütge (2001), p. 147 
et sqq. for a discussion of the costs and benefits of popperian falsificationism. 
see lütge (2001), p. 130 et sqq. for a discussion of traditional quality criteria of 
science such as internal and external consistency, testability, explanatory power, 
simplicity, etc.
123 see footnote 109 in this chapter for the references.
124 see e. g. brennan/buchanan (1985), p. 151 et sqq.
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utation if competitors detect errors in their results. another institutional rule 
of science is the winner-takes-all principle – only those scientists who publish 
new results first are rewarded.115 This leads to the highly innovative nature of 
science.116 so even if the rules of science are fairly different from the stand-
ard market assumptions117, economic and institutional analysis can contrib-
ute much to a better understanding of the special nature of science. be sure 
to note here that neither Kitcher nor David argue for laissez-faire or low reg-
ulation in science; they merely argue in favour of some aspects of the current 
institutional setting of science.
The comparison of Kuhnian philosophy of science with the economics 
of standardisation118 can give additional insights when allowing for invisible-
hand arguments. The economic interpretation of Kuhn’s philosophy pro-
vides reasons for the persistence of paradigms: it is in the rational self interest 
of each scientist to dogmatically defend his old results, as he loses reputa-
tion if they get falsified or – even worse – if the paradigm he is working on 
becomes outdated. The more human capital has been invested, the higher are 
the opportunity costs a paradigm switch generates.119 note that in contrast 
to the standard view on Kuhnian philosophy, from an esK perspective dog-
matic behaviour is by no means irrational; it is instead highly rational for the 
individual scientist. additionally – and this is again an invisible-hand argu-
ment – dogmatic behaviour might not even be harmful to science as a whole. 
115 The reward is nowadays mostly measured by means of the »impact« of a publi-
cation, meaning the number of references it attracts. The status of the »impact-
factor« is highly controversial, mostly because popularity is not the same as sub-
stance: e. g. in some cases, an exceptionally bad publication can be cited quite 
often.
116 as i am only introducing the idea of esK, the depiction remains fairly rough 
here. To be conclusive, the above arguments have to be discussed empirically, of 
course. for example, it may well be the case that some scientific results are not re-
liable at all, because within certain communities there is no critical discussion of 
the ideas. This may be the case in communities small enough to make personal 
dependence among the majority of scientists highly probable. additionally, the 
reward for confirming or falsifying old results of others is relatively low, which 
may cause a low level of reproducing experiments or even checking proofs. see 
beck-bornholdt/Dubben (1998), p. 192 et sqq. clearly, there is room for improv-
ing the institutions of science.
117 for example: first, in contrast to standard market-goods, scientific results be-
come non-rivalry goods after publication; and second, there is no room for cost 
saving by means of imitation due to the winner-takes-all principle of the reward 
system.
118 see section 7.1.
119 note, however, that this argument is not confirmed by empirical studies. see 
lütge (2001), p. 80.
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consensus-criterion about abstract rules. full consensus in every question 
would be terribly costly, buchanan argues. Therefore, full consensus can only 
be demanded for the most general abstract rules at the constitutional level.125 
note that rules which are pareto-superior to the status quo should find con-
sensus – but now the hierarchy is turned upside down: The (pareto)-efficient 
is not the declared optimum; the rules that find consensus are declared more 
efficient than the existing ones. normativity is completely naturalised here: 
There is neither an external standard nor an external source for it. The only 
source for normativity is the consensus of the citizens.
 lütge builds heavily on this idea and transfers it to philosophy of science: 
normative philosophy of science is not about single theories but about ab-
stract rules of the scientific game. These rules are justified by the consensus of 
the community. social constructivism is avoided by allowing internal factors 
to restrict the room for consensus. That is, lütge acknowledges that theories 
are empirically underdetermined, but still claims that there are theories that 
do not fit empirical data and therefore will never find consensus.126
in this picture, the normative question is different from Kitcher’s and Da-
vid’s, as it cares neither about single theories nor about desirable outcomes, but 
only about consensus for rules. like buchanan, lütge does not ask for full 
consensus for every single question, but proposes a hierarchy of consensus: 
first, consensus for the constitution of a country is assumed. Therefore, the 
election process and the decisions of elected science-politicians are accepted. 
The politicians may find consensus at the most abstract level in saying that 
any form of science that is based on some set of rules is better than science 
with no rules at all.127 in a second phase, scientists form communities by 
finding consensus that defines their community. The acknowledged experts 
of the field probably heavily shape these rules.
To sum up, good science is conducted by rules that can be legitimised 
through a hierarchy of consensus levels. such a construction aims at avoid-
125 consensus is easier to achieve for abstract rules, because the more abstract the 
rule, the less people will hope for personal advantages or fear disadvantages. as 
people live behind a »veil of uncertainty« concerning their future, they will tend 
to approve fair rules. see buchanan/Tullock (1962) and brennan/buchanan 
(1985) for the detailed development of these ideas.
126 lütge is rather vague at this point. he seems to presume the existence of empiri-
cal data that is independent from the views of scientists. see lütge (2001), p. 209. 
elsewhere lütge recommends accepting empirical knowledge that was used when 
designing a new theory as safe background knowledge for that theory. see lütge 
(2001), p. 167.
127 note that even rules for voodoo-science could be included here; so probably 
even feyerabend would agree on this level. see lütge (2001), p. 212. buchanan is 
arguing for an economically balanced amount of rules and argues that too little 
and too many rules can both reduce efficiency. see e. g. buchanan (1975), p. 12-
14.
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ing the role of a philosopher-monarch who tells scientists what they should 
do.128 The role of the philosopher of science is now to look at the consensus 
rules of science and analyse how they solve dilemma situations. The term »di-
lemma situation« refers here to situations with a prisoner’s-dilemma struc-
ture. as it is easy enough to imagine it for oneself, i will omit the famous pD-
matrix in the following illustration.
here is a basic example of such a dilemma situation: each scientist of a 
community may have an advantage when he breaks methodological rules, 
but collectively the community can gain from established institutions.129 in-
stitutional economic analysis is used to assess the rules. for example, within 
a community there may be rules that define the standards of how certain ex-
periments are properly conducted.130 The above methodological dilemma is 
solved through excluding scientists who do not adhere to the given stand-
ards from the scientific community if their attempt to defraud is detected; by 
this, compliance to the norm is enforced. norms like this can have, of course, 
both negative and positive effects: They reduce transaction costs and facili-
tate communication among researchers, but they can also hinder innovation, 
at least from a short-term perspective. The task of the philosopher of science 
is now similar to an institutional economist: he analyses institutions and 
their efficiency in promoting certain (scientific) aims. according to lütge, 
the institutional economic analysis of science has to fulfil three tasks:131
1. Delivering and explaining a hierarchy of consensus as explained above.
2. Testing the efficiency of methodological rules compared to the scien-
tific aims as defined by a higher consensus level. Testing is done by 
means of an economic reconstruction of historical theory-choice, i. e. it 
must be shown how the acceptance of methodological rules historically 
led to pareto improvements for scientists.
3. based on the knowledge gathered in the foregoing steps, the economist 
of science can propose reforms of internal (methodological) or external 
(organisational) rules. These proposals are considered empirically test-
able hypotheses.
lütge provides the so-called Devon-controversy in geology as an extensive 
case study (which i cannot reproduce here due to space constraints). in the 
concluding sections lütge reconstructs several rules of the scientific commu-
nity as rational reactions to dilemma situations. The winner-take-all or pri-
128 see lütge (2001), p. 213. for criticism, see section 4.1.3.1.
129 The scientific institutions are often informal ones, as methodological rules do 
not have legal status.
130 note for example that such rules differ substantially between psychology and ex-
perimental economics. see hertwig/ortmann (2003).
131 see lütge (2001), p. 217.
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ority principle that was mentioned before is an example: lütge grants the in-
novation-driving and efficiency-promoting effects of this rule, but also sees 
negative aspects. The priority principle makes plagiarism very tempting and 
can hinder collaboration and communication between scientists – especially 
when they work on long-term projects and are under high competitive pres-
sure.132 here we find a prisoner’s-dilemma situation again: everyone would 
be better off if there was no plagiarism, but each individual scientist can gain 
from successful plagiarism. There are already rules in the scientific commu-
nity that make plagiarism less tempting: e. g. scientists can lose their phD title 
and thereby the ability to work as scientists if plagiarism is detected in their 
doctoral thesis. because perfect control is impossible, a certain level of trust 
among scientists is indispensable for efficient work. lütge concludes that the 
ideal of science as friendly competition among gentlemen has contributed a 
lot to resolving issues of scooping and plagiarism and has helped to solve the 
underlying prisoner’s dilemma.133 The task of the economist would be to pro-
pose more efficient rules, after having diagnosed a dilemma structure in the 
way science is organised. such work is unfortunately only just beginning, but 
e. g. the emergence of open-access journals can be seen as a step in this direc-
tion.134 Until now, esK is mostly stuck in the second phase of economically 
reconstructing the behaviour of scientists.
one final remark on esK: it is important to note that esK is completely 
neutral regarding theories of truth. its pragmatic nature might suggest a prag-
matic truth criterion or even instrumentalism, but in fact, the economic anal-
ysis of scientific behaviour in certain institutional settings is completely neu-
tral to the actual aim of the scientific game.135
4.1.3.1. Critical Discussion
we have now seen how the advocates of esK try to re-establish a normative 
stance in philosophy of science. it is easy to imagine that there are problems 
with this approach, which i shall discuss below.
132 This is surely more common in the »hot fields« of the natural sciences than in 
humanities or social sciences.
133 see lütge (2001), p. 228.
134 open-access journals can make science more efficient for many reasons: They 
save licensing costs for the libraries and they facilitate communication and help 
to spread scientific results in poor regions of the world, thus fostering competi-
tion and pluralism. The emergence of scientific blogs has changed communica-
tion in a similar way. see e. g. lindner (2007), harnad/brody (2004) and reich-
ardt/harder (2005).
135 however, the aim must be somehow detectable, otherwise no means-ends rea-
soning can be employed, because one cannot know whether the aim is achieved.
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at first there are doubts about whether the »market of ideas« is indeed sim-
ilar to commercial markets. James wible provides several arguments why sci-
ence is not really a market system:136
1. The »business cycles« in science are very long, so market stabilisation in 
terms of self-correctiveness works very slowly.
2. scientific discoveries are treated as public goods. after publishing an 
essay, the respective scientists lose the exclusive property on their ideas.
3. science has moved away from its demand side, many scientific works 
seem to be a kind of l’art pour l’art. scientific standards are set by scien-
tists themselves.
4. as opposed to commercial markets, there are no real prices in science. 
There are merely proxies like reputation.
additional arguments offer further support for the thesis that science is dif-
ferent from fully competitive commercial markets. suppose a scientific par-
adigm looks promising at the beginning, but proves unfruitful after some 
time:
1. There is low incentive to change the paradigm if the peers stick to it as 
well, because there is no external control.
2. change is obstructed by the financial incentives, too: scientists are mostly 
paid by the state, and success is difficult to control.
3. Network effects: starting a new paradigm is difficult; one has to attract a  
 substantial number of peers.
4. Capital: The more specific (human) capital individuals invest, the more 
difficult it is for them to switch, because the capital will be useless after-
wards.
5. Rational ignorance could be a problem: it would be very costly for scien 
  tists to inform themselves about new, possibly unfruitful paradigms.
6. Psychological factors like group-identity or feelings of discomfort towards 
any change, caused by the uncertainty about an individual’s role in a fu-
ture system, stabilize the present paradigm.
These arguments are important drawbacks for comparing science directly to 
commercial markets. but as i tried to point out in my overview, this is not 
the approach esK takes. rather, it uses economic reasoning to analyse sci-
ence as a result of individually rational behavior. The above arguments show 
why science cannot react as quickly as commercial markets can, but it does 
not show that a long-term analysis of science by means of economic theories 
136 see wible (1997), p. 153 et sqq.
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is wrongheaded in principle. rather, some of the above arguments already use 
economic reasoning.
The next problem to address is that esK usually starts with the assump-
tion that science is indeed somehow epistemically superior and on average, 
running just fine. starting at this point seems to assume away the attacks of 
postmodern relativism rather than facing them. however, with esK norma-
tivity has no universal domain but is rather instrumental, as it is restricted to 
hypothetical imperatives:137 if you accept certain aims, then you should pro-
ceed in such and such a way. put like this, the charge of dogmatism becomes 
less plausible, as esK only assumes an epistemic advantage of science but does 
not depend on it. in theory, esK could be used to analyse any other sort 
of enquiry as well. There is a reason why i add the limiting remark »in the-
ory«: of course esK is not neutral in an absolute sense, but it relies heavily 
on the standard assumptions of rationality such as completeness, reflexivity 
and transitivity. Therefore, it is unsuited for the analysis of practices that fun-
damentally reject the very notion of rationality.138 however, it seems fair to 
argue that large parts of science do not reject the standard view of rationality, 
and therefore the analysis of economics by means of esK seems legitimate.
additionally, there is a slightly different problem of normativity: is the 
idea of analysing economics by means of economic methods not somehow 
cyclical? To find an answer, i have to take a big swing: when you think of an 
alternative to this cyclical analysis, you have to adopt a foundationalist po-
sition. if you accept the problems of foundationalist justifications that were 
discussed in the first major sections of this work, you are hopefully inclined 
to accept a somehow cyclical procedure as suggested by holism, coherent-
ism or any naturalist epistemology. once it is accepted that philosophy is 
137 in this restricted view of normativity, the problem of reflexivity that wade hands 
lists (see hands (2001), p. 391) does not emerge, because the aim is not »deriving 
a notion of good and bad science« anymore. for the sake of clearness, hands’ ar-
gument should be reproduced here: esK says that scientists do not seek truth, 
but truth emerges nonetheless. if this is granted, then esK theorists do not seek 
truth, either. now, how can we know if their theory (esK) is true? The claim that 
truth »emerges« in esK is only true if this very theory (esK) is true. now the ar-
gument is circular, or rather, we are at the beginning of an infinite regress. again, 
the escape lies in rejecting universal normativity or speaking about »truth«: esK 
states that by means of an invisible hand, the way science is organised leads 
to positive (by consensus), unintended results. This can be applied to esK sci-
ence as well without the argument becoming circular, because the judgement of 
whether results are considered »positive« or not is an external value judgement 
that is independent from esK.
138 e. g. parts of heideggerian philosophy that are explicitly headed against this no-
tion of rationality may be an example. see carnap (1931), p. 231-232.
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not necessarily the only justified »foundation«139 for analysing science, the 
right question to ask is not whether or not an argument is circular, but rather 
whether the circle esK provides is a vicious or a virtuous one.140 The follow-
ing example should make clear, that not every circular argument is deemed 
to be faulty or »vicious«. if every circle were vicious, it would be impossible to 
construct isochronal clocks, for example: before we could build such a clock, 
we would need another one to test it. similarly, it could be argued that there 
is a circlular nature to building hammers, because you always need a hammer 
in order to build a new one.141 obviously, it is not impossible to build ham-
mers or better clocks, and the reason is that the web of propositions involved 
is complex enough that each in some way supports the other, but there is no 
vicious circle. rather, there is »a fruitful self-correcting feedback loop«142 that 
can lead to continuous improvements. self-applicability, which is given for 
esK, is actually a good thing from this perspective. Therefore, it seems hard 
to find a vicious circle in analysing the behaviour of economists by economic 
methods, or (more generally) a methodology reflecting on its own rules.
in the imperialist, beckerian sense the economic method, if skillfully 
adopted to the task at hand, is a theory of every kind of human behaviour143 
and in this sense should be applicable to science as well. There is no reason 
why esK should be unable – due to some alleged circle – to criticise the way 
economics is organised. esK has little to do with the actual content of a spe-
cific branch of science, as it only looks at the behaviour of scientists. The very 
idea behind this is purely pragmatic: esK theorists do not seek a firm ground 
from which to assess economics and make prescriptions; the reasoning goes 
the other way round. first, they aim to understand the rules of the scientific 
game, and only then to make suggestions for reform that respect the status 
quo – everything else is considered to be hopelessly naïve moralising.144 as 
wade hands has put it:
139 it seems strange that something that is so far from being settled as philosophy has 
ever been accepted as a foundation. for this reason, naturalist positions reject 
any kind of »first-and-fundamental philosophy«. from this perspective, it can be 
acceptable to start directly with economics as a »naturalising base«.
140 see vollmer (1985), p. 217 et sqq. for the distinction between vicious and virtuous 
circles.
141 vollmer (1983), p. 810-811.
142 vollmer (1983), p. 801.
143 see lawson (2004a).
144 Ken binmore’s perspective on ethics parallels this view: he argues that in ethics, 
too, it does not make sense to look abstractly for »the good«; rather, one should 
understand how certain equilibria that solve moral-dilemma situations came into 
being. with this knowledge, moral reforms could be proposed that have at least 
a chance of being effective. see binmore (2005). as you can see again here, prag-
matism implies that not normative philosophy but detailed analysis comes first.
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The general philosophical perspective on norms (ethical or epistemic) is essen-
tially an usher’s or central planner’s view; the problem is to find the right rules 
so that agents who play by them will produce the right stuff…. for economists 
… the question is more about emergence and sustainability.145
if you accept the foregoing arguments, the problem is not about esK being 
circular, but rather about whether one accepts its results. in its current state, 
esK provides more formal than empirical arguments, and there is a long way 
to go for having a thorough understanding of the institutional arrangements 
that form scientific behaviour. accepting esK is therefore more or less a 
value judgement about accepting formal economic arguments as conclusive. 
There are reasons for accepting them, but as Daniel hausman146 has pointed 
out, such reasons are rather a priori in their nature, because the core of eco-
nomic theory is hard to put to the test due to its various ceteris paribus as-
sumptions, which are hard do not match up with reality.
another critical point concerns the practical value of esK. is there really 
much to it, or does it just tell us that competition is a good thing? as i said 
before, the whole project is very much in the beginning; for now, it is rather 
about reconstructing science than reworking it. in its current phase, esK is 
more like a new paradigm for methodology than a »real« methodology on its 
own. This is reinforced by the fact that large parts of esK do not care about 
single models at all. whether this is a weak point or a strength is again a mat-
ter of the relevant problem: if one wants to criticise and understand single 
economic models, the institutional branch of esK is not much of a help, 
but if the aim is improving economics or science in general, it seems a much 
more convincing approach. as the latter is probably the broader aim of the 
majority of methodologists and esK has some (instrumentally) normative 
propositions to offer (even if in a very early state), it is undoubtedly a use-
ful approach for economic methodology, even respecting all its restrictions.
The final point of criticism is directed against the use of buchanan’s con-
sensus criterion and his contractarian theory as a basis for instrumentally 
normative judgements. remember that the main idea is reconstructing a hi-
erarchy of consensus in order to establish a normative basis. however, this 
concept has a shortcoming, which is common to all forms of contractarian-
ism: The alleged consensus is never real. even if the rhetoric stresses »meth-
odological individualism«, one is forced to assume consensus when in fact 
there is none. The problem may be less harmful for philosophy of science 
than for social philosophy when the aim is legitimising constitutions by 
means of a hypothetical contract. still, a fictive story about agreement is not 
145 hands (2001), p. 392. it might be added that philosophy is often not even about 
rules, but rather about how an ideal agent would behave.
146 see section 4.1.1.
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likely to settle real methodological quarrels.147 hence, the contractarian vi-
sion is doomed to remain at the most general level, which is why it is usually 
not very helpful. note again that attacks of this kind do not affect the instru-
mental version of esK, which employs cost-benefit analysis in order to find 
the right means for given aims. note, too, that buchanan’s theoretical con-
sensus framework is, despite the practical problem of finding the hierarchy of 
consensus, quite convincing, as it does not presume any normative aim apart 
from what citizens or scientists can agree upon.
4.1.3.2. Lessons Learned
The upshot of this chapter should already be quite clear, so i will keep this 
short in order to avoid too much repetition: esK does not offer an answer to 
the universal normative question about theory choice. it is rather the making 
explicit of the old pragmatist programme, as on the one hand it looks for use-
ful (and not necessarily true) theories for solving problems by means of cost-
benefit analysis and on the other hand evaluates the way science is organised 
in order to achieve this aim. in this way it provides a concretisation of prag-
matist philosophy, as it does not only speak abstractly about »useful« theo-
ries and »efficient« organisation but puts some economic meat on the prag-
matic bones.148 if economists are the target group, such »economic meat« is 
much more likely to convince them than e. g. taking the standards of liter-
ary criticism for the evaluative basis as proposed by mccloskey. it is, how-
ever, important to note that esK does not sneak the standards of empiricism 
in through the back door, as it allows scientific communities to set their own 
standards. as esK is a meta-theory throughout, it is deemed to remain very 
general and therefore seems to lack substance. note, however, that this can 
be seen as an advantage as well, because by shifting normativity to the meta-
level esK can escape the postmodern criticism against rule-based method-
ologies.
in the next section i will discuss in more detail some standards for theory 
evaluation in economics.
147 buchanan’s idea of creating consensus is ultimately based on efficiency argu-
ments. so even if he states that consensus comes first, it is the convincing force 
of proposing pareto-superior (i. e. more efficient) institutional arrangements that 
are supposed to create the consensus. even at the most basic consensus level, the 
acceptance of any form of state as superior to anarchy, buchanan’s arguments rely 
on this argumentative scheme. see buchanan (1975), p. 5 et sqq. it is however 
doubtful if a pareto-superior state would easily lead to consensus, because even if 
there is an improvement for everyone, individuals can still argue about distribu-
tional questions. see aufderheide (1998). for a substantive comment on the lim-
its of contractarianism see Kraus (1993).
148 see hands (2001), p. 386.
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4.1.4. pragmatic theory eValuation
we have seen how some pragmatic approaches go beyond the dichotomy of 
empiristic philosophy of science and their postmodern counterparts. in this 
section my aim is twofold: first, i want to sketch out more fundamental argu-
ments from philosophers or philosophically inclined economists that favour 
a pragmatic approach for theory evaluation and argue against both the old 
empiricist methodologies and the postmodern relativists. i will not give a de-
tailed summary of the positions, but restrict myself to arguments that can be 
used for defending a pragmatic approach.149 after that, i will turn to a more 
concrete discussion about criteria for pragmatically evaluating, criticising or 
defending economic models. a high degree of repetition is unavoidable in 
this chapter, but the main insights of this and the forgoing subchapters will 
be condensed to a consistent picture in section 4.2.
4.1.4.1. Pragmatic Views on Philosophical Problems of Methodology
larry laudan is probably the most prominent exponent of a methodology 
that tries to pragmatically overcome both positivism and relativism. his 
starting point is a philosophical attack against the foundations of many post-
modern methodologists: laudan argues in detail that incommensurability 
and underdetermination do not necessarily lead to relativism concerning sci-
entific methods. here are some of his arguments:
laudan argues against the notion that the Duhem-Quine thesis makes the 
acceptance of any theory rational in the face of any evidence whatsoever – an 
idea often held by relativists, because the Duhem-Quine thesis allows for ad-
justment of auxiliary assumptions or background knowledge even to the ex-
tent of changing the meanings of words. laudan admits that in this way it is 
possible to protect any thesis from falsification, but he denies that such a pro-
cedure can be called rational.150 in most cases it is probably more rational to 
reject a thesis than to try to protect it, if it contradicts the evidence. accord-
ing to laudan, rational arguments in favour of a theory need to show much 
more than just the compatibility of a theory with the evidence. for example, 
the theory should explain the evidence as well, granted all the difficulties 
clarifying what that means, but laudan states that fiddling with a theory in 
order to make it compatible with evidence that it formerly contradicted most 
likely reduces its explanatory power.151 laudan argues even more fundamen-
tally against judging theories exclusively by their empirical consequences. he 
149 This approach can lead to misrepresentations of some positions, of course. i ac-
cept this disadvantage, as my aim is not representing positions but delivering ar-
guments for pragmatism in theory evaluation.
150 see laudan (1996), p. 35.
151 see laudan (1996), p. 37 et sqq.
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claims there are fundamental differences between a theory’s (first) entailing 
the evidence as a consequence, (second) being supported by it and (third) 
explaining it. laudan lists some cases where the data supports a hypothe-
sis without being a consequence of it: for example. he states that the detec-
tion of brownian motion supported the atomic theory without being a con-
sequence of it.152
next, he shows by a simple counterexample that there is a difference be-
tween logically entailing the evidence and explaining it: every theory logi-
cally entails itself, but arguably no theory explains itself.153 similar to fried-
man, laudan argues that theories are made to offer solutions and explanations 
to specific problems, and that this is how they should be judged.154 Therefore, 
even if laudan grants underdetermination (in the sense that there is always 
an infinite number of theories that are logically compatible with the evi-
dence), such logical compatibility is a far-too-weak criterion for choosing a 
theory – and that is why the underdetermination thesis does not offer a real 
argument for relativism. if one asks more of theories than just logical com-
patibility with evidence, namely explaining phenomena and getting eviden-
tial support from them, the Duhem-Quine thesis »cuts no ice whatsoever«.155 
There are other interpretations of the Duhem-Quine thesis that are much 
weaker, as they do not state that any theory can be rationally defended come 
what may, but merely that there are no criteria that can uniquely determine 
theory choice. This, however, is only a threat to the project of theory choice, 
if one expects the unambiguous choice of theories from it.156 There has been 
much confusion between the strong and the weak versions of the Duhem-
Quine thesis, and often arguments for the weak thesis – that choice between 
two theories is never determinate – have been used to argue for the much 
stronger thesis, which says that theory choice is completely ambiguous. as 
stated earlier, Thomas Kuhn argues that theory choice always involves sub-
jective elements and is therefore never mechanically determinate.157 but it 
surely does not follow from this that any theory is as good as any other.158 
laudan lists a set of standards from which he believes that, even if it does 
152 see laudan (1996), p. 35.
153 see laudan (1996), p. 37.
154 see Deichsel 2009 (forthcoming) for a comparison of laudan’s methodology 
with friedman’s.
155 laudan (1996), p. 38.
156 see laudan (1996), p. 43.
157 see footnote 94 in chapter 2.
158 again, a comparison to ethics might help clarifying the point: even if in many 
cases it may be hard to decide between two ethical theories, it does not follow 
that murdering is equally as good as helping the poor or that any behaviour is as 
good as any other.
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not mechanically determine theory choice, still restricts it in quite a substan-
tial and rational way:
• prefer theories which are internally consistent;
• prefer theories which correctly make some predictions which are sur-
prising given our background assumptions;
• prefer theories which have been tested against a diverse range of kinds 
of phenomena to those which have been tested only against very simi-
lar sorts of phenomena.
even standards such as these have some fuzziness around the edges, but 
can anyone believe that, confronted with any pair of theories, and any 
body of evidence, these standards are so rough-hewn that they could be 
used indifferently to justify either element of the pair?159
it should be clear now that strong underdetermination of theory choice (»all 
theories can be rationally made compatible to any empirical data«) is proba-
bly wrong, and weak underdetermination (»empirical data always allows for 
more than one theory«) does not necessarily lead to relativism.
now let’s turn to laudan’s arguments against the thesis that incommen-
surability prevents the rational choice of theories. in philosophy of science it 
is nowadays widely accepted that complete reciprocal translation of theories 
is impossible. laudan accepts this, but argues that full translatability is not a 
necessary condition for rationally comparing theories.160 laudan grants that 
rank-ordering theories by their verisimilitude requires translatability, but de-
nies that such a ranking is the only way of rational comparison. for example, 
after settling for a more-or-less precise definition, standards such as »prob-
lem-solving ability, maximum internal coherence, simplicity, and minimum 
anomalies«161 can be used for comparing theories without the need for object-
level translation between the theories at hand.
laudan grants the existence of Kuhnian losses162, i. e. problems that were 
solved by the old theory and are not by the new one, but he still maintains 
that rational theory comparison is possible. first, laudan denies that incom-
mensurability is as widespread as followers of Kuhn often claim. according 
to laudan, in many cases scientists have rationally adopted new paradigms 
159 laudan (1996), p. 47.
160 see laudan (1996), p. 10 ff.
161 see laudan (1996), p. 11.
162 apart from arguing against incommensurability, laudan heads an argument 
against Kuhn by observing that he cannot have both Kuhnian losses and full in-
commensurability between paradigms, because you need some comparison of 
theories to detect the Kuhnian losses in the first place. see laudan (1996), p. 10.
4. establishing a pragmatic view on economic methodology146
and were quite able to assess their advantages. of course, such decisions nec-
essarily depend on scientific or epistemic values, but laudan states that this 
is unavoidable and does not make the choice irrational at all.163 in contrast 
to Kuhn, laudan asserts that criteria such as internal consistency or predic-
tive power often provided convincing arguments for new theories, which led 
to their quick adoption in the respective scientific communities. in laudan’s 
view, Kuhn and his followers have exaggerated the possibilities of dissent in 
science and hence neglected the cases in which standard criteria for theory 
choice gave rather unambiguous results.164 in short, laudan has shown that 
incommensurability is not omnipresent and can be overcome when employ-
ing standards that do not require reciprocal translation of theories. it is cer-
tainly not the case that most scientists dogmatically stick to their views until 
they die, especially when they are faced with convincing counter-evidence.
laudan’s own proposal for settling methodological quarrels accepts the 
fact that decisions are necessarily based on subjective values. he suggests a 
weighing process of the costs and benefits related to the weight and number 
of the problems a theory solves compared to the weight and number of the 
anomalies it has.165 The counting and weighing of problems is, as laudan ad-
mits, surely problematic, as it prevents a mechanical procedure and hence un-
ambiguous outcomes. The proposal of such a procedure seems to therefore 
support a relativistic view rather than refute it, because there are no objective 
standards for weighing and prioritising. however, methodological relativism 
can be overcome, even if one grants that there is no way of objectively deter-
mining the weight or importance of aims. This leads of course to a restriction 
of methodology to purely instrumental rationality, but laudan states that 
this is the most one can expect from theory evaluation: »good reasons are 
instrumental reasons; there is no other sort.«166 so laudan accepts relativism 
when it concerns the selection and weighting of problems and goals. however, 
he proposes »normative naturalism«, as laudan calls his meta-methodology, 
for finding the best methods to solve problems or achieve goals once they are 
selected. Determining the efficiency of methods for solving problems that 
are selected by the respective scientific communities is an empirical question 
for laudan. his normative naturalism rests on the conviction that method-
ological rules can be tested for their efficiency to bring about the desired re-
sults by analysing the history of science.167
163 see laudan (1996), p. 92.
164 see laudan (1996), p. 93. in Donovan/laudan/laudan (1988), p. 14 et sqq. there 
are the results of empirical studies of scientific change which pretty much refute 
the thesis that theory choice is irrational or arbitrary.
165 see laudan (1996), p. 82.
166 laudan (1996), p. 178.
167 see laudan (1996), p. 131 et sqq. again, such a procedure sounds cyclical at 
first, but as with any naturalist strategy, one could argue that the circle is virtu-
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in the course of his investigations, laudan contradicts feyerabend’s credo 
»anything goes«.168 he accepts that feyerabend found cases in which non-
conformance to methodological rules have led to great advances, but he de-
nies that this is enough for disproving that a set of rules was on average the 
best strategy for reaching certain desired aims. in this view, methodological 
rules are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for progress towards an 
end. hence, a methodological rule would be refuted not by some counter-in-
stances of genially rule-breaking scientists, but only by showing that an alter-
native set of rules – or in feyerabend’s case, the absence of rules – would be 
more efficient in promoting a set of given goals. when methods are seen as 
means for solving problems, incommensurability loses its relativising force 
for methodology, because incommensurability of problems does not lead to 
incommensurability of methods for solving them. by taking problem-ori-
entation seriously, laudan frees science from any general values such as the 
»quest for truth«, but he is by no means committed to an engineering kind 
of science that is restricted to solving only practical problems. relativism 
concerning problems allows for the most abstract problems conceivable and 
therefore does not reduce science to narrow-minded »toolbox-thinking«.
bas van fraasen’s pragmatic theory of explanation provides additional ar-
guments for a genuinely problem-oriented approach to theory evaluation.169 
van fraassen’s first step is a redefinition of empiricism that he brands »con-
structive empiricism«.170 according to this theory, the only goal of scientific 
theories is to be empirically adequate. even if van fraassen grants that cer-
tain theoretical claims may be in fact true or false, this does not matter for 
theory evaluation as long as the consequences of the theory fit the observa-
tions.171 accepting the weak underdetermination thesis, this allows of course 
for a plethora of possible theories, because for any given set of observations, 
there are infinitely many theories that are equally empirically adequate. van 
fraassen would accept this, as he strictly separates the pure, epistemic val-
ues of science from the pragmatic ones. The epistemic value of creating em-
ous rather than vicious. see section 4.1.3.1 for a longer discussion of this point. 
laudan’s testing of methodologies does not presume a »final, correct way of test-
ing«, it merely claims that it is an empirical question whether a methodology is a 
good means for the ends it promotes.
168 see laudan (1996), p. 101 et sqq.
169 The sketch of van fraassen’s theory is particularly short, as the basic ideas are pre-
sented again in the discussion of boylan’s and o’gorman’s causal holism later in 
this section.
170 see van fraassen (1980) on nearly every page of the book.
171 note how well this fits the as-if assumptions in economics: economists grant 
they may be true or false, but they do not care about this, as long as the out-
comes of the theory are empirically adequate. This allows for realism concerning 
scientific theories, but denies the relevance of such questions for science, which is, 
again, a pragmatic way out of an old dichotomy.
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pirically adequate theories is, according to van fraassen, the only goal of sci-
ence, but that in no way excludes the employment of pragmatic criteria such 
as simplicity or explanatory power for theory selection.172
interestingly, explanation is not a genuine goal of pure science for van 
fraassen; it is rather a side effect of the application of pure science.173 This fol-
lows straightforwardly from his assertion that finding empirically adequate 
theories is the only goal of science. however, this does not mean that expla-
nations are unimportant. van frassen’s theory of explanation solves an im-
portant problem of the classic Dn-model of explanation. The Dn-model’s 
basic idea – that providing an explanation for a fact means deducing it from 
some given facts plus a natural law – is problematic, because of so-called ex-
planation asymmetries such as this: The length of a tower can be deduced 
by the length of its shadow plus the position of the sun plus some geometric 
operations. however, we would not agree that the length of a shadow can ex-
plain the length of a tower, even if we can deduce it from a natural law plus 
some given facts.
van fraassen set out to overcome such problems with his pragmatic the-
ory of explanation. at the basis of this theory is the idea that explanations 
are essentially context-dependent; he characterises them as answers to con-
trastive why-questions. every event allows for many different why-questions 
that require different answers or explanations. Take, for example, a car crash: 
There are many possible why-questions to ask, and each one requires a differ-
ent explanation: why did the driver crash the car rather than driving safely 
on normally (probably a psychological or medical explanation required)? 
why did the metal of the car bend and not break (mechanical explanation 
required)? why was the street narrow rather than wide (political explana-
tion)? This could be continued forever, and it shows that explanations can-
not just occur between theory and data but need context, viz. a specific, ad-
ditional why-question.174 explanations are therefore a part of the pragmatic 
side of the scientific coin. This view offers interesting new aspects for theory 
evaluation and enables us to escape both positivism and relativism: Theo-
ries can be judged according to their ability to answer certain why-questions 
and, according to van fraassen, this is independent from their epistemic qual-
ity: »even what part of … background information is to be used to evaluate 
how good the answer is … is a contextually determined factor«.175 To clarify 
the difference between pragmatic and epistemic aspects, van fraassen often 
stresses the explanatory difference of being a daughter and being a woman – 
which is pragmatically not the same, even if every woman is a daughter and 
172 see van fraassen (1980), p. 97.
173 see van fraassen (1980), p. 157.
174 see van fraassen (1980), p. 156.
175 van fraassen (1980), p. 156.
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every daughter is a woman, so that there is no epistemic difference between 
the two terms.
van fraassen’s twist pushes many of the relativists’ attacks to the prag-
matic side, where relativism is not that big of a problem, as context depend-
ency is easily granted here. of course it is impossible to determine objec-
tively what questions we should ask. but his constructive empiricism does 
not lead to »anything goes« when it comes to theory evaluation. note that 
constructive empiricism does not require a defence of pure science as a neu-
tral description of the world. pure science is about constructing models that 
are empirically adequate to the phenomena they refer to. van fraassen intro-
duces a crucial distinction between »observing« and »observing that«, and 
he offers arguments that only »observing that« is affected negatively by the-
ory-ladenness: »suppose one of the stone age people recently found in the 
philippines is shown a tennis ball …. from his behaviour, we see that he no-
ticed them …. but he has not seen that it is a tennis ball«.176 but even »ob-
serving (without ’that’)« is not neutral or objective for van fraassen: observa-
tion is of course observation-for-us and not neutral observation.177 so while 
he grants the postmodern point that neutral observation is not possible, he 
does not subscribe to the far-reaching postmodern relativism and holds that 
some quality standards are well applicable for human beings.
avoiding the danger of digressing too far from economic methodology, i 
turn to the work of Thomas a. boylan and pascal f. o’gorman, who have de-
veloped a pragmatic methodology for economics which they call »causal ho-
lism«. The sense of the foregoing philosophical »digressions« becomes clear 
when one identifies their methodological framework as a synthesis of Quine’s 
holism with van fraassen’s constructive empiricism. like van fraasen, boy-
lan and o’gorman put explanation entirely to the pragmatic side of eco-
nomics (which they call applied economics) and see the epistemic aim of 
pure economics only in delivering adequate descriptions.178 following Quine 
they accept that theory-free description is impossible, as theory and descrip-
tion are inseparably linked, which leads to an antifoundationalist picture in 
176 van fraassen (1980), p. 15.
177 however, theory-ladenness can even occur on an intersubjective level, e. g. scien-
tific training can enable a person to see differences in objects where an untrained 
person does not see them. observation-for-us therefore does not entail the claim 
that all humans see the same things, but allows for the qualification »under op-
timal epistemic conditions«, which surely includes scientific training. see van 
fraassen (1980), p. 17-19. nonetheless, the distinction between observables and 
unobservables is notoriously hard to draw. see Klee (1997), p. 299 et sqq. This 
problem will be dealt with more closely in the following section and especially in 
section 4.2.1.
178 note that this does not contradict any interpretation of the interests and desires of 
scientists. see boylan/o’gorman (1995), p. 162.
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which every statement is evaluated by how it is connected to other convic-
tions in an overall web of belief. To give a short example, even the simple de-
scriptive statement »the lower the price, the higher the sales (c.p. )« involves 
theoretical assumptions and cannot be observed neutrally or directly.
since causal holism sets descriptive adequacy as the only epistemological 
goal, it suspends judgement on the reality of unobservable theoretical enti-
ties and on the truth-status of theories in general.179 boylan and o’gorman 
accept many of van fraasen’s conclusions, but there are important differ-
ences. a highly crucial point is, of course, the definition of »observable«.180 
in the section »causal holism and Descriptive adequacy« the authors ex-
tend the notion of »observability« even to causality. They argue that the 
recognition of causes does not differ in principle from the recognition of 
complex objects – they are learned in the same way.181 further, causal ho-
lism contradicts constructive empiricists in the definition of empirical ade-
quacy. it rejects van fraassen’s stance that observability is a theory-independ-
ent question.182 for causal holists observation (without »that«) cannot be 
theory-independent, and hence empirical adequacy is a highly complex issue 
that involves a holistic evaluation of the competing models and their descrip-
tive resources183 – the »logical notion of isomorphism fails to grasp the rich 
complexity of empirical or descriptive adequacy which results from its em-
bededdedness in ‘historical’ time«.184 accepting this, it is hard for causal ho-
lists to define a standardised method for evaluating the descriptive adequacy 
of models. but the main point is a negative one: causal holists refrain from 
speaking about the »essence« of entities. an example from economics will 
help to clarify the point: causal holists would not agree with the realist’s in-
terpretation that maximising revenue is the »essence« of firms – causal ho-
lists would not care about the essence as long as a model is empirically ad-
equate.185 This view leads to the rejection of unification as a normative goal 
179 however, like van fraassen, causal holists agree that models literally say some-
thing about unobservable mechanisms which are true or false. see e. g. boylan/
o‘gorman (1995), p. 202.
180 see fleetwood (2002) and boylan/o’gorman (2006) for a detailed discussion of 
the status of unobservables in causal holism. fleetwood, as a realist, sees an es-
sential tension between causal holism’s ontology (which grants the existence of 
unobservables) and its epistemology (which suspends judgement on them). boy-
lan and o’gorman defend their position against this charge by stressing the dan-
gers of a realistic interpretation of the ontology of economic theories.
181 see boylan/o‘gorman (1995), p. 163 et sqq.
182 see van fraassen (1980), p. 57.
183 see boylan/o‘gorman (1995), p. 168.
184 boylan/o‘gorman (1995), p. 166.
185 see boylan/o‘gorman (1995), p. 175.
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of economics and establishes theoretical pluralism as more than an interim 
position.186
apart from philosophical subtleties, the most palpable impact of causal 
holism is its position towards holistic learning from experience, which ex-
tends hausman’s discussion of ceteris paribus clauses in economics. re-
member hausman’s argument that the ceteris paribus assumptions are prob-
ably the weakest links in economic theory, which protects the theoretical core 
from empirical falsification and makes learning from experience almost im-
possible.187
from the perspective of causal holism, this would exclude economics from 
the domain of science.188 boylan and o’gorman argue (again referring to 
Quine), that more holistic testing is required, which means that the theoreti-
cal core of economics is not privileged over the ceteris paribus assumptions. 
This shows that causal holism rejects hausman’s interpretation of econom-
ics, which consists of accepting the core of economics by means of com-
mon-sense realism.189 as causal holism refrains from realistic interpretations, 
boylan and o’gorman insist that learning from experience must be possi-
ble for any part of theory – including the theoretical core. This seems prima 
facie desirable, but following lakatos and Kuhn the protection of a theoreti-
cal core and the resulting defence of paradigms or research programmes can 
lead in the long run to changes of the core as well, if an old paradigm or re-
search programme is substituted with a more promising one. This means that 
»learning from experience« does not necessarily have to take place directly at 
the level of the theoretical core of neoclassical economics but can emerge 
over time through the arrival of new paradigms or research programmes in 
the normal course of science.
apart from the above point, which shows why protecting some parts of 
theories can be reasonable, boylan and o’gorman do not explain what 
working »on a ship at sea« – where no part is protected from the bar of expe-
rience – could look like. so one could say that they reject relativism, but their 
normative concept needs further refinement.
all three conceptions presented in this chapter share the commonality 
of accepting the postmodern insight that science cannot be built on firm 
ground; yet they are convinced that this neither makes science an irrational 
enterprise nor leads to an »anything goes« relativism. laudan, van fraassen 
and boylan/o’gorman develop concepts for empirical research that allow 
186 see e. g. boylan/o‘gorman (1995), p. 177. again, boylan and o’gorman are fol-
lowing Quine in this. see boylan/o’gorman (2003), p. 4. note that caldwell, as 
a pioneer of pluralism in economic methodology, cautiously called pluralism an 
interim position. see footnote 95 in chapter 3.
187 see hausman (1992a), p. 307.
188 see boylan/o‘gorman (2003), p. 9.
189 see boylan/o‘gorman (2003), p. 17.
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for relativism concerning the problems one deals with, but not for relativism 
when it comes to the assessment of the solutions: laudan’s important move 
was to stress the problem-solving capacity of theories as the primary crite-
rion for their quality; van fraasen overcame difficulties of traditional empiri-
cism through his strong distinction between epistemic and pragmatic aspects 
of theories; and boylan/o’gorman tried to apply a blend of Quine’s holism 
and van fraassen’s constructive empiricism to economics.
 alas, all three conceptions discuss matters on a fairly abstract level and 
are (even in the case of boylan/o’gorman) not easily applied to economics. 
This is the reason why the next section deals more concretely with the under-
standing and improving of model building in ecomomics.
4.1.4.2. Reflections on Model Building in Economics
how can models be justified that are full of counterfactual assumptions? in 
which way do economic models help us to understand what’s going on in 
the real world? how do – and how should – economists actually learn from 
the bar of experience? i will briefly discuss several pragmatic approaches to 
these questions in this section. all authors presented in this section have 
normative positions about how to improve or assess economic theory, but 
they don’t call dogmatically for more empirical work at the core of econom-
ics, nor do they demand tougher falsification. in this sense, all contributions 
are small steps towards a solution for the dichotomy of (dogmatic) empiri-
cism and postmodern relativism in economic methodology.
4.1.4.2.1 Justifying Idealisations
an important field for discussion is the role of idealisations in economic the-
ory. if strong idealisations could be justified, this would be a major difference 
from the empiricist claims discussed above.
before discussing idealisations it is important to stress some fundamental 
aspects of economic model building and how it helps promote learning from 
the »bar of experience« in a holistic fashion. as always, i will restrict myself to 
theoretical models, leaving the econometric models aside. economic model-
ling can be defined as the idealised reconstruction of essential features of eco-
nomic systems.190 it is important to note how the process of model building 
actually works. obviously there are different approaches,191 but they all have 
one important point in common: They acknowledge that models are not 
merely simplifications of the real world. modelling is instead a creative pro-
cess in which functional mechanisms are suggested and not merely extracted 
from what we observe in the world.
190 see frigg/hartmann (2006) for an excellent overview of the role of models in sci-
ence.
191 for a nice and short example of a »model-building handbook« see varian (1997).
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mary s. morgan has argued that learning from models is a creative pro-
cess that happens at two stages of model building: the construction and the 
manipulation of the model. in her view, models are not passive mathemat-
ical structures but always involve a »story« that relates them to the world;192 
models are like instruments that need to be used or manipulated if we want to 
learn something from them.193 These arguments about the particularities of 
economic building show once again why we must go beyond traditional em-
piricist standards when doing theory evaluation in economics.
additionally, many features of models are introduced for convenience 
and better mathematical tractability even if they contradict empirical knowl-
edge.194 Therefore, economic models are not only necessarily incomplete but 
are also based on counterfactual assumptions. These assumptions are mostly 
characterised as idealisations that stress the essential features of the relevant 
problem. now the question arises of how the use of idealisations can be jus-
tified. To answer this, it is important to note that idealisations are common 
even in the »hardest« natural sciences like physics – at the very least since 
galileo galilei’s free-fall experiments. interestingly, idealisation on the as-
sumption-side in physics was linked with an increase in predictive power.195 
as i will show in section 4.2.1.2, idealisations are not a sufficient reason to 
refrain from a realistic interpretation of economics. in fact, idealisations are 
necessary for any form of theorising; without them we would be trapped in 
the messy world of photographic description. idealisations help to unify ob-
servations under a theory that would otherwise have no connection to each 
other. in short, learning from experience requires theorising and theorising 
requires idealising. of course there can be losses in empirical adequacy due 
to idealisations, but if one looks at the degree to which economists employ 
idealisations in their models, it seems clear that predictive accuracy is not the 
only aim of their enterprise.196 for example, a game-theoretic reconstruction 
of patent races as delivered by etro 2004197 makes – as do most game-theo-
192 see e. g. morgan (2001). morgan builds on ideas first mentioned in gibbard/var-
ian (1978).
193 see morgan/morrison (1999), p. 10 et sqq. as i am not primarily concerned with 
a characterisation of models, but rather aim at finding a new balance for theory 
evaluation and hence a justification for the use of (false) economic models, i will 
leave the topic with these short remarks.
194 an example are models that assume one-product firms in an atomistic market.
195 see hüttemann (1996), p. 91.
196 hüttemann even takes the use of idealisations to be an argument against van 
fraassen’s dictum that empirically adequate prediction is the aim of science (see 
hüttemann (1996), p. 127). i would not go that far, because some idealisations 
(as in galilei’s case) can lead to higher empirical adequacy.
197 a more detailed discussion of this paper will be given in section 5.1.3.
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retic models – at best only vague tendency predictions which are nowhere 
tested for their empirical adequacy.
 nancy cartwright has argued that idealisations are necessary for finding 
interesting mechanisms so that the highly abstract and hence descriptively 
unrealistic nature of neoclassical economic modelling is not a disadvantage 
as such. cartwright characterises neoclassical models as thought experiments 
and makes clear that all thought experiments rely on idealisations or false as-
sumptions. however, according to cartwright the idealisations in economics 
are not of a helpful or »galilean« kind as they are tailored to facilitate math-
ematic tractability and therefore do not merely isolate relevant features but 
add additional restrictions to the model, which makes the results highly de-
pendent on them and reduces their applicability.198 however, she offers no 
proposals for what better idealisations would look like.
4.1.4.2.2 Learning from Models
marcel boumans refers to cartwright and deals with the question of how 
learning from experience is possible in economics. his proposal goes against 
the classical ceteris paribus laws of the empiricist tradition: boumans ar-
gues that the traditional notion of ceteris paribus laws is ill-suited for the so-
cial sciences, as here the conditions are never constant and especially hard to 
control. Therefore, economists should instead look for general relationships 
that »continue to hold … as various other conditions change.«199 This shifts 
the focus from searching ceteris paribus laws to investigating the domain for 
which a relationship holds. hence, boumans refers approvingly to fried-
man’s approach where specifying the domain is an integral part of a hypoth-
esis that must be empirically enquired.200 in that way one is much more likely 
to find relations that are actually useful under real-world conditions. clear 
specifications of domains where relationships hold independent from dis-
turbing factors can lead to decomposing the complex economic system into 
a hierarchy of subsystems »where the elementary units … are bound only 
by simple relationships. Their simplicity implies that they probably repre-
sent autonomous relationships.«201 This presumes, of course, that fixed sim-
ple patterns create the complexity of economics by their interdependence. 
how can the simple structures that underlie complex system be untangled if 
the ceteris paribus condition never holds and controlled experiments are not 
198 see Kaldor (1978), p. 202 for a similar point. see cartwright (2002), p. 11 & p. 15.
199 boumans (2003), p. 310.
200 see boumans (2003), p. 318-319. on page 328 boumans concludes that it is not 
the domain of negligible changes that should be investigated, but rather the do-
main of the phenomena that can be successfully predicted.
201 boumans (2003), p. 325.
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possible?202 again referring to nancy cartwright, boumans discusses »ceteris 
neglectis regularities« as a possible substitute: invariant relationships could 
also occur if the influence of the environment is negligible. The problem is, 
however, that highly autonomous relationships are in most cases rather im-
precise or last only for short timespans.203 Therefore, boumans agrees with 
friedman’s recommendation to not look for general models with high au-
tonomy but to investigate for which phenomena a model holds. boumans 
concludes that strictly controlled experiments are not necessary for finding 
lawlike relationships in economics.204 however, as explained above, he agrees 
that this may be possible only in small, restricted domains. still, boumans 
points to a way out of relativism without going back to the traditional em-
piricist notions.
gibbard and varian offer an interesting perspective on theory evaluation 
in economics that directly contradicts the empiristic picture and proposes a 
new standard: in an article where they characterise most economic models as 
»caricatures«, they argue that the point of these economic models is not so 
much accurate prediction but rather »emphasizing – even to the point of dis-
torting – certain selected aspects of the economic situation«.205.
if one accepts that models are caricatures that are not only based on false 
assumptions but also make false and intentionally distorted predictions, it 
becomes harder to justify the use of idealisations (though it is still possible). 
gibbard and varian argue that simple models are needed for generating re-
sults that can be meaningfully reduced to the assumptions, because models 
that bring in many and countervailing economic forces tend to bury their 
effects, i. e. can provide no explanation why a certain result has been ob-
tained.206 when the results of caricature-models are robust to changes in ide-
alisations and auxiliary assumptions, this can increase our trust in the mod-
els.207
in a recent paper hindriks has further reflected on the puzzling idea that it 
is possible to explain by employing »false« models.208 The descriptive side of 
202 This refers of course to macroeconomics and does not deny the possibility of ex-
periments in the domain of individual decision making.
203 see boumans (2003), p. 326.
204 see boumans (2003), p. 328.
205 gibbard/varian (1978), p. 665.
206 see gibbard/varian (1978), p. 673.
207 see gibbard/varian (1978), p. 674. alexander rosenberg criticises this point and 
states that the explanatory power of a theory is actually decreased if »a wide variety 
of equally plausible alternative theories« (rosenberg (1989), p. 67) is available. i 
think he misunderstands the term »robustness«, which refers to varying the as-
sumptions of one theory and not comparing structurally different theories. see 
section 4.1.4.3 for a more detailed discussion of the robustness criterion.
208 see hindriks (2008). i adopt hindriks’ talk of »false models»only for conveni-
ence; i still accept hausman’s view that the models themselves are predicates that 
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his analysis is similar to gibbard and varian: hindriks accepts that not only 
the assumptions but also the implications of economic models may contra-
dict our best knowledge. however, if they are »false« in the right sense they 
can be very fruitful »explanatory engines«. hindriks draws – again – an anal-
ogy to galileo galilei’s law that all bodies fall at the same speed in a vacuum. 
here, the assumption of bodies falling in a vacuum is false, and the predic-
tions do not hold in the real world, either: a feather falls slower than a stone 
outside a vacuum. hindriks compares this to the miller-modigliani theorem, 
which states that the way a firm is financed is irrelevant to its value in a world 
where finance markets operate perfectly. again, the assumptions and the pre-
dictions are false: finance markets do not operate perfectly, nor is the way a 
firm is financed irrelevant to its value. however, as in galilei’s case, the the-
ory behind such models can be counterfactually true. hindriks argues that 
good models are »explanatory engines« because they help to ask contrastive 
why-questions in van fraassen’s sense. They provide a background foil for 
further research and learning from experience.209 The unrealistic assumptions 
and the resulting unrealistic predictions are »the contrast relative to which a 
certain fact is to be explained«210. The explanations of different questions are 
delivered by relaxing assumptions: in galilei’s case the vacuum-assumption 
and in case of the modigliani-miller theorem the perfect-markets assump-
tion. This does not contradict friedman’s methodology, as he would recom-
mend changing the assumptions, too, if they lead to false predictions. The re-
laxation of assumptions of the modigliani-miller theorem led to important 
contrastive questions such as »why is leverage relevant to the value of a firm 
rather than being irrelevant?«211, »why do firms retain some of their equity 
rather than relying on debt only?«212 and »why do firms opt for this partic-
ular equity-debt ratio rather than another one?«213. This suggests what hin-
driks means by calling false models »explanatory engines«: a possibly coun-
terfactually true theorem that delivers false predictions because it is based on 
false assumptions can stimulate a fruitful line of research and generate (possi-
ble) explanations by implicitly suggesting the relaxation of assumptions. The 
stimulation of questions is a new normative aspect for theory evaluation that 
lies completely beyond the empiristic picture.
vilks adds another argument in favour of models based on empirically 
false assumptions.214 in his view, models based on false assumptions can 
cannot be actually »false«. see section 4.1.1.
209 see hindriks (2008), p. 338&340.
210 hindriks (2008), p. 342.
211 hindriks (2008), p. 352.
212 hindriks (2008), p. 355.
213 hindriks (2008), p. 355.
214 see vilks (2002) The falsity of assumptions refers of course to assumptions that 
are known to be false in other contexts or are known to be causing false predic-
4.1 finding a new balance 157
sharpen our intuition about relationships in economic systems, as they fos-
ter tacit knowledge in a way similar to the study of fictive case studies. in his 
view, economic models do not describe the reality »essentially correctly« and 
do not deliver knowledge about the economy, but serve rather as a training in-
strument that shapes the worldview of economists.215 however, vilks stresses 
that it is not at all clear which models should be studied and to what degree 
this should be done, as adverse effects of dealing with formal models are ev-
idently conceivable as well. The relation between models and the real world 
consists, in his view, of a kind of family resemblance: even if no part of the 
model refers to reality – neither the assumption nor the predictions – there 
still is a similarity. vilks argues that learning and understanding always works 
this way for humans – our brains are not made for mechanically deducing 
from theories; rather, they learn in a creative, parallel and connective way.216
eric schliesser extends this discussion and sets out how theory can be an 
engine for empirical discovery.217 The course of his arguments shows that em-
pirical confirmation is probably not what we should expect from economic 
theory; rather, we should concentrate on how we can improve it. This is again 
a normative proposal that goes beyond the classic empiricist ideas.
according to schliesser, some theories enable measurements that can lead 
not only to confirmation or disconfirmation of theories but as well to the 
generation of new theories.218 his thesis is that those theories which enable 
measuring the »nature, scope, and robustness of a theoretical constant«219 are 
particularly good engines for new theories, as they enable scientists to learn 
from the shortcomings of the current theories by generating interesting em-
pirical research questions. The Duhem-Quine thesis and the resulting diffi-
culties of testing complex and uncontrollable systems are for schliesser only 
problematic when justification is the aim of enquiry.220 The forward-looking 
activity of science is not undermined, and even if falsification is made im-
possible by the Duhem-Quine thesis, disconfirmations in no way hinder the 
refinement of theories or the development of new ones. The crucial question 
is, therefore, how empirical research can be guided by economic theories in 
a way that helps to improve the theories themselves. schliesser argues that 
the search for constants could be a useful regulative idea for this.221 i agree 
in part, but as i will propose later in this section, the search for constants is 
tions. friedman’s argument that the falsity of assumptions cannot be known be-
forehand is hence rejected here.
215 see vilks (2002), p. 25.
216 see vilks (2002), p. 27.
217 see schliesser (2005).
218 see schliesser (2005), p. 51.
219 schliesser (2005), p. 65.
220 see schliesser (2005), p. 67.
221 see schliesser (2005), p. 71.
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not enough for guiding research – a research programme such as the heuris-
tic interpretation of rational choice is also needed in order to make mean-
ingful empirical research possible in economics, and this will be discussed in 
the next subsection.
all the discussed approaches to economic modelling try to justify – in a 
pragmatic way that takes the peculiarities of economics into consideration – 
the use of unrealistic models for help in understanding the real world. Thus 
they are neither empiricist nor relativistic.
4.1.4.2.3 Rational Choice as Heuristic
The last approach to model building presented in this section is, in my opin-
ion, by far the clearest and most complete pragmatic justification for eco-
nomic modelling: homann and suchanek justify the rational-choice ap-
proach by calling it tautological and a mere heuristic.222 in this interpretation 
it actually loses any direct empirical content and therefore cannot be called 
»unrealistic« anymore.223 This is the main twist of the heuristic approach: 
what was called unrealistic before is now assumed to be a heuristic princi-
ple without any ontological relevance. from this perspective, the important 
question is no longer whether or not economic explanations are »realistic« 
but only whether or not one can find an economic reconstruction of some 
observed behaviour that delivers an explanation in terms of individually per-
ceived costs and benefits – it doesn’t matter if those factors »really« motivate 
human beings or not.
economic modelling means, then, to unravel hidden costs and benefits 
and to construct motives and incentives that underlie a given situation.224 
The empirical side of economics does not consist of its basic model of ra-
tional behaviour but of the description of situations in cost-benefit terms. 
The underlying rational-choice modelling scheme is not built on empirical 
research, nor is it considered falsifiable; it merely delivers a perspective on 
human behaviour.
many critics have argued that this framework is too narrow for under-
standing human behaviour. homann and suchanek reply that every science 
222 They admittedly develop their position as an extension of popper’s view of the 
rationality principle, as discussed in section 2.3.1.1.
223 notice the proximity to gary becker’s approach, discussed in section 2.4.2.1. 
homann and suchanek deliver methodological reasons for justifying this ap-
proach. needless to say, they are not alone in doing this. similar arguments can 
be found e. g. in Kirchgässner (1991), vanberg (2002) vanberg or pies (1998).
224 as always, this refers to situations in which many individuals interact and not to 
the decision procedures of single individuals. Knowledge of average preferences 
is nonetheless necessary for analysing the behaviour of collectives: e. g. if the as-
sumption that most people prefer more money to less was incorrect, economists 
could hardly make any predictions.
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has a method and as a result, a narrow perspective on the world (e. g. medi-
cine cares only about how to cure diseases); so an alleged narrowness is not a 
disadvantage as such, but rather the opposite: specialisation and division of 
labour is as necessary for scientific progress as it is for the efficient organisa-
tion of modern societies. fruitful interdisciplinary research requires clearly 
separated and well-defined methodologies.225 put in a paradoxical way, the 
heuristic view of the economic man encourages pluralism and interdiscipli-
nary research in economics by being strictly dogmatic concerning the meth-
odological basis.226
The defence of rational-choice modelling is presented along pragmatic 
lines: complexity reduction is always necessary, and for the solution of some 
problems it is often pragmatically most convenient to reduce them to ra-
tional-choice problems: a search for »truth« does not tell us where and how 
to reduce complexity, because it is far too general – every detail is important 
when looking for »the truth«. applying the rational-choice methodology to a 
given problem guides the researcher to reduce complexity.227
homann and suchanek define economics by its method and thereby avoid 
fundamental criticism of it: if economics is bound to rational-choice expla-
nations by definition and if it is successful with some applications, it is meth-
odologically justified, in the sense that it cannot be rejected as being »unre-
alistic and therefore useless«. once this is accepted, the central question has 
shifted from »is the rational choice approach justifiable?« to »which prob-
lems can be solved by the rational choice approach?« in other words, the 
central methodological matter is now the fruitfulness of the rational-choice 
approach, not its intuitive appeal or realisticness. with their heuristic inter-
pretation of the economic man, homann and suchanek take the view that 
the rational-choice approach can be fruitfully applied even where it is seem-
ingly falsified. They, too, refer to galilei’s laws of falling bodies and com-
pare them to fundamental laws in economics.228 as galileo »saw« his laws 
at work everywhere and attributed the differences of falling speed to variances 
225 see suchanek (1993), p. 3. homan and suchanek stress that that there is no well-
defined domain for economics but rather that the findings of other social sciences 
can be integrated into economics as additional restrictions. see homann/su-
chanek (2000), p. 395 et sqq.
226 hausman sees this dogmatism as a valid point for criticism. see hausman 
(1992a), p. 235. homann and suchanek disagree, because their view on ration-
ality is completely open, as it allows for the inclusion of any costs and benefits, 
even purely psychological ones. in this way the results from other sciences can 
be integrated into the economic approach.
227 see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 341.
228 in particular, they take the law of falling demand and the dominance of defection 
in prisoner’s-dilemma situations as examples for fundamental economic laws. 
see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 344.
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in boundary conditions, homan and suchanek see social-dilemma situa-
tions like the prisoner’s dilemma everywhere; and if people sometimes coop-
erate and sometimes don’t, this does not affect the general theory but should 
be explained by unravelling the different institutional settings.229 This fits 
perfectly to hausman’s description of economics as a separate science, one 
where the theoretical core is protected. note that this does not make it a nar-
row science, because the economic method can be applied to a plethora of 
distinct problems and is by no means restricted to an »economic domain«.
homann and suchanek defend their view against several critiques that 
have been headed against rational-choice reasoning. They reject simon’s 
view that modelling individuals as »satisficers« would be superior to model-
ling them as »optimisers«, because they see satisficing as an optimisation pro-
cess that includes the search costs. optimising is a more general approach 
that can integrate search costs when necessary.230 in a similar vein, homann 
and suchanek reject simon’s concept of bounded rationality: while they ac-
cept that humans do not have complete knowledge, nor do they react at un-
limited speed, they again recommend attributing these facts not to the basic 
rational-choice model but to the restrictions, if they are relevant for the prob-
lem under scrutiny. in homann’s and suchanek’s view, economists should 
concentrate on modelling the results of human behaviour, not on modelling 
the decision process. consequently, they reject attacks from experimental 
economists that are headed against rational-choice modelling, too. The heu-
ristic rational-choice approach is committed to the view that humans some-
how react systematically to changes – otherwise, no economic theory is pos-
sible. where experimental economists search for deviations from the classic 
narrow interpretation of rationality, homann and suchanek recommend 
looking for (rational) reasons of such deviations.231
it should be clear by now that the heuristic interpretation of the eco-
nomic man is very liberal and does not in principle prefer monetary incen-
tives to others (such as psychological ones). This is one reason why they re-
ject buchanan’s defence of the economic man as a worst-case scenario.232 
another reason is that they do not see the traditional homo oeconomicus 
to be a worst-case scenario, but a rather realistic one, at least in competitive 
situations or when a »bad guy« forces other participants into defection. This 
makes homann’s and suchanek’s view somewhat inconsistent, as they first 
stress the broad interpretation of »utility« but at the end of the day adopt 
the traditional view, which excludes e. g. true altruism.233 This reveals a fun-
229 see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 358.
230 see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 364.
231 see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 367.
232 see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 371 and footnote 222 for a short remark on 
buchanan’s view.
233 see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 372-373.
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damental lack of clarity in their position: Do they see the homo economi-
cus as an empirically grounded model, or not? for the most part, they stress 
the heuristic character of rational-choice models and stress that economics 
is not a realistic theory of human behaviour – and should not be.234 at other 
times their argumentation seems different, such as when they state that given 
situations and their incentive-structure really motivate individuals.235 as long 
as such statements are not substantiated with good arguments – which is 
not the case in the rare236 occasions homann and suchanek make them – it 
would be philosophically wiser to suspend judgement on knowledge of the 
»reality« of human motivations.
Köllmann has discussed the position of homann and suchanek, and while 
generally favourable of their view, he criticises their lack of justification.237 it 
is certainly true that homan and suchanek often write as if any other meth-
odology besides the rational-choice paradigm is »beside the point«. The jus-
tification of the approach remains implicit: similarly to laudan, homann 
and suchanek acknowledge that while their methodological perspective (see-
ing rational choices everywhere) is something pre-empirical, the success of 
this pre-empirical heuristic is an empirical matter. if there were other heu-
ristics that could provide better solutions to the economic problems ho-
mann and suchanek are interested in, they would substitute the economic-
man methodology.238 if this is granted, dogmatism (in the sense of Kuhnian 
normal science) can be actually a good thing, as it leads to detailed research 
and tough competition. as Köllmann points out, homann and suchanek 
sometimes do not seem to acknowledge this when they call many criticisms 
of the rational-choice approach »beside the point«: if every change of the 
core of economics was »beside the point«, amendments like game theory, in-
stitutional economics or the inclusion of search costs into the optimisation 
process would have never been made.239 Therefore, it would be more hon-
est if homann and suchanek would admit that some suggestions are beside 
their point of reconstructing human interactions as dilemma-situations of ra-
tional egoists.
so while the defence of rational-choice modelling that homann and su-
chanek deliver is persuasive, they overemphasise the strengths and corre-
spondingly neglect the weaknesses of this concept. Their argumentative twist 
is binding economics to the rational-choice approach by definition, so that 
problems in need of a different approach are assigned to sciences distinct 
234 see e. g. homann/suchanek (2000), p. 376 for an explicit statement.
235 see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 371.
236 since i found only the one referenced above, it is perhaps fairer to attribute the 
inconsistency to carelessness rather than calling it a fundamental error.
237 see Köllmann (2001), p. 32.
238 see homann/suchanek (2000), p. 378.
239 see Köllmann (2001), p. 16.
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from economics; but whereas rational choice, in the broad interpretation 
that homann and suchanek apply, is surely well-suited for many problems 
such as analysing the incentive-structure of different institutional settings, it 
inherently lacks e. g. the capability for predicting the amount of the effects.240
This section on model building in economics has covered a lot of ground 
and presented many methodological positions that neither follow the empir-
icist strand of chapter 2 nor the relativism of chapter 3 but instead propose 
new criteria that offer a pragmatic way out of this dichotomy. while there is 
much to be learned from the rather scattered methodological remarks dis-
cussed here, a broader framework for theory evaluation is still lacking; this 
will be presented in chapter 4.3. This framework will be applied to four case 
studies in order to show how economic models can be fruitfully criticised.
but first, the next section gives an overview of traditional criteria for the-
ory evaluation and how they can be applied to economics.
4.1.4.3. Some Criteria for Theory Evaluation
after having mentioned some criteria for theory choice in the preceding sec-
tions rather unsystematically, here is a more systematic summary of criteria 
by which theories can be evaluated. at this time, at least two points should 
be considered to be beyond question:
1. There are criteria for theory choice. relativism is plausible only at the 
most global level of problem- or goal-selection. as soon as a problem 
is given, it is possible to assess the quality of possible solutions in a ra-
tional (even if not a mechanical) way.
2. empirical adequacy is not the only criterion for evaluating theories. 
while empirical adequacy is important, claiming a more empirical sci-
ence of economics is often of little help and can even be confusing 
when appraising economic models.
while the discussion in the foregoing chapter concentrated on the peculiari-
ties of economic modelling and how to justify it in ways that differ from tra-
ditional empiricist standards, i will now present criteria to evaluate economic 
models or theories.
of course, the acceptance of such criteria rests ultimately on values that 
gain their status through their endorsement by the scientific community.241 
in that sense, relativism is granted: there could be values other than the ones 
240 models based on rational-choice approaches need to be calibrated if they are to 
be useful for prediction. such calibration sometimes includes chance, noise and 
other errors that cannot be reconstructed as rational behaviour.
241 see Kuhn (1977). Kitcher is arguing along similar lines when he discusses the sim-
ilarities between ethical and scientific revolutions. see Kitcher (2008). carrier ar-
gues in a recent paper that empirical underdetermination combined with the ac-
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suggested by the criteria listed below – take again praise of god as a radical 
counter-example. a list of criteria for scientific theories is therefore rather an 
explication of the values most scientists agree upon than a normative defini-
tion of what science should look like.242 but if our notion of science is more 
or less fixed, the listed criteria are both explications of scientific values and 
criteria for rational theory appraisal if we accept those values. This means 
epistemic values are of course not objective eternal platonic ideas, but this 
does not lead to »anything goes« as long as the epistemic values are justified 
by a reflective equilibrium of aims and methods to achieve them.243
Unsurprisingly, the most important criteria for good scientific theo-
ries are the classics, sometimes called »necessary criteria for good scientific 
theories«.244
• non-circularity: good theories should be free of vicious circles, be-
cause this makes them tautological.245
• internal consistency: if a theory is logically inconsistent, everything can 
be deduced from it, so the theory is of no help at all (if applied with-
out judgement).246
• external consistency: Theories should not contradict other well-es-
tablished theories or background knowledge. of course, many major 
breakthroughs in science did just that – but arguably, they did not gain 
their status because they were inconsistent with accepted knowledge but 
rather despite this.
tual theory choices made by scientists leads to »expounding hidden variables of 
the scientific community«. see carrier (2009).
242 The same holds, of course, for »rationality« or in fact any term at all – there are 
no essential definitions that can capture the »heart« of a term once and for all.
243 see laudan (1984).
244 see vollmer (1992) and lütge (2001), p. 129 et sqq. for a more detailed discussion 
of these criteria. note that at the latest since lakatos’ constructive falsificationism 
it has been widely accepted that theory appraisal is never absolute but always in-
volves comparing theories to their predecessors or competitors.
245 note that some circularity is unavoidable if one rejects the possibility of founda-
tionalist justification and opts for a reflective equilibrium method. goodman, 
vollmer and other naturalist philosophers argue that such circles are good circles. 
see goodman (1955), p. 78 for the locus classicus.
246 note, however, that some theories that were internally inconsistent became huge 
successes afterwards. Take the old quantum theory of black-body radiation, for 
example. (see Da costa/french (2002), p. 105.) nonetheless, even if inconsist-
encies may be temporarily accepted, they are the most-agreed-upon error a theory 
can have.
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• explanatory power: Despite the ongoing philosophical debate about 
the nature of scientific explanation, scientists demand that good theo-
ries offer explanations. if a theory is merely descriptive or does not offer 
causal hypotheses, this is seen as a severe disadvantage.
• Testability/success in tests: good theories should offer hypotheses that 
can be empirically tested. That does not mean that every single part of 
a theory must be testable (in most cases the theoretical core is not), but 
after some time theories should pass some empirical tests successfully, 
at least for the phenomena they were intended to predict.247
other criteria like generality, simplicity, precision, reproducibility of results248 
or completeness are usually taken to be less important and are merely called 
»desirable criteria«.249 The history of science has shown, however, that there 
were tradeoffs between necessary and desirable criteria. in particular, gener-
ality and simplicity are often decisive in the early stages of theory creation, 
when the »necessary« criteria are not yet applicable and are merely hoped to 
be met at later stages of theory development.250 most notably, the persistent 
use of the homo oeconomicus in economics is not justified by its (broad) 
success in empirical tests but rather by its simplicity and applicability in var-
ious different contexts. This shows again that criteria cannot be universally 
ranked by their importance, but that their importance depends on the spe-
cific problems dealt with. in the social sciences, which deal with highly com-
plex phenomena and where controlled experiments and precise prediction 
is impossible, simplicity and generality may legitimately be more important 
than e. g. striving towards high precision in predictions, because the latter 
seems unachievable in the first place.251 in mainstream economics the trade-
off between generality and specificity is overcome by the heuristic interpreta-
tion of the rational-choice approach: rational choice is justified as the best 
we have as a general approach, but the models relying on it are usually very 
specific and will hold only for a narrow domain of events.
247 as feyerabend has continuously remarked, instant falsification when theories are 
not predicting successfully would lead to an unfair preference for established the-
ories. The criterion of success in tests is important for ruling out sentences such 
as »the moon is made of cheese« to count as scientific just because they are testa-
ble.
248 if you wonder why reproducibility is not a necessary criterion, remember that 
many important scientific theories – such as astronomy or the theory of evolu-
tion – deal with phenomena that are not reproducible.
249 see e. g. vollmer (1992), p. 21.
250 see Quine (1960), p. 19 et sqq.
251 remember the discussion of the KiDs vs. Kiss modelling approach in sec-
tion 2.3.2.4.
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as argued extensively in section 2.3, the traditional criteria are of limited 
help when evaluating economic models. naturally, other criteria have been 
suggested. here are some examples that are particularly interesting:
after a discussion of aklerof’s »market for lemons« and schelling’s check-
erboard model of segregation, robert sugden proposed looking at economic 
models as descriptions of counterfactual worlds which should be assessed by 
the robustness of the model and its credibility, if it is an account of what could 
have been true.252 in more detail, he argues that models are not abstractions 
or simplifications from reality but constructions of parallel worlds, which is 
why it makes little sense to assess their similarity to reality; other criteria are 
needed.
checking a model for robustness means to examine the kind and degree 
of which variations of the assumptions affect a model’s implications.253 The 
aim of robustness checks is to find out if a model’s outcomes depend cru-
cially on what were intended to be merely auxiliary assumptions.254 if this is 
the case, the model’s outcomes are probably mere artifacts that do not tell us 
anything about the real world. if the results turn out to be robust to various 
changes in parameters and auxiliary assumptions of the model, the robust-
ness-checking can help in determining which assumptions are essential for 
the primary results to occur.255 robustness is, however, a completely internal 
criterion that does not relate the model in any way to the real world. so even 
if an effect is robust under variations of a model, this is not enough reason 
to infer that it holds outside the model world as well.
sugden suggests it should be possible to infer from a model to the real 
world when the model credibly captures relevant features of reality for the 
problem under consideration, because we permanently make inductive in-
ferences from real instances to other real ones.256 The thesis is easier to un-
derstand by an example: we observe racial segregation in real cities like new 
york, philadelphia, Detroit and so on. from this we infer that other similar 
cities are similarly segregated. now each city can be seen as a »natural model« 
of the driving forces for racial segregation. sugden’s twist is to ask »… if we 
252 see sugden (2000). see sugden (2009) for a refinement of the original thesis. a 
thorough discussion by various authors follows in the same issue of Erkenntnis.
253 see sugden (2000) p. 21 et sqq. sugden was not the first to propose this criterion, 
but he provides a very convincing discussion. for more details see woodward 
(2006).
254 e. g. main findings of schelling’s segregation model are robust, e. g. for variations 
in the grid-structure. see flache/hegselmann (2001).
255 note that it is impossible to decisively assess the robustness of a model, because 
there are infinite ways to vary the assumptions, of which only a small fraction can 
be actually carried out.
256 see sugden (2000), p. 24.
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can make inductive inferences from natural models, why not from theoreti-
cal ones?«257
The crucial point in sugden’s proposal is certainly the definition of the 
term »credibility«. sugden writes: »credibility in models is, i think, rather 
like credibility in ‘realistic’ novels. in a realistic novel, the characters and lo-
cations are imaginary, but the author has to convince us that they are credi-
ble – that there could be people and places like those in the novel.«258 later 
he specifies this credibility in terms of internal and external coherence, where 
external coherence refers only to a kind of »family resemblance« between the 
model and our knowledge of causal processes in the real world.259 This gives 
us a rough idea that models are credible in sugden’s sense if the causal me-
chanics they propose fit to our sense of the world.
sugden’s proposal seems appealing at first sight, but it has the shortcom-
ing that credibility is only vaguely defined. he is, however, completely aware 
of this problem, and it would be unfair to expect an exact justification of in-
ductive reasoning, as such a definition would be nothing less than a solution 
of the problem of induction. nonetheless, the criterion of »credibility« is of 
questionable help for finding out which inductive inferences from theoreti-
cal models to the real world are credible and which are not.260 additionally, 
as i argued in section 4.1.2, plausibility considerations can even be harmful 
for science as they may decelerate scientific progress by being inherently con-
servative. following aydinonat, the role of (credible) models in economics is 
often different from traditional scientific aims. in many cases, all models can 
do is offer a possible and partial (invisible-hand) explanation for perceived 
facts.261 such explications are typically not testable, nor do they claim to be 
complete. still, they may be epistemically useful: in case of the checkerboard 
model, a new and credible possible explanation for the emergence of segre-
gation was offered.262 even if it is hard to show which causal factors are really 
driving society, the presentation of new ones can lead to a change in perspec-
tive and stimulate new lines of research. so the criterion that aydinonat pro-
poses is to ask whether a model offers a new and possible partial explanation.
The main problem with all quality criteria is of a more general nature: 
every criterion needs interpretation, and no criterion can mechanistically de-
termine theory choice. Therefore, instead of applying criteria directly, a kind 
of »market test« may be more suitable for determining the quality of theories, 
at least ex post. »market test« refers here of course not only to the usage of 
257 sugden (2000), p. 24.
258 sugden (2000), p. 25.
259 note the similarity to vilks (2002).
260 see grüne-yanoff (2009a) p. 93-95 for more detail on a similar point.
261 see aydinonat (2007) for a short explication and aydinonat (2008) for a full 
book. see grüne-yanoff (2009b) for a similar point.
262 see grüne-yanoff (2009a), p. 97.
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theories in commercial products or services but to their usage in other scien-
tific works as well. if a model were able to convince a certain amount of other 
researchers of its usefulness, this would surely be an indicator of its overall 
quality.263
»policy relevance« is another standard that economics is often demanded 
to fulfil, and it is notoriously hard to meet. as i see it, »policy relevance« is 
not a unique criterion at all; it is rather a mixture of success in empirical tests 
and short-term manipulability of the matters dealt with. since manipulabil-
ity is a criterion which has nothing to do with the theories themselves, the 
criterion »policy relevance« reduces to empirical success and hence all the 
problems discussed in section 2.3 apply to it.
There are other, more technical criteria related to trusting scientific find-
ings (not only theories!) that are usually not even mentioned in philosophical 
discussions but are nonetheless important. Take the following items as exam-
ples for criteria that are unquestionably264 important when findings involve 
statistical analysis of data:265
• adequateness of the sample size and type of randomization.
• Diligence of control for confounding variables.
• Theoretical substantiation of the statistical correlations that were found.
• availability of relevant and reliable data for the hypothesis in question.
it is insightful to conclude this subsection about criteria for theory choice by 
an exposition of critical rationalism, which is highly critical of any standard-
ised method for theory choice. in economics, critical rationalism was first in-
troduced by Klappholz and agassi in 1959 in response to the ongoing meth-
odological fight in these days. Klappholz and agassi rejected every rule or 
criterion that was proposed as insufficient and argued that economics can-
not be saved by imposing single criteria but only by a general, open and prob-
lem-oriented critical attitude: »[T]he impatience appears to give rise to the 
belief that, if only economists adopted this or that methodological rule, the 
road ahead would be at least cleared …. our view, on the contrary, is that 
there is only one generally applicable methodological rule, and that is the ex-
hortation to be critical and always ready to subject one’s hypothesis to criti-
263 The usual disclaimer »the successful is different from the good« is less true, the 
more empirical content a model has and the more critical of an attitude has been 
established in the respective community. however, the criterion has the disad-
vantage that it can be assessed only in the very long run.
264 note again that the evaluation of the criteria themselves critically hinges on the 
values of the respective community.
265 see beck-bornholdt/Dubben (1998) for an entertaining yet detailed discussion of 
these criteria (and many more).
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cal scrutiny.«266 because critical rationalism is directly headed against propos-
ing criteria for theory choice, i will not pursue it here but will continue the 
discussion in the last section (5.2) of this book, in which i reflect more gen-
erally about the role methodological considerations play for scientists. in 
the remaining parts of the current section i will deal with different types of 
philosophical realism, which is often seen as the enemy of the pragmatic ap-
proaches that i have so far presented very favourably.
4.2. no need For truth But For a uSeFul methodology
in the foregoing sections i have discussed many different methodological 
positions that offer a pragmatic way out of the dichotomy between empiri-
cist and relativist methodologies. The summary is provided at the end of this 
section, where i try to condense the positions discussed above to a consistent 
blend of pragmatic methodology. at this point, i will first present the views 
of realists in economic methodology, who at first sight seem directly opposed 
to pragmatic solutions. but as i will try to show, the brand of pragmatism 
i endorse is not headed against but rather orthogonal to scientific realism.
4.2.1. realiStic poSitionS in economic methodology267
4.2.1.1. General Arguments Supporting Realism
every discussion of realist philosophy of science must necessarily begin by 
distinguishing precisely the different forms of realism and declaring what is 
exactly at issue. The following list provides an overview of different realis-
tic positions in philosophy of science, in ascending order of the strength of 
their claims:268
1. ontological realism: This is the most modest realistic claim and merely 
entails the belief in the theory-independent existence of an external re-
ality.
2. semantic realism: scientific theories refer to an external reality.
3. weak epistemic realism: scientific theories refer to an external reality 
and may be correct in their claims about it, i. e. they are capable of being 
266 see Klappholz/agassi (1959), p. 60.
267 The contents of this chapter have been published in Deichsel (2011).
268 see mäki (2001) for an overview about different forms of realisms. note that put-
nam’s »internal realism« would not count as realism in this classification, be-
cause it does not fulfil even the weakest claim of ontological realism. see putnam 
(1981).
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true or false. This includes the semantic thesis that theories are true if 
and only if they correctly refer to an external reality.
4. scientific realism/strong epistemic realism: well-confirmed scientific 
theories refer to an external reality and are basically correct in their 
claims about it.269
both weak and strong epistemic realism are deeply connected with the cor-
respondence theory of truth, because their central point is to make claims 
about the properties of an external reality. if ealists relied on a coherence or 
consensus theory of truth, this would directly beg the question. i take anti-re-
alism as the thesis that we should suspend judgement on the truth and truth-
worthiness of our theories or avoid talking about the truth of theories alto-
gether in order to minimize the confusions that surround this concept.270 i 
analyse the pragmatic aspects of the justifications for realism of two prom-
inent realists in economic methodology: Uskali mäki and Tony lawson. i 
argue against these pragmatic aspects and try to show why an anti-realist per-
spective is preferable.
a first twist the realists could take to defend themselves against anti-re-
alist attacks shall be answered shortly: when pressed by a sceptic who in-
sists we cannot know anything for certain about the existence of entities, let 
alone their »reality«, modest realists could react by pointing out that they are 
merely referring to a common-sense notion of reality and only hold that en-
tities used in successful scientific theories have an reality status that is simi-
lar to observable objects whose »reality« no one would seriously doubt. how-
ever, such strategic withdrawals deprive the realists’ position of its bite.
ian hacking’s work prominently uses an argument based on this line of 
reasoning: his central argument is that reality is not a property of theories as 
such (and in this he agrees with van fraassen), but rather that our practical 
intervening with entities assumed by a theory makes those (and only those!) en-
tities real.271 more concretely: The fact that we can do something with elec-
trons makes them real. hacking’s realism is of a very modest sort and refers 
only to a small class of theoretical entities, not to theories as a whole. This al-
269 The qualification that theories are only »basically« right allows for structural re-
alism as well. (see worrall 1989 for the locus classicus). hence, even if i coin it 
»strong epistemic realism« it is still a rather modest position compared to the 
view that many scientific theories are completely correct in their claims about 
reality. note that this definition differs from Dummett’s classic (see Dummett 
1982) which identifies realism with the concept of evidence-transcendent truth, 
which makes it impossible to claim truth for any existing theory. please note that 
i do not claim my list of realisms to be exhaustive.
270 note that i do not claim that no theory can be possibly true — there may well be 
theories that are true (even if just by chance), but we should avoid talking about 
the truth of theories.
271 see e. g. hacking (1983), p. 262 et sqq.
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lows him to argue in favour of a disunity of science, where different branches 
tackle different problems by means of theories that may even be inconsistent 
to each other because they have no truth-status whatsoever.272 hacking’s view 
could be taken as a basis for an anti-realist273 interpretation of economic the-
ory, because even if we successfully intervene on a daily basis with the objects 
of economics (such as money, markets and individuals), thus making them 
»real«, economic theory would be freed from criticisms calling it an »unrealis-
tic representation« of what is going on in the world: from a hackingian per-
spective theory has no truth-status and is not representing anything. here a 
realist’s philosophy offers anti-realistic arguments.
in short, the modest realists like hacking are not claiming anything met-
aphysical but at best do »descriptive metaphysics«274 i. e. try to untangle the 
implicit ontological assumptions behind scientific theories. This is of course 
a far cry from epistemic realism.
for my project, an epistemic realism that avoids the above twists is the rel-
evant claim to analyse, because anti-realism is precisely the rejection of the 
claim that we should talk about the »truth« of theories.275 This claim is the 
form of anti-realism adopted by most economists (consciously or uncon-
sciously following boland’s276 interpretation of friedman’s classic method-
ological article). economists usually don’t doubt the existence of a theory-
independent world, nor do they deny that their theories could be true; they 
merely do not want to talk about truth, and underpin this view by constantly 
repeating the common cliché that all models are false, but some are useful.277
first i will summarise some of the strongest arguments in favour of realism 
and after that present the approaches of the two best-known realists in eco-
nomic methodology, Uskali mäki and Tony lawson.
The so-called no-miracle argument is often considered to give the strong-
est support for scientific realism.278 in its most basic version it simply states 
that realism is the »only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science 
272 see hacking (1983), p. 219.
273 note that i use the terms »anti-realism«, »non-realism« and »instrumentalism« as 
synonyms that are all merely defined by their rejection of any form of epistemic 
realism.
274 peter strawson coined this term. see strawson (1959). This is why i do not deal 
with hacking’s realism here. hacking’s main point is that theoretical constructs 
can have the same reality status as observable objects, and this is a point of de-
scriptive metaphysics and not an ontological claim.
275 from this point on, the term »realism« refers to the kind of realism described 
above, if not indicated otherwise.
276 see boland (1979).
277 see mayer (2004).
278 even if many philosophers have used similar arguments, the no-miracle argu-
ment is nowadays attributed to hilary putnam.
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a miracle.«279 This means that realism can explain the success of science, and 
positions opposed to it cannot. The no-miracle argument is based on the in-
ference to the best explanation, which becomes clear in a slight reformula-
tion:
first premise: it is legitimate to conclude that the best explanation of a 
phenomenon is true.
second premise: The best explanation for the success of science is that 
it offers true representations of the external world.
conclusion: it is true that science offers true representations of the ex-
ternal world.
The no-miracles argument is reversed in a different reformulation: why 
should we believe in science at all, if we do not believe that it tells us basi-
cally the truth?
another argument in favour of realism is asymmetrical to the no-miracle 
argument. it takes the fact that theories can fail as an argument for realism.280 
note, however, that this argument only supports weak epistemic realism, i. e. 
the thesis that theories may be true accounts of reality.
a third argument connected to the no-miracles argument refers to conver-
gence in science. remarkably, there is convergence in the measurement of nat-
ural constants: new methods of measurement often confirm old values and 
increase precision. if measurements did not roughly tell us the truth about an 
external reality, it would be a miracle that they often converge to ever more 
precise values even if various and diverse techniques of measurement are in-
volved.281
now that we have seen the most important general arguments favouring 
strong epistemic realism – which are quite simple in their basic form – let’s 
turn to realism in economic methodology, after which the subtlety of the ar-
guments will become more evident.
4.2.1.2. Uskali Mäki’s Realism
Uskali mäki is probably the best-known realist in economic methodology.282 
his overall strategy consists of developing a discipline-sensitive brand of re-
alism that is tailored to analysing many of the traditional problems in eco-
279 putnam (1975), p. 73.
280 see vollmer (1991), p. 139.
281 There is a different convergence argument that claims the long-run convergence 
even of theories. i do not list it here as an argument for realism, because its basic 
premise that theories tend to converge is highly controversial.
282 see mäki (2008) for a recent overview of his position. The following outline 
builds on this article, where not indicated otherwise. see peter (2001), 579 et sqq. 
for a different synopsis of mäki’s main points.
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nomic methodology. his approach can be described as »bottom-up«, which 
means that he tries not to invoke external philosophical concepts for criti-
cising economics but to first understand what economists are doing before 
seeking a realist interpretation for it. mäki’s justification for taking a realist 
position is pragmatic insofar as he fears that giving up realism »would result 
in the worst kind of complacency«.283 i call this a pragmatic justification be-
cause it focuses on the positive consequences that an adoption of realism 
would have. on the other hand, mäki believes that realism can offer argu-
ments against the well-known defence of abstract economic reasoning that 
jumps from the premise that all models are false anyway to the claim that all 
criticism against the falsehood of economic models is to be rejected.284
in a definition of realism that mäki gives it becomes clear that his real-
ism is based on a correspondence theory of truth, as he argues that good sci-
ence pursues theories that are true by corresponding to reality (»the objective 
structure«): »… theories and models are true or false in virtue of the ways of 
that objective structure – not in virtue of whether evidence supports them or 
whether we are otherwise persuaded to believe in them, for example. finally, 
good science pursues theories that are true, while being prepared for the pos-
sibility of error.«285
mäki’s realism allows him to talk of economic models resembling the real 
world. he distinguishes between models whose internal analysis is, for econ-
omists, a complete substitute for analysing the real world and other models 
that are useful surrogates for doing this. while the terminology of substitutes 
and surrogates may be confusing, the claim that some economists are getting 
lost in formal analysis – which becomes a substitute for real-world research – 
is quite plausible.
a main point of mäki’s work consists of trying to show how highly ide-
alised economic models can relate to reality so that their analysis can be a 
useful surrogate for doing direct empirical research. mäki states that »econ-
omists can be philosophical realists about their models even though these 
describe imaginary situations«286 and turns the above argument against the 
relevance of falsehood upside down: even if all models are necessarily false 
in the details, we can believe them to be essentially true, because the idealisa-
tions are strategic and necessary falsehoods that aim at isolating the true core 
of a model. referring to hausman, mäki takes the high degree of theoreti-
cal isolation in economics to be the reason why it is an »inexact and sepa-
rate« science.
283 see mäki (2002), p. 102
284 see mäki (2008), p. 7.
285 mäki (2008), p. 9.
286 mäki (2008), p. 15.
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mäki compares his approach to nancy cartwright’s287 point that econom-
ics lies because the world is messy and the models are cleaned of disturbing 
factors, but in contrast to cartwright, he believes there is a chance for the 
basic causal mechanisms of a model to be true, even if the messy world seems 
to contradict them.288 yet it is undeniable that some assumptions in econom-
ics are merely introduced for tractability reasons and not because they isolate 
central factors – take e. g. the assumption of perfect knowledge, the ignorance 
of transaction costs or constant returns to scale. mäki acknowledges this and 
sees relaxing these assumptions (and not the ones which are needed for the-
oretical isolation!) as a major driving force of economics becoming more re-
alistic »in the right sense«.289
mäki borrows an important argument in favour of realism from lionel 
robbins.290 he takes the view that economics does not create new »unob-
servables« but deals with entities that are close to common sense (which he 
calls »commonsensibles«), such as firms, households and prices. These en-
tities have a certain amount of »reality« because we deal with them in our 
daily life (in contrast to physical entities like electrons or quarks). even if 
the »commonsensibles« that economic theory deals with are highly ideal-
ised, the idealisation is »strongly condensed by economists’ commonsense 
intuitions«.291 This leads of course to the rejection of models that contradict 
common sense, making the differing commonsense convictions of econo-
mists a highly crucial point in theory choice. but if we accept that the basic 
entities of a certain economic model are based on commonsense notions, it 
becomes clear why the existence of the basic entities is – in contrast to phys-
ics – not the main point of a realistic position in economic methodology. in-
stead, the main point regards the reality of the causal mechanisms postulated 
by economic models.
in his conclusion, mäki repeats the distinction between realism and real-
isticness.292 he admits that it is impossible to know if his philosophical meta-
theory of realism is true and that – even worse – when we agree that economic 
models may be false (due to several epistemic and institutional disturbances), 
we are forced to admit that the meta-theory may be false for the very same rea-
sons. This finally leads to the introduction of fallibilism as the super-rule.293
287 see cartwright (1983). even if she initially referred to physics, cartwright’s point 
about the lying of abstract laws is similar in economics.
288 see mäki (2008), p. 17.
289 see mäki (2008), p. 19.
290 see robbins (1932).
291 mäki (2008), p. 27.
292 see section 4.1.2.1.
293 see mäki (2008), p. 35.
4. establishing a pragmatic view on economic methodology174
in a text called »some non-reasons for non-realism about economics«, 
mäki rejects several premises that seem to support an anti-realistic interpre-
tation of economics. here is a short summary of his counter-arguments:294
Thesis 1: »economics postulates unobservables, therefore it is better 
interpreted by non-realism.« mäki responds that this happens in every 
science and is no reason for non-realism, especially because many of 
the unobservables in economics are »commonsensibles« as explained 
above.
Thesis 2: »economics is based on false assumptions; this is an argu-
ment for interpreting it by non-realism.« mäki responds again that this 
is true for all sciences in a strict sense, so it does not support non-real-
ism. The relevant question is whether the false assumptions help to iso-
late parts of reality or not.
Thesis 3: »economics is not predictively successful, so the basic prem-
ise for the no-miracle argument is missing, which is an argument for 
non-realism.« mäki responds, as explained above, that we have more di-
rect access to economic phenomena by our common sense, so believ-
ing in the reality of basic economic premises does not need to be jus-
tified by the no-miracles argument. besides that, he claims, taking into 
account the complex nature of economic systems, it would be a miracle 
indeed if economics was predictively successful.
Thesis 4: »when accepting a theory, economists are persuaded (and 
not rationally convinced) by other things than truth, which is an argu-
ment for non-realism« harshly abbreviated, mäki responds by arguing 
that persuasion is completely orthogonal and not antagonist to truth, 
and therefore the argument is not against realism. even if much persua-
sion is involved, the resulting theories can still be true.
These arguments show how anti-realism should not be justified, according to 
mäki. They also show that his justification of realism often consists of attacks 
against anti-realism combined with an appeal to realist intuitions. however, 
as mentioned above, it should be noted that mäki also provides a pragmatic 
justification for his realism when he expresses the fear that giving up realism 
could lead to justifying anything in economics, even if it were only »a game 
of just playing with fictions«.295 obviously mäki believes in the good meth-
odological consequences of realism and, again, this is what i call a pragmatic 
justification. while mäki is doubtful of whether a strong epistemic realism 
can be achieved, he clearly sets this as an aim.296
294 see mäki (2002), p. 92 et sqq. see hodge (2007), p. 10 et sqq. for a discussion.
295 mäki (2002), p. 102.
296 see mäki (2002), p. 104.
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below i will consider whether mäki can live up to the task of improving 
economics by means of his realism. but before this, in the next section, i will 
present the other key realist position in contemporary economic methodol-
ogy: lawson’s critical realism.
4.2.1.3. Tony Lawson’s Realism
Tony lawson’s realism differs fundamentally from mäki’s.297 where mäki is 
generally neutral or even affirmative concerning mainstream economic the-
ory, lawson decidedly wants to use realism as a tool for criticising current 
mainstream economics. lawson starts with the premise that mainstream eco-
nomics is in a state of disarray because it focuses too much on formalised 
deductive modelling and does not deal with real-world issues.298 he locates 
the fundamental error of mainstream economics in its anti-realist method-
ology299 that sees truth as an irrelevant criterion for theory evaluation.300 his 
basic argument is that instrumentalism leads economists to ignore the central 
problem of their field – the lack of realisticness of theories – by rendering it 
unproblematic by definition.301 according to lawson, the instrumentalist is 
in a desperate situation if the theories are not successful at predicting empir-
ical data. in this case, the instrumentalist usually recommends to try harder, 
to dig deeper and to search for regularities at a more disaggregated level – re-
alism is the recommended way out of this problem.
lawson states that in some sense nearly everybody is a realist, as even 
methodological instrumentalists often accept ontological or semantic real-
ism. for this reason he defines his blend of realism by its »sustained con-
cern with ontology«.302 by this focus on ontology, lawson hopes to learn 
something about the nature of social phenomena, which he thinks will ena-
ble him to give better methodological advice to economists than instrumen-
talists can.303 This is a pragmatic defence of realism, as it concentrates on the 
positive consequences of adopting critical realism. indeed, it is much more 
explicitly pragmatic than the defence mäki gives, because lawson’s project is 
much more normative. in his most recent book, Reorienting Economics, law-
297 see fleetwood (1999), lewis (2004) and fullbrook (2009) for volumes dealing in 
detail with critical realism.
298 see lawson (2001), p. 155 et sqq.
299 lawson chooses to talk about »instrumentalism» but explicitly includes the prag-
matic view that theories can be false, but nonetheless good. see lawson (2001), 
p. 164.
300 see lawson (2001), p. 161.
301 lawson (2001), p. 164.
302 lawson (2001), p. 168.
303 note that this is a pragmatic justification of realism similar to mäki’s. lawson 
owes much of the philosophical foundations to roy bhaskar’s work, though. see 
hodge (2007) for a comparison of mäki’s and lawson’s versions of realism.
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son even suggests that all heterodox traditions are best understood by look-
ing at the social ontology they presuppose.304
lawson’s most important critical point concerns deductivism. he states 
that the formalistic models of mainstream economics necessarily rest on a 
deductivist mode of explanation, even if that fact may be concealed by the 
usage of stochastic variables or non-linear equations. according to lawson, 
the fundamental problem of deductive reasoning is its dependence on closed 
systems that are characterised by stable, observable event regularities. how-
ever, lawson suggests »that the social realm is everywhere open, that scien-
tifically interesting event regularities rarely, if ever, occur.«305 This makes de-
duction of future events or using theories as tools for prediction not only 
difficult but inherently wrong. lawson argues that deductivism in econom-
ics needs an ontology »of structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies, 
etc., that are irreducible to, but which underpin the actual course of events 
and states of affairs. once this ontology is established it supports a concep-
tion of science as moving from phenomena at one level to its conditions or 
causes at a different, deeper, one.«306 lawson states that deductivists (includ-
ing predictive-instrumentalists) cannot discuss these matters and are there-
fore unable to explain why science is in fact successfully applied to open sys-
tems where event regularities do not hold.307
in lawson’s view, economic laws should not be made to represent observ-
able event regularities but rather the underlying workings of mechanisms and 
tendencies. he states that his (realist) perspective should be accepted due to 
its greater explanatory power concerning the question of how it is possible 
that results which hold in closed systems can often be meaningfully trans-
ferred to open systems, even if the predicted event regularities do not hold 
there.308
his studies in »social ontology« lead lawson to claim »that economics 
ought really to move in a different direction entirely, to develop ways of un-
covering causal mechanisms in a seemingly quintessentially open – as well 
as intrinsically dynamic and highly internally-related – social reality.«309 The 
described social reality does not have the same ontological independence of 
human thought as does the natural reality, because it is a human construct 
and hence depends directly on human thinking. lawson rejects the view that 
304 see lawson (2004b), p. 330.
305 lawson (2001), p. 170.
306 lawson (2001), p. 172. This quote shows that lawson is committed to »real« on-
tology and merely in debunking metaphysical presuppositions of existing eco-
nomic theories.
307 see lawson (2001), p. 171. note the similarities between lawson’s view and 
hausman’s notion of tendency laws.
308 see lawson (2001), p. 173.
309 lawson (2001), p. 175.
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all causal forces of social reality are reducible to individuals, because socioec-
onomic structures exist prior to individual action.310 even if lawson’s social 
ontology is supposed to reveal »deeper structures« and »essential features«, 
it does not include the claim of ultimate knowledge about these matters and 
admits its findings are fallible.311
lawson is convinced that if one accepts the above ontological claims, a 
methodology that takes individual reactions to changes in relative prices as 
its basis is ill-conceived, because it systematically neglects the freedom of 
human choice and the power of social structures. orthodox economic theo-
rising therefore often employs convenient fictions that state very general and 
tractable connections between variables, instead of looking at real and essen-
tial forces.312 lawson seems to suggest that a realist methodology is a neces-
sary precondition for supplementing or replacing the (alleged) mainstream 
concentration on correlation analysis with causal explanations.313
according to lawson, adopting his methodological views will lead to an 
economics that is a much more complicated and messy affair than the cur-
rent mainstream.314 in this context, the best we can hope for is a kind of inter-
pretative explanation (i. e. not the prediction) of so-called demi-regularities, 
a term that is essentially equivalent to Kaldor’s »stylised facts«.315
in short, lawson states that economics should be concerned with the es-
sential features of economic systems, and his critical-realist methodology is 
designed to uncover them.
4.2.1.4. Critical Discussion
we have now seen many arguments supporting scientific realism in general 
and two positions in the methodological literature of economics specifically. 
as might have been clear from the beginning, i do not adopt a realist’s po-
sition in this work. on the contrary, i hold the view that realism makes no 
methodological difference. There is a crucial difference from the discussion 
about postmodern relativism in section 3.2: where the enemies of postmod-
ernism hoped to fight relativism by attacking the postmodern claim that sci-
ence is separate from truth, the discussion is now twisted: first i try to refute 
the constituting arguments behind strong epistemic realism, and then i aim 
to show why this does not lead to relativism. i will argue that »truth« is almost 
always replaceable by other terms that are ontologically more parsimonious 
310 see boylan/o‘gorman (1995), p. 98-99.
311 see e. g. lawson (2001), p. 178.
312 see boylan/o‘gorman (1995), p. 105-106.
313 see lawson (2001), p. 178.
314 see lawson (1997), p. 270.
315 see lawson (2003), p. 79 et sqq. lawson approvingly names veblen’s evolution-
ary economics as a role model for ontology-committed research in the social sci-
ences. see lawson (2003), p. 184 et sqq.
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(such as empirical adequacy316 or fit with the totality of current knowledge317) 
and may nonetheless fulfil the normative intentions mäki or lawson had.318 
while i accept many of the conclusions that mäki draws (and some of law-
son’s), i cast doubt on whether realism is necessary for justifying these con-
clusions. The next sections will elaborate on these doubts.
4.2.1.4.1 Rejecting the General Arguments for Realism
The philosophical dispute about realism is, of course, not easily settled. i will 
first sketch some general arguments against realism before dealing specifi-
cally with mäki’s and lawson’s arguments.
let’s start with the famous »no-miracle« argument for realism. it states that 
the success of scientific theories can be explained, claiming that these theories 
capture elements of an external reality. it is true that anti-realism cannot offer 
such an explanation, but the crucial question is whether the realist move is 
an explanation at all. it often seems that the realist’s arguments are begging 
the question of the anti-realists and vice versa.319 i think this is the case with 
the »no-miracle« argument as well. The anti-realist would claim that we are 
not justified in explaining the success of science by its truth320, because theo-
ries could well be successful without being true, due to empirical underdeter-
mination.321 in short, scientists simply accept those theories that work well – 
and that is all there is to say. accepting truth (in the sense of correspondence) 
as the best explanation for their success means to go beyond the borders of 
what we can legitimately infer. from this view, the suggestion that truth ex-
plains the success of theories is no explanation at all – it is rather an illegiti-
mate ad-hoc statement. we could argue equally well that the existence of god 
is the best explanation for why our theories work, but anti-realists are con-
vinced that we should not do that on the same grounds of why we should not 
»explain« success by an independent reality: in both cases, the explanation 
is based on uncertain ontological claims. but we can know whether or not a 
theory is helpful for solving our problems, because that is a completely sub-
jective judgement which does not involve an ontological claim.
316 see van fraassen (1980) for the locus classicus of a defence for this criterion.
317 in the sense of Quine/Ullian (1970).
318 a similar claim has been made by rorty (1994), p. 23.
319 as stated earlier, i will only argue against strong epistemic realism. anti-realism is 
therefore opposed only to this form of realism. This means that claiming the ex-
istence of an external reality that »pushes back« against our theorising is no prob-
lem for the anti-realist here.
320 Keep in mind that i assume realism is committed to a correspondence theory of 
truth by definition.
321 remember that this does not entail the claim that all theories are equally good. 
Underdetermination merely claims that two theories can be both perfectly em-
pirically adequate while they seem to make different claims about reality.
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a stronger argument in favour of anti-realism is the fact that even incon-
sistent theories can »work«322 – which shows that success is not bound to 
truth, because the truth can hardly be inconsistent.
once we talk about the acceptance of the »inference to the best explana-
tion«, the quarrel between realists and anti-realists gets more complicated. in 
her daily work, an anti-realist may accept and use some theories because she 
holds them to be the best explanation for a phenomenon under scrutiny. for 
example, the anti-realist may accept increased demand for oil as the best ex-
planation for a rising oil price.
now, the realist can ask why the anti-realist stops short of accepting realism 
as the best explanation for the success of theories and hence does not give up 
his anti-realist position. at this point, it becomes clear why the »no-miracle« 
argument is question-begging and cannot settle the argument between real-
ists and anti-realists: both may be willing to accept best explanations, but the 
anti-realist never asserts the truth of the explanations she accepts and so will 
not accept truth as the best explanation for success.
furthermore, the argument that scientific theories can fail does not refute 
an opponent of strong epistemic realism, either. it merely supports what i 
have dubbed »ontological realism«, i. e. the view that there is an external real-
ity that can be incompatible with our theories. however, it does not show that 
those theories that are compatible with the external reality are such because 
they are »true« or »realistic«.
we have already seen another argument favouring epistemic realism – the 
so-called convergence argument – which takes the increasing precision in the 
measurement of natural constants as an argument for realism. but can this 
argument really support the view that the measured constants are really »out 
there« and are represented realistically by our theories? The anti-realist can 
argue against this by stressing that the precision of natural constants only 
grows as long as a paradigm prevails. The argument of growing precision can 
be turned against strong epistemic realism by using larry laudan’s argument 
of the pessimistic meta-induction, which says (briefly summarized) that we 
have good reason to doubt the realism of our recent theories because many 
old and successful theories proved to be wrong.323 so increasing precision 
does not warrant realism, because the measurements are always »paradigm-
laden«. Different theories may lead to an increasing precision of the natural 
constants, but that is what you would expect if something like Kuhnian nor-
mal science is going on. when the whole paradigm comes into a crisis and a 
new one arises, the old constants may cease to be meaningful at all. The con-
vergence argument about strong epistemic realism would be convincing if we 
believe that the increasing precision will go on forever. This is, however, very 
322 see Da costa/french (2002), p. 105 et sqq. for a stunning overview.
323 see laudan (1981).
4. establishing a pragmatic view on economic methodology180
unlikely. even if realists may claim that their metaphysical stance is based on 
a picture that is supported by our best science, there are anti-realists (or »ag-
nosticists«, as they are called in the source referred to above) that show quite 
convincingly that there is no general metaphysical picture supported by our 
best science, and hence divergence rather than convergence is the most likely 
outcome.324
following the arguments against realism in general philosophy of science 
given above, i will now provide a discussion of mäki’s and lawson’s position 
and by this make the discussion more tailored to economics again.
4.2.1.4.2 Against Mäki’s Realism
before criticising some of mäki’s arguments in support of realism, i should 
stress that i accept many of his arguments and even generally share his point 
of view, except for its realist branding. i welcome his bottom-up approach, i 
accept his distinction between »realism« and »realisticness« and i even accept 
his point that many assumptions in economic models serve the tractability of 
models rather than their epistemic value. his argumentation on these points 
is careful and convincing – which is why it does not need to be repeated here. 
The list could go on further, but there would be little point in listing all the 
commonalities i share with mäki. Therefore, i will now start to argue against 
the points i do not agree with.
The main point against mäki’s usage of the term »realism« would be that 
it is nothing more than a brand name. mäki explicitly admits that many 
other methodologists contribute to the realist project, even if they don’t do it 
»under the banner of realism«.325 This raises the question, of course, whether 
the term »realism« as mäki uses it is informative at all.326
The main problem when trying to refute mäki’s realism is that he does not 
offer a real defence for it that could be attacked. his lack of a defence shows 
up clearly when he tries to defend realism against mccloskey’s postmodern-
ist charges – in opposition to the very notion of an external truth – merely 
by stating »in my alternative realist account of rhetoric, the world and truths 
about the world are not dependent on persuasion amongst economists and 
their audiences. i reject the presumption that the occurrence of rhetorical 
persuasion alone rules out the possibility of attaining and communicating 
persuasion-independent truths about economic reality«.327 instead of defend-
ing realism with arguments, mäki admits that he begins with the intuitions 
324 see ritchie (2008).
325 mäki (2007), p. 438. he even includes hausman, who attacked realism in a re-
cent article. see hausman (1998).
326 These doubts are reinforced by the fact that a big share of mäki’s work consists of 
realistic reinterpretations of economic classics that are usually not seen as realist, 
most notably friedman’s methodology. see e. g. mäki (2005b).
327 mäki (2008), p. 30.
4.2. no need for truth but for a useful methodology 181
of a realist.328 he then proceeds by showing how much of what is going on 
in economics can be rendered intelligible by his realist interpretation. i am 
the last to doubt that mäki is immensely successful in this, but i do doubt 
whether this is enough of a justification for realism – or rather, whether he is 
preaching to the already converted.329 mäki’s work does show that realism of-
fers a good way to talk about problems of economic methodology. however, 
this is not enough for refuting anti-realism. if mäki wants to defend his brand 
of realism pragmatically, he needs to show how his version of realism would 
lead to an improvement of economic research and which standards it would 
specifically employ apart from standards that are compatible with anti-real-
ism, such as problem-solving capability or empirical adequacy.
The lack of this discussion in mäki’s work and, as i would say, the impos-
sibility to show specifically how realism would change economic research, 
makes a pragmatic justification for realism difficult to provide. mäki, at best, 
gives reasons which show that it is sometimes simply natural to assume an 
external world and economic models relating to it, and the realist can talk 
about unrealistic models that do or do not capture features of the world. 
here, however, the anti-realist would talk about making assumptions that di-
verge from our current beliefs about the world but nonetheless make success-
ful (structural) predictions, and by this, offer plausible explanations.
mäki uses his realist rhetoric to argue against mere derivational unification 
(deriving more outcomes from the same set of premises) and in favour of on-
tological unification (establishing more »ontic unities« between phenomena, 
i. e. showing that they are of the same kind).330 This sounds convincing, but is 
it really a normative guideline that differs substantially from what an anti-re-
alist would advocate? as long as realism does not provide a unique standard 
to distinguish the two modes of unification, we are left with commonsense 
arguments that are not opposed to anti-realist positions.
 This, of course, undermines any normative thrust for realism, as we are 
still left with anti-realism-compatible standards such as empirical adequacy 
plus some pragmatic values like simplicity, fertility, modesty and conserva-
tism.331
328 see e. g. the very first sentence in mäki (2008).
329 schliesser (2010) makes a similar point.
330 see mäki (2008), p. 25.
331 in his major work »philosophy and the mirror of nature« rorty argues that the 
(alleged) fixation to a correspondence theory of truth has been a major error of 
epistemology since the times of plato. see rorty (1979). now, a realist could try 
to escape the trouble and argue that our theories will be true »at the end of all sci-
ence«, because science approximates truth. be aware of the difficulties of such a 
position, which were in part discussed in section 2.3.2.2. it is tough to argue that 
science approaches something we are not capable of knowing, even when we have 
reached it. »The end of all science« serves here as a substitute for truth but does 
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mäki often speaks about the »www« (the way the world works) constraint, 
which refers to economists’ convictions about real, causal connections in 
contrast to their model results.332 but this is hardly a constraint at all if we 
cannot know when it is met.333 in his most recent paper, mäki seems to in-
tend by the »www constraint« nothing more than checking a model’s as-
sumptions against commonsense intuition.334 This is of course unproblem-
atic for the anti-realist, because it is only a consistency criterion and is a far 
cry from making ontological claims.
as i said, mäki pragmatically justifies his realism as a powerful instru-
ment of criticism for economic models.335 To me, the issue seems the other 
way round: realism is less critical of a methodology than anti-realism is, be-
cause it allows talking about truth while anti-realism suspends judgement on 
the matter. mäki’s recommendation for developing useful surrogate models 
instead of getting lost in internal formal analysis, or his suggestion to check 
models against commonsense intuition, can be kept without subscribing to 
realism of any form.
4.2.1.4.3 Against Lawson’s Realism
now let’s see how Tony lawson’s critical realism fares against critical scrutiny. 
where mäki’s work is a rather neutral outline of a realist’s point of view of 
economic methodology, lawson intends to overthrow economic orthodoxy. 
if one is inclined to accept the methodology of mainstream economics as it 
is – and therefore does not share lawson’s view that the search for observable 
event regularities fundamentally contradicts the ontology that underlies so-
cial processes – there is little reason to follow lawson’s demand for more re-
alism at the foundations of economics. and even if one disagrees with much 
that is going on in mainstream economics, there is no need to accept law-
son’s realist critique. it is important here to keep in mind that lawson pro-
poses a normative methodological realism: in his view, economics should deal 
with the real forces that move societies, and these cannot be modelled in the 
deductivist style, according to lawson. where mainstream economists cher-
ish elegance, simplicity, parsimony, tractability, unifying power and the like, 
not concretise it at all. rather, science becomes connected to truth by the very 
definition of truth, making the rebuttal circular. note also that even at »the end 
of all science« there may be irreconcilable theories due to empirical underdeter-
mination.
332 see e. g. mäki (2005b), p. 21.
333 This is a general problem with any correspondence theory of truth: a corre-
spondence theory may capture adequately what is commonly meant by »truth«, 
but it fails to give viable criteria to decide whether something is true or not.
334 see mäki (2008), p. 27.
335 see e. g. mäki (2002), p. 102.
4.2. no need for truth but for a useful methodology 183
lawson wants to assign greater weight to other epistemic virtues such as truth, 
realism (or realisticness), credibility and plausibility.336
but is he justified in demanding this? There are at least three reasons why i 
disagree with his position: first, we cannot know what the real forces are; sec-
ond, his proposal can be turned against any form of idealisation; and third, 
it is doubtful whether mainstream economics is well characterised by law-
son’s interpretation of the term »deductivism« at all.
i will not deal with the first point in much detail here, as i have already 
laid it out in quite some detail during my discussion of mäki’s realism. it is 
important to note that this point is even more crucial for lawson, because 
of his strongly normative orientation: lawson urges economists to deal with 
the true and essential powers, but he fails to show how anyone could have 
knowledge about this. lawson argues in the typical question-begging way 
that characterises the debate between realists and anti-realists: he accuses in-
strumentalism of ignoring the central problem of realisticness.337 refusing to 
talk about realisticness is of course the main point of any form of anti-real-
ism, and therefore not an argument against anti-realism at all.
i will also grant that lawson’s constant demand to search for the real struc-
tures in inherently open social systems may lead to a more realistic descrip-
tion of those sytems, but taken seriously it prevents many forms of abstract 
theorising and the usage of idealisation. There are many theories that would 
have to be abolished straightaway if lawson’s normative realism was uni-
formly accepted: Just think of formal decision theory, game theory, any the-
ory employing folk-psychological reasoning, any form of hypothetical con-
tractarianism and even political liberalism – they are all admittedly based on 
unrealistic assumptions.338
it is questionable whether looking for the real essential powers that drive 
human behaviour will soon lead to theories of any use for economic prob-
lems. it seems more likely that such a procedure will spur a quest into the 
mysteries of the human brain and the freedom of the will. lawson does not 
promote this, but rather takes his favourite project, called »social ontology«, 
as a starting point.339 The sustained concern with social ontology is bound to 
realism by definition in lawson’s work.340 but is lawson justified in his de-
336 see vromen (2004).
337 see lawson (2001), p. 164.
338 if one extends lawson’s demand to the natural sciences, many parts of applied 
physics would have to be abolished as well; the usage of idealisations and coun-
terfactual assumptions is widespread here, too. see e. g. audretsch (1989).
339 in lawson’s view, »essence« is different from »invariant« or »ultimate« – it de-
pends on our transitive knowledge. as he sees it, social ontology can provide the 
essence of economics. see boylan/o‘gorman (1995), p. 100.
340 see e. g. lawson (2001), p. 167.
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mand that economics should be reoriented to become a science based on so-
cial ontology?
This can be denied at two different levels:
first, it is not obvious that social ontology gives us a realistic representa-
tion of the social world. surely, the attempt to incorporate our commonsense 
knowledge of social systems (e. g. the claim that social processes are dynamic 
and inherently open processes) into the fundament of economic theory will 
make it more realistic by commonsense standards. but again, there is no via-
ble criterion to judge how a »reoriented economics« based on social ontology 
approaches or mirrors an external reality, except for the notoriously vague no-
tion of common sense. or, as wade hands puts it, »critical realists […] offer 
no unique method […] that gives us access to those enduring structures«.341 
additionally, it is even doubtful if lawson’s ontology – which assigns so-
cial structures an individual-independent existence – is indeed more realistic 
even by commonsense standards.
second, for the sake of lawson’s argument, let us accept that an ontology 
that respects the inherent dynamics and openness of social systems fits bet-
ter into the totality of our current beliefs than a mechanistic picture would. 
This fit is surely not an absurd standard for »realism«, but is improving it a 
helpful normative guideline? i have my doubts. also, at the methodological 
level more realism may not be helpful: The increased detail of research based 
on »social ontology« is not likely to be a useful basis for theorising, because 
the emerging picture is too »messy« for that. while a deterministic picture of 
humans as rational agents may be false, this might in fact be fruitful. To be 
sure, lawson would deny this, because he thinks the whole project of main-
stream economics is on the wrong track. alas, this fundamental assump-
tion of his work is not carefully argued for. lawson merely provides a collec-
tion of critical voices and adds the claim that mainstream economics is not 
successful with accommodating the data.342 This is at best only a half-truth: 
surely economics is completely unsuccessful at predicting the next financial 
crisis or even the growth of the gDp for more than one year. but on the other 
hand, there is a plethora of well-confirmed conditioned predictions of tenden-
cies which become better and better in non-crisis situations without the need 
to refrain from the underlying »deductivist« structure.343 Therefore, lawson 
341 hands (2001), p. 327.
342 see lawson (2001), p. 168.
343 see e. g. the case studies of section 2.4. besides, it would be confusing that gov-
ernments, companies and individuals continue to hire economists to a much 
higher degree than they do other scientists, if their advice was not useful at all. 
still, it may be the case that governments are wrong in trusting economists as 
much as they do, and that they are merely impressed by the formal work – see 
Klein (2010). consider the fact that there are many open disputes in economics 
and hence many situations where forecasting is affected in a strong degree by in-
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is not justified in completely rejecting the mainstream research programme. 
of course, he is free to start his own project of a critical-realist economics 
that is based on social ontology, but lawson will hardly gain many adherents 
if there is no agreement on the mainstream being in irresolvable disarray, so 
that the only escape would consist of changing the goals entirely and remov-
ing prediction (even conditioned prediction) from the wish list. so even if we 
accept that lawson’s ontological approach is more realistic, it does not fol-
low that it is convincing and should be adopted.344
now let’s turn to the third point, namely the question of whether main-
stream economics is adequately characterised by lawson’s label »deductiv-
ism«. as he describes it, deductivism is necessarily committed to a notion 
that characterises scientific laws as observable event regularities. This is a 
big misunderstanding. The mathematical-deductivist style (which is admit-
tedly used often in mainstream economics) does not commit economists to 
a »flat« ontology that forbids any talking about underlying structures that 
cause event regularities to occur. as vromen notes, economists try to look for 
more than just event regularities – and are even encouraged in this by fried-
man’s classic methodological manifesto345, which i already have shown to be 
much less »positivist« than its title suggests. Despite the common usage of 
mathematical deductions, mainstream economics aims at uncovering under-
lying structures of the social world – they do this by devising an axiomatic 
theory that offers a possible explanation for the observable data.346 instead of 
calling this »method deductivism«, one is equally (or even better) justified in 
calling it »abductivism«, for abduction is precisely the development of a the-
dividual judgements about the future, therefore being very unreliable. see rein-
hardt (2009).
344 This is, of course, a typical situation with any paradigm shift. lawson is aware of 
this and therefore mainly addresses those who accept that the economic main-
stream is in inescapable disarray. note that lawson does not intend to use his 
ontological research for building an alternative economics by himself. rather, he 
wants to support existing heterodox schools by showing that their foundations 
are ontologically more realistic than those of mainstream economics. his project 
is essentially about improving heterodox economics by reinterpreting and refin-
ing their presupposed ontological commitments. see part iii of lawson (2003).
345 see vromen (2004) pointing to friedman (1953), p. 33.
346 see reiss (2004) for a similar view. in a response, lawson steps back from his 
claim that formalistic modelling is principally opposed to the search for deeper 
structures and waters down his position to the thesis that not all essential struc-
tures can be adequately treated by deductive modelling. (see lawson (2004b), 
p. 337.) This is, however, not in contrast with how mainstream economists would 
define their project. only the most dogmatic economist would insist that formal 
modelling captures all underlying structures and is the only way to go.
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ory for explaining facts.347 mainstream economists of course reject the inter-
pretation that they have found and even that they should find true and es-
sentially realistic underlying structures as lawson demands.
There is another confusing point about lawson’s sharp distinction be-
tween underlying structures and event regularities: if one accepts (as i have 
argued most economists do), that scientific laws are not about event regu-
larities but rather about the underlying structures that cause them, one can 
still stick digging for event regularities by arguing that an underlying struc-
ture must somehow show up in the empirical data – if it were completely hid-
den, how could we ever be justified to speculate about it? This seems to imply 
that lawson may be much closer to mainstream methodology that he is will-
ing to admit: one of his main points is the denial of strict event regularities 
in an open system, which he takes as an argument against deductivist mod-
elling. he prefers to talk about demi-regularities. now, it is hard to believe 
that mainstream economists would really insist on the strictness of the regu-
larities in question and would reject searching for demi-regularities – Daniel 
hausman’s characterisation of economic laws as tendency laws may indicate 
that the mainstream view is not as distinct from lawson’s view as he says it is.
To sum up, there are many points of mainstream methodology that re-
semble aspects of lawson’s critical realism, but it is precisely the realist as-
pects of his methodology that do not show why realism is justified or prefer-
able to a more modest methodology. simply put, lawson commits the naïve 
realist fallacy that believes higher realisticness (even if seen as descriptive ac-
curacy of the assumptions) should be an end in itself, and by this excludes 
many forms of theorising that are commonly accepted to be useful or suc-
cessful. This is the main reason why his plea for more realism is pragmati-
cally unconvincing.
4.2.1.5. Lessons Learned
The foregoing sections about realism covered a lot of ground. now it is time 
to step back and draw conclusions: is realism helpful for theory appraisal 
in economics? it should not surprise the reader at this point that i answer 
this question negatively. if scientists (in contrast to philosophers) want to as-
sess theories, they want to know how well they work, not why.348 The ongo-
ing battle between realism and anti-realism in traditional epistemology can 
be completely separated from issues pertaining to theory appraisal. even if 
347 it is questionable whether abduction is really antagonistic to deduction as a sci-
entific method as lawson portrays it. in scientific practice, all three modes of in-
ference (induction, deduction, abduction) exist on a par – and no one is likely to 
call this inconsistent. This becomes particularly clear in hodge (2007), p. 23.
348 according to goodman, scientists don’t even look for truth, but for system, sim-
plicity and scope. see goodman (1978), p. 18. my position is more modest, as it 
entails no claim of what scientists are looking for.
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there were a conclusive proof in favour of scientific realism, this would still 
allow for a purely instrumental way of assessing theories, i. e. deciding how 
well they are suited for solving given problems, since this question can be 
completely separated from their truth-status.349 put slightly differently, if one 
wants to make normative statements, pragmatic reasons are needed; how-
ever, as i tried to show above, it is difficult to defend realism on pragmatic 
grounds, as adopting realism does not lead to normative implications that 
are unavailable to the anti-realist.
i argued that the realists neither successfully justify the legitimacy of talk-
ing about features of an external reality nor explain why empirical adequacy 
for given problems is not enough. remarkably, all realistic positions dis-
cussed include confessions for fallibility. if we take those confessions seri-
ously, strong epistemic realism collapses to weak epistemic realism, and anti-
realism loses its main enemy: if the realists are indeed convicted of fallibility 
there is little point in their distinctive claims. why should they stress the im-
portance of truth as a means for fighting against bad theory when they admit 
that truth is not even a viable criterion because everything is fallible? if they 
admited that, realism would have no special normative thrust. This is one of 
the main conclusions from my discussion of realism: strong epistemic real-
ism cannot be justified, and all other forms are fine for the anti-realist.
such weaknesses notwithstanding, it should be clear that this does not 
imply that there is nothing acceptable in the realist’s prescriptions, even if 
they stem from the wrong reasons. for example, within the assumption de-
bate, the realists carefully distinguish between assumptions that isolate real 
factors and others that merely serve the tractability of economic theory. a 
certain type of anti-realism may well accept the message that it is important 
to filter out the crucial, the fundamental or the necessary assumptions of a 
theory even if it would hesitate to call them real. such a procedure could be 
called »anti-realist ontology« as it is a venture into the status of the very fun-
damentals of economics – and by this it would retain the lessons from one 
of the realists’ preferred projects without committing to a version of ontolog-
ical realism.
another possible form of anti-realism may even agree with mäki’s recom-
mendation of developing useful surrogate models for analysing the real world 
instead of playing with substitutes; but in contrast to mäki, the anti-realist 
would not ask whether a model is representing »the real world« but would 
focus instead on its ability to shed light on real problems. if the problem to 
be solved is one of policy-consulting, it should be clear even to the anti-re-
alist that researching the formal aspects of a general-equilibrium model can 
349 note that this does not necessarily entail the claim that the realism debate is 
about a pseudo-problem. it might be a valid philosophical problem, but it can 
be separated from theory evaluation.
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become a dangerous substitute for practically relevant economic research.350 
however, if some formal aspects are indeed the problem a scientist wants to 
deal with, the anti-realist must accept this and cannot urge her to concentrate 
on surrogate models. a type of anti-realism could indeed accept a kind of 
»as-if realism« that accepts many arguments and terminological points but re-
jects the interpretation that theories – or parts of them – are literally true.351 
with this in mind, the anti-realist could actually talk about more »realistic« 
assumptions when he uses a coherence theory of justification instead of a 
correspondence theory of truth.352 The debate about realism against anti-real-
ism would then be merely semantic, bearing no pragmatic implications what-
soever. The more realistic assumptions would then be the ones that fit bet-
ter to the totality of our current beliefs.353 it is, however, another main point 
(one which i have consistently argued for above), that more realistic assump-
tions are not always better ones; we should look for adequate idealisations for 
the problem at hand instead of mechanically heading towards more realistic-
ness. if one accepts these arguments, it is difficult to defend realism pragmat-
ically as a critical therapy for economics. There are forms of anti-realism that 
can do the same thing but are far more epistemologically modest concerning 
the ontological status of theories.
in the next section, i will try to sketch out the main characteristics of a 
methodology that is well suited for theory appraisal and, though modestly 
instrumentalist in nature, could be even accepted by realists, because it sus-
pends judgement on the truth-status of theories and therefore would neither 
recommend nor rule out a realistic interpretation.
4.3. what iS leFt For theory eValuation?
at this point, it is time to sum up the results we have found so far; i have ar-
gued that several methodological approaches are not useful for theory ap-
praisal. The empiricist claims were rejected mainly for two interdependent 
350 The only point of normative difference between this form of instrumentalism 
and mäki’s recommendation would occur in the unlikely case of a substitute 
model that generates perfectly correct predictions. in any other case the instru-
mentalist, too, must look for a better model, and she would be badly advised of 
doing so by treating all possible assumptions as equally useful. hence, it is not 
enough for the instrumentalist to generate merely »testable« predictions when 
there is a demand for increasing success in tests.
351 a similar argument is made by carnap (1950).
352 The addition of a semantic correspondence theory of truth to a coherence the-
ory of justification is in fact the only feature that clearly distinguishes mäki’s re-
alism from the anti-realism presented here. see peter (2001).
353 This suggestion is inspired by Quine/Ullian (1970).
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reasons: on the one hand, they ignore the peculiarities of the economic 
research programme, and on the other hand, they can be easily employed 
in other research programmes – like psychology or sociology – that tackle 
with economic questions from a different perspective.354 The postmodernist 
methodologies were rejected because they are either completely relativistic, 
and therefore useless for theory appraisal, or they promote standards (such 
as mccloskey’s persuasiveness) that are not convincing for anyone except the 
postmodernists themselves. finally, the realists were not successful in show-
ing why »truth« is a helpful criterion for theory evaluation.
The pragmatic approaches discussed in this section seem to make the most 
promising candidate for theory appraisal in economics. while they are open 
to different methods, they do not let in everything. The most important as-
pect of a pragmatic methodology is taking problem-orientation seriously. in 
a pragmatic framework, everything that can contribute to the solution of a 
given problem is acceptable.355 This requires, of course, an honest descrip-
tion of the problem at hand. much of formalistic research in econom-
ics can be saved from methodological attack when we accept that the 
question of whether equilibrium is possible under specific formal con-
ditions is a valid problem.356 by this move, dogmatic claims like those of 
the empiristic, realistic or rhetorical schools are ruled out as general ap-
proaches: as i argued in section 2.3.2.5, formal approaches can be jus-
tified in their own right.357 in many cases, however, economists want to 
do more than purely formal work: they want to explain and even pre-
dict the social world. if this is indeed the aim, problem-focused empiri-
cal adequacy is the minimum constraint. a pragmatic methodology does 
not entail the claim that theories are nothing but tools for solving practi-
cal problems. Theories can have epistemic value in being empirically ad-
equate answers to very abstract questions.358 it is important here to re-
strict empirical adequacy to a given problem, because using empirical 
adequacy as a general criterion presupposes a clear separation between 
354 This is in fact what happens under the label of behavioural or experimental eco-
nomics.
355 remember that this includes even highly theoretical problems, so that the prag-
matism i endorse becomes by no means »atheoretical« or plain.
356 some formalistic models in decision theory can be justified against empiricist 
charges by their normative character. This occurs more often in philosophy than 
in economic models.
357 The enemies of formalism deny, of course, that solving formal problems is a 
valid field for research. The rejection of the relevance of a problem is, however, 
something that cannot be rationally argued for.
358 note that the demand for explanation precludes any recommendation to achieve 
empirical adequacy by mere statistical correlation processing.
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what counts as observable (i. e. empirical) and what does not.359 This sep-
aration is notoriously difficult to draw, but fortunately we do not need to 
draw it for pragmatic theory evaluation. The separation of unobservables 
from observables is critical if one wants to draw a clear distinction be-
tween the epistemic and the pragmatic, as van fraassen does. as shown in 
section 4.1.4.1, van fraassen argues that »observing« is mostly free from 
theory, whereas »observing, that« is not. many philosophers of science at-
tack van fraassen on this separation when they argue that there is no such 
a thing as theory-free observation. in the pragmatic framework that i sug-
gest is best suited for theory evaluation in economics, theory-free obser-
vation is not an issue, because i accept that observation always happens 
under the framing of a given problem – if the problem is given in some 
detail, this already defines what counts as empirical data and what does 
not. for example, when the problem is determining influence factors for 
economic growth, the gDp counts as observable data – as unobservable 
as it might seem from a classic perspective, whose adherents might even 
wonder if entities such as the gDp exist at all. economists are quite free 
even to introduce new »observables« when they specify where they get 
their data from. an empirically adequate theory in the pragmatic sense is 
therefore not one that matches the »sense data« of »pure observation«360, 
but one that gives a coherent picture of data and theory that is accepted 
to be useful for solving a problem that existed before the theory was for-
mulated. if this is the case, it poses no harmful difficulty when the data 
are infected to some degree by theory.
The point can be further generalised: Taking underdetermination seri-
ously, a pragmatic methodology refrains from talking about truth and there-
fore has no problem with intertwining the pragmatic with the epistemic. we 
do not need problem-independent knowledge (the realists can have that – if 
they manage to show what it is, how we achieve it and how we know that we’ve 
got it). The pragmatic approach seems very permissive at this point, because 
it will apparently count the solution of any and even the most absurd prob-
lem as success. but the ranking of problems is surely beyond the capabili-
ties of any philosophy of science, because it is something that underlies the 
judgement of individuals and cannot be answered generally. This is the point 
where holism enters: The recognition of progress is always dependent on an 
existing web of beliefs. people may have their individual problems and solu-
tions to them, but as long as there is no community that shares their beliefs, 
the progress made becomes non-communicable and is therefore irrelevant.
359 see Klee (1997), p. 229.
360 note that these standards are obsolete since the demise of logical positivism. yet 
they are often attacked and claimed to be the basis of any form of empiricism. 
This is, however, a straw-man fallacy, as my above argument shows.
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in western science, there is an overarching meta-paradigm that roughly 
defines what counts as a problem and what solutions look like. The »sci-
entific worldview« is nothing more and nothing less than a shared web of 
beliefs (or values, as Kuhn has it). in section 4.1.4.1 i argued with laudan 
that paradigm-shifts under this meta-paradigm can happen quite ration-
ally and quickly. in western science, the most prominent, overarching 
standard for empirical theories is currently predictive success.361 if there 
were a new but seemingly crazy theory of labour economics that per-
formed better than any other in predicting the net effects of reforms to 
the labour market, it would soon be used broadly, no matter how crazy it 
had seemed at first sight.362
however, when there is no clear winner in terms of prediction, or when 
prediction is not even the aim,363 the methodological discussion gets more 
complicated. The history of methodology has shown that the postulation of 
additional criteria is not likely to settle the argument. This is why the prag-
matic approach achieves the maximum one can hope for in philosophy of 
science, since true knowledge of the right rules for good science is unachiev-
able and the proposal of rules that are supposed to characterise good science 
by definition is of little help. 364 escaping to relativism is no solution but a 
mere denial of the project. This is why a pragmatic means-ends analysis of 
361 note that the criterion says nothing about the reliability and precision of predic-
tive success. in economics, the most we can expect nowadays is conditioned pre-
diction of tendencies of aggregated values. nonetheless, those predictions can 
be empirically adequate (see schmid (2005), section 4). if we had even less than 
that, economics could no longer claim to be an empirical science, as the notion 
of an empirical science is tied to some – however inexact – degree of predictive 
success. at least rough tendency predictions must be possible – this is the core of 
gibbard/varian (1978), which characterises economic models as caricatures (see 
section 4.1.4.2.2.) note also that »prediction« of past events, i. e. retrodiction, is 
meant to be included in the notion of prediction here.
362 This is the main reason why i refrain from concrete prescriptions in my work: 
good theories can speak for themselves and do not need methodological ser-
mons. e. g. if hans albert believes that more sociological work is needed in eco-
nomics, he must explain why the sociological theories that deal with economic 
phenomena are far from being a success story. note that all this does not deny 
that including data from experiments can very well lead to an increase in predic-
tive success.
363 remember that a large class of economic models aims not at prediction but 
merely at offering new partial, potential invisible-hand explanations for certain 
observable phenomena. see aydinonat (2008).
364 The justification of methodological rules and their results by means of a reflec-
tive equilibrium would lie between those two extremes, but it is doubtful if such 
an equilibrium is generally achievable or stable over time. some of the most gen-
erally acceptable criteria are listed in section 4.1.4.3.
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theories seems the most promising approach, if indeed »only« theory evalu-
ation is at issue.
for this pragmatic approach to be workable, a detailed and honest descrip-
tion of the problem, including the expectations for a solution, is required. 
in other words, the domain of theory must be clearly specified.365 The first 
step is classifying a theory as an empirical theory. only if this is done can the 
overarching criterion of predictive success be legitimately employed. note 
that theories that are not empirical can be of great help for the development 
of empirical theories. nonetheless, economics must be considered a partly 
empirical science if it claims to tell us something about the social world. 
where does pragmatic theory evaluation lead us, here?
suppose some schools of thought in current economics – such as 
behavioural economics, computational economics or classic rational-
choice economics – have no clear winner in terms of prediction. behav-
ioural economics is probably best at predicting the behaviour of indi-
viduals in precisely specified situations; computational economics beats 
the others, e. g. when it comes to predicting spatial patterns and cluster-
ing processes. rational-choice economics has advantages when deduc-
ing the long-term macro-effects of policy reforms. a refined description 
of problems is a helpful start to a means-ends analysis. Does the respec-
tive model live up to its own standards, or does it promise something it 
cannot fulfil?366 if behavioural economists claim to replace the neoclassical 
mainstream, they cannot argue with the higher descriptive accuracy of their 
fundamental assumptions or with the increase in predictive power of indi-
vidual decision-making. They must also show why their framework is better 
(or at least equally well) suited for solving the problems that can be solved 
by rational-choice reasoning.367 This exemplifies again how the epistemic 
is intertwined with the pragmatic: as long as there is no well-confirmed 
bridge between theories that operate at a lower level and others which 
work with highly aggregated and long-term data – i. e. if the more abstract 
theory (rational choice) cannot be reduced to the more concrete (behav-
ioural economics) – there is no problem-independent way of deciding be-
tween them. an extreme form of optimism is needed for believing that 
we are anywhere near a successful reduction of standard economic theory 
365 remember marcel boumans’ point made in section 4.1.4.2.2.
366 remember nancy cartwright’s argument that the idealisations of economic 
models are often of the wrong kind, i. e. badly chosen for the promises they make. 
see section 4.1.4.2.1..
367 remember the point made by several authors – vilks, hindriks and schliesser, as 
discussed in section 4.1.4.2.2. – who all argue that learning from models based 
on counterfactual assumptions is possible. homann/suchanek (2000) transcend 
the issue because they reject the notion that basic assumptions in economics are 
to be judged in terms of their realisticness. see section 4.1.4.2.3.
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to behavioural terms. additionally, as i argued in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, 
there are even arguments for using the more abstract theory for some 
problems even if it was constructively falsified by or reduced to a lower-
level theory: for some problems the lower-level theory may be more com-
plicated without delivering a decisive increase in precision.
on top of that, there are epistemic advantages of pragmatic criteria, 
such as simplicity and tractability: some important effects easily get out 
of sight when using a theory that is »too far away from the problem«. This 
would only not be an issue if we had a workable »theory of everything«;368 
as long as such a »theory of everything« is not available, theories must be 
pragmatically chosen for solving given problems, whether one is dealing 
with highly theoretical problems of fundamental research or giving pol-
icy advice. This shows that classic epistemic goals such as unification are 
not beyond the reach of a pragmatic framework, even if any claim of an ex-
clusive (problem-independent) status of such goals is ruled out.
when it comes to judging single models, the relevant question is 
whether or not it solves the problem it promised to solve. This can be 
checked afterwards by a kind of market test: if the theory or model is used 
and accepted in practice (which includes other theories as well), this is a 
strong argument in favour of it.369
when whole research programmes are at issue, there is no single objective 
criterion to judge them, either. past success does not tell much about the cur-
rent state of a research programme. rather it is its fruitfulness that is decisive, 
i. e. the potential of a research heuristic to generate theories or models that 
will solve a set of different problems.370 such an assessment cannot be given 
by an algorithm – which is a good thing, actually, because differing judge-
ments about the future lead to scientific pluralism and hence to competition 
in the marketplace of ideas, which is epistemically superior to any form of 
368 The advocates of a strong notion of »emergence« between low-level and high-
level theories argue that such a »theory of everything« is impossible to achieve 
even in principle, whereas those advocating a weak notion of emergence argue 
that a correct »theory of everything« would eliminate all emergent phenomena. 
as the strong view presupposes knowledge about the impossibility of future the-
ories, i shall stick with the second view. note that an even weaker notion of emer-
gence would still hold even if we had a »theory of everything«: we may want 
explanations at the higher level even if all phenomena could be reduced to move-
ments of elementary particles. see stöckler (2008) for this so-called explanatory-
pragmatic theory of emergence.
369 see ahrweiler/gilbert (2005) for a discussion and an interesting application of 
this criterion.
370 remember the discussion in section 4.1.4.2.2. and 4.1.4.2.3. where several au-
thors argued how economic models fruitfully enable learning from experience in 
the messy domain of the social sciences and thereby may help to solve practical 
problems.
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centralism.371 The past success of a research programme for empirical theories 
could be evaluated by its success in generating theories that successfully gen-
erated solutions to their problems. This would be nothing less than a means-
end analysis on the meta-level, but here incommensurability is a major ob-
stacle: whether the neoclassical research programme scores high on this test 
is hard to tell; there are supporters and opponents who argue about the fun-
damental concepts, and each group claims to be superior in terms of empir-
ical adequacy.
but as long as there is no other research programme that is clearly better 
off, we do not need final judgement, as the supporters are free to proceed with 
their programme and the opponents can continue looking for alternatives. The 
empirical underdetermination of theories shows once again why true theories 
are so hard to achieve in economics: if we are not even sure of our judgement 
about empirical adequacy, how can we know whether theories are true?
is there any way to assess the future fruitfulness of a research programme, 
i. e. to give a means-ends analysis of its heuristic? we could allow for induc-
tion and accept that research programmes that were successful in the past will 
stay so in the future. This is, however, a risky step that need not be taken. we 
can leave the judgement to the process of competition in the scientific com-
munity. The time of rule-based methodologies is over, and this means that 
philosophers cannot claim to prescribe what is »scientific« and what is »un-
scientific« from an external point of view; rather, they need to connect to 
practicing scientists with their arguments.
Therefore, the most important tasks left for philosophers are, on the one 
hand, criticising fundamental points that may be overlooked by practition-
ers and, on the other hand, clearing up misunderstandings by increasing the 
conceptual precision of scientific debates – and in that way improving the 
quality of scientific competition.372 of course philosophers are free to sketch 
out their own ideas or offer suggestions for research, but in these regards they 
have no general advantage over practicing scientists. finally, philosophers 
can productively contribute to the methodological discussion by attacking 
the views of their colleagues who want to give prescriptions that are deduced 
from philosophical convictions without paying respect to the peculiarities of 
the science they deal with.373
as i showed in section 4.1.3, economics can contribute its mite to method-
ology by analysing the efficiency of scientific institutions and suggesting re-
forms. so while external, prescriptive suggestions are ruled out in the prag-
371 see hayek (1969) for a classic argument.
372 The methodological analysis of the misled confrontation between behavioural 
and mainstream economics is a good example of this. i will elaborate more 
closely on the remaining role for philosophy in section 5.2.
373 This point was discussed at the beginning of section 4.1.4.2.1.----
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matic framework, there is still room for normativity on the meta-level of 
institutional reform or on criticising fundamental issues.
after the philosophical characterisation of a pragmatic version of theory 
evaluation, it will be helpful to briefly summarize and then proceed with 
some case studies. it should have become clear that my version of pragmatic 
theory evaluation is quite pluralistic, but there are still cases left which call 
for criticism. an economic model is to be pragmatically criticised in the fol-
lowing cases:
1. There is no problem that is solved, but only a description of an eco-
nomic situation, couched in theoretical terms. such models are merely 
reproductions of their input.
2. a problem is only seemingly solved. in economic models, there is often 
a (sometimes implicit) claim about empirical adequacy which gets 
never substantiated. This has often been attacked as formalism: pure 
formal approaches are given credit to solve empirical problems without 
any further justification.374
3. The problem that is adequately solved seems irrelevant to anyone but 
the author of the solution. while such projects are internally oK, it is 
doubtful whether they are tackling with something that can be legiti-
mately called a problem at all.375
in the final, conclusive section i will present some case studies in order to 
show how pragmatic theory evaluation can be put into practice.
374 as i said before, formalism is fine when dealing with formal aspects. when it as-
pires to something greater, this must be justified empirically.
375 it is hard to find such cases, because usually there are strong claims of relevance 
in every paper – which is why criticism tends to concentrate on cases 1 and 2. if 
a problem is really irrelevant, it tends to get completely ignored.

5. ConClusions
The conclusions of this thesis are threefold: First, i shall summarise the 
methodological conclusions and illustrate them with some exemplary cases. 
After that, i will reflect on how a normative role can be justified for method-
ological works. Finally, i will refute some doubts critics might raise against my 
pragmatic framework for theory evaluation.
5.1. Case studies of PragmatiC theory aPPraisal in eConomiCs
As should be obvious by now, i am promoting a rather defensive methodol-
ogy that neither prescribes generally what economists should do nor criticises 
economics as a whole. Economics is a highly complex science, and it should 
be clear that we cannot expect precise, unconditioned predictions here. This 
does not make economics a bad science but a rather normal one: just think 
of biology, which is a perfectly acceptable science that makes vague predic-
tions at best. Therefore, mainstream economics and the rational-choice ap-
proach should not be attacked on the basis that they make relatively vague 
predictions.
Again, i refrain here from general claims that say economics is »too for-
mal« or that it must become »more empirical«. There is no way to know the 
right balance of formal, empirical and applied work. in this context it is 
important to notice that the discontent of many methodologists with the 
amount of formal research in academic economics often does not consider 
the huge amount of empirical and applied work in government departments, 
companies, banks and journalism.1
of course, the current mainstream in economics should neither be de-
fended nor attacked dogmatically – but it should not be rejected too eas-
ily, either, because a lack of defence by general appeals to pluralism is meth-
odologically dangerous, as it can lead to a vague acceptance of everything 
without thinking about reasons. And this would mean nothing but a lack of 
standards and intellectual honesty.2
Even if i were to spend considerable time defending mainstream econom-
ics, of course heterodox approaches like behavioural economics, or even com-
1 of course there is also scientific literature on how practitioners work. Mostly, 
they refrain from theorising and rely on statistical methods. see sattler/nitschke 
(2001) for a comparison of different approaches to estimate optimal prices which 
do not make the assumption of price being a function of demand.
2 see Colander (2007) for a similar point.
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pletely distinct fields like sociology and psychology, are free – and should 
even be encouraged – to try to beat the economic mainstream.3 While the 
mainstream rational-choice approach has often been identified with very ab-
stract and purely formal models that have little relevance for practical prob-
lems, Homann and suchaneck delivered a reinterpretation by their charac-
terisation of the economic man as a heuristic device, which shows this does 
not need to be the case. so what often has been criticised as too formal (and 
therefore deemed irrelevant) can be justified as conceptual exploration that 
delivers a framework for more empirical research. Rational-choice econom-
ics and behavioural economics are not necessarily opposed to each other as 
research directions – as might seem to be the case at first sight – but can fruit-
fully contribute to better modelling when they understand their methodolog-
ical status. Where the rational-choice school is dedicated to explaining and 
predicting changes in macro-rates as reactions to shifts in relative prices, be-
havioural economists look at the empirical details of individual human be-
haviour. There is plenty of room for applied research, which can have the 
power to change established ways of modelling in the long run.4 To sum up, 
there is no a priori argument that can decide whether more empirical or more 
theoretical research is needed, so there is not much to say about theory eval-
uation at the global level. Therefore, it is helpful to focus on more specific 
models. still, it is impossible to criticise a model from an independent stand-
point, but nonetheless there remains much room for constructive criticism 
by focusing on the standards set by the problem in hand and the way it is ap-
proached. The main point for criticism is therefore not the model by itself 
but its incorrect use or exaggerated and unjustified interpretation. in short, 
the hallmark of a model is whether it really achieves what it claims to do.
With the criteria given at the end of the forgoing section at hand, i shall 
now present some criticism of economic models along these lines.
3 Daniel Hausman described the state of economics in the early 1990s nicely: 
»What is wrong with economic theorizing is not what economists are doing, but 
what they are not doing and what they refuse to do.« (Hausman (1992a), p. 255.) i 
believe with the spread of rational choice methodology to sociologists, the grow-
ing acceptance of experiments and survey-data in economics and the widespread 
acknowledgement of the relevance of institutions, the situation has greatly im-
proved since then.
4 see Carrier (2004) for a concise article on this point. see Cartwright (1983) for a 
classic account against the view that useful models can be derived from an over-
arching theory. in her view, even physical laws are false in their pure form.
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5.1.1. first Case: inadequate assumPtions
The first case makes a model which aims at policy consulting and deals with 
the question of how to distribute investments into education.5 The model is 
an agent-based computer simulation where »policy makers« (in this case the 
economists who made the model) can decide whether to invest in the educa-
tion system evenly in two regions or spend all the money in one region and 
completely neglect the other one. in the language of the model, distributing 
investments evenly lifts both regions from low skill levels to medium levels, 
and focusing the money on one region lifts the region invested in to a »high-
skilled region« while the other region stays at the low level. The model sim-
ulates the labour market and goods market, including commuting costs, in 
the two regions at a fairly complex level, but a more detailed description of 
the model’s assumptions is not necessary to describe the central problem of 
the paper.
The main conclusion is summarised by the authors as follows: »if com-
muting costs are positive but low, than [sic] a spatially concentrated policy 
[of investments into education] performs better than a uniform approach«.6 
However, this thesis is not well argued for in the paper. After describing the 
model, it is said to »reproduce several stylised facts«7. But the »remarkable 
finding« that the existence of commuting costs can actually increase the over-
all output results crucially from the assumption that the model allows for 
firms employing higher-skilled workers and paying them higher salaries even 
when they are not any more productive than lower-skilled workers at the be-
ginning. This goes against standard economic reasoning and is surely not ac-
cepted as a stylised fact.8 Yet this assumption is responsible for the conclu-
sion that there is higher growth when education investments are distributed 
unequally, because the lower-skilled region can produce the same goods at 
lower prices – and this starts off a number of self-reinforcing effects which 
lead to continuous growth in the lower-skilled region and increasing unem-
ployment in the higher-skilled region.9
5 see Dawid, et al. (2009).
6 Dawid, et al. (2009), 4.1.
7 see Dawid, et al. (2009), 1.0.
8 Following the so-called efficiency wage theory, it is a stylised fact that firms pay 
wages in excess of market clearing – but only if this reduces the individual firms’ 
production costs, because they can attract a more productive workforce by this. 
This second condition is ill-represented in the model, because the higher-skilled 
workers cannot use their skills for being more productive initially, so they be-
come merely a cost factor.
9 see Dawid, et al. (2009), 3.12. note that the existence of commuting costs is nec-
essary to separate the regions at all. With commuting costs at zero, there is only 
one global labour market.
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This model gives us a clear case of a policy recommendation that is drawn 
too quickly. Remarkably, in the pre-print version the authors recommended 
spatially concentrated investments into education, even if this actually harms 
the region that gets the investments (but leads to higher total growth).10
Even if models cannot (and should not) be complete, they must be ade-
quately simplified. The model described here is designed in such a way that in 
some situations firms are unable to profit from the benefits of higher-skilled 
workers and nonetheless pay higher salaries to them – this seems like a fun-
damental flaw and not an adequate idealisation when the effects of education 
to output are the problem tackled with.
Criticism of this model is possible without referring to empiricist stand-
ards of theory evaluation. The main flaw of the model can be detected by 
plausibility considerations that the authors apparently did not make. sug-
den’s credibility criterion applies here: The assumption that firms employ 
higher-skilled workers even if this is to their long-run disadvantage does not 
credibly fit with our current knowledge of the world, and it leads to the strange 
prediction that firms with lower-skilled workers are better off in the long run.
By concentrating only on their model, the authors are surprised by its pre-
dictions instead of critically assessing them. As explained in section 2.3.2.4, 
agent-based models are not well suited for predicting but can only be used 
for explaining why certain observable results or patterns come about. if the 
observable patterns are not reproduced by the model or if there are no ob-
servable patterns that could be compared with the model-results, our trust in 
agent-based models should be rather low.
A model that is wrong in both its assumptions and its predictions is espe-
cially hard to justify if it is not a general concept (such as rational choice) but 
made for predicting the outcomes of quite specific situations – as is the case 
with the model discussed here.
note that neither a claim for tougher falsification nor a demand for more 
empirical work at the basis was needed to criticise this model.
5.1.2. seCond Case: over-interPretation
Flawed models like the one described above are hopefully the exception rather 
than the rule. More often, the model seems prima facie alright and does not 
produce »remarkable« outputs that can be easily traced to ill-chosen assump-
tions. in many cases the problems arise one step later, when it comes to the 
interpretation of the results. The following case made by Milberg and spiegler 
10 see Dawid, et al. (2009), 3.12. (in the published version there is no direct policy 
recommendation.)
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shows this very well.11 Milberg and spiegler propose a four-part framework 
for discussing economic models, which they summarise as follows:
1. »Delimiting, in which the set of social phenomena under study is de-
limited and a research question is formed;
2. naming, in which a mathematical construct meant to be analogous 
to the social phenomena is introduced, along with a »catalog of corre-
spondences« which links elements of the construct with elements of the 
phenomena under study;
3. solution, in which the mathematical construct is brought to a solution;
4. interpretation, in which the mathematical solution and its implications 
are interpreted with respect to the research question. Empirical testing 
of the interpretation is also a part of this phase.«12
in the cited paper, Milberg and spiegler discuss three models using the frame-
work described above. While they see no problems with the first and second 
step of model building, they identify major difficulties in third and fourth 
phase. They argue that economists tend to overstate their case when interpret-
ing their models. This over-interpretation results from the careless identifi-
cation of purely mathematical systems with their socially understood coun-
terparts. Throughout their arguments, economists tend to conflate ordinary 
language and mathematical symbols, which increases the reader’s tendency 
(and probably the author’s as well) to forget about the limits and the narrow-
ness of the mathematical representation. Milberg and spiegler use Acemo-
glu/James 2006 as the main example for their criticism. Acemoglu and James 
set the question of why some countries are democracies and others are not as 
their problem to solve.13 This is a fairly broad question, and it generates an 
impression of relevance; they present the formal structure of their model in 
combination with ordinary terms and a suggestive story.14 in Mary Hesse’s 
terms, they are concentrating only on the positive analogies – the ones in 
which the model can be meaningfully transferred to the problem.15 The con-
flation of ordinary language terms and mathematical symbols continues in 
the solution phase.16 The interpretation phase largely consists of comparing 
historical case studies to the ordinary-language version of the model. What 
Acemoglu and James actually do is not answer the question of why countries 
become democracies but show that a formalised model can be interpreted in 
such a way that it fits some case studies by analogy. note that this is not a bad 
11 see Milberg/spiegler (2008).
12 Milberg/spiegler (2008), p. 8.
13 see Acemoglu/James (2006), p. xi.
14 see Acemoglu/James (2006), p. xii.
15 see Hesse (1963).
16 see Acemoglu/James (2006), p. 185.
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thing to do: As i argued above, much of economic reasoning consists in de-
vising a theory for reconstructing the facts. The problem is that economists 
are often far too confident that their models actually describe the real driving 
forces of phenomena under scrutiny, even if all they can show is the mere pos-
sibility that their model describes forces that can be found in the social world. 
such overstatements of model results may be due to the demand for »policy 
relevant« outputs.17 But this merely explains the overstatement – it does not 
justify it. over-interpretation of economic models can lead to incorrect pol-
icy decisions that are hard to reverse, even when the model becomes scientif-
ically obsolete. E. g., Easterly shows how the outdated Harrod-Domar model 
(see section 2.4.1) is still used today in foreign aid policy, leading to grossly 
inaccurate predictions.18 it seems that Friedman’s recommendation to tie the 
domain specification – which precisely defines under which circumstances 
a model works – inherently to the model19 would indeed be a step towards 
more honesty, as the over-interpretation of models seems rather the rule than 
the exception.20
The criticism of Acemoglu/James 2006 showed once again how theory 
evaluation is possible even if one does not employ the classic empiricist 
standards.
5.1.3. third Case: other Problems with interPretation
There are many papers in which the presented model is not overinterpreted 
but rather not interpreted at all. E. g. Etro 2004 tells a general-equilibrium-in-
spired story about patent races, but gives no hint as to how his models should 
be compared to the social world. instead, he merely ends the paper with the 
standard disclaimer that »much further theoretical and empirical research is 
needed«.21 of course, this is less harmful than over-interpretation is, but the 
interpretative language that is used throughout the paper actually suggests a 
stronger conclusion, which the authors finally hesitate to draw. This further 
reinforces the impression that the crucial point of economic models often 
does not lie in the models themselves but in their interpretation.22
The real problem with formalism is therefore not the obsession with math-
ematical exploration of rational-choice theory or equilibrium analysis and 
17 see Milberg (1996).
18 see Easterly (2002), p. 6. and p. 22.
19 see Friedman (1953), p. 15.
20 see Rodrik (2009). note that over-interpretation is usually not adopted by the 
media, which remains quite sceptical when it comes to the assessment of eco-
nomic models.
21 Etro (2004), p. 302.
22 see Frigg/Hartmann (2006) section 3.2.
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the neglecting of empirical data. The problem is the unclear status of such 
formalist analysis. During the 1950s it became common practice among 
economists to discuss purely conceptual problems, under headings that sug-
gested occupation with empirical questions that in fact never occured.23 To 
avoid the resulting confusions, economists should pay more attention to 
making the methodological status of their models clear. Are they purely for-
mal? Are they a kind of conceptual exploration? Are they making empirical 
claims? Which empirical claims do they make, exactly? How are they jus-
tified? such reflections are lacking in many economic publications, which 
makes economics an easy target for those who do not adhere to the princi-
ple of charity. E. g., much of the famous criticism of nicholas Kaldor against 
equilibrium theorising results from the unclear status of equilibrium models. 
if economists had been honest, they would have admitted the non-empiri-
cal nature of their project. As Kaldor argues, many economists became so fas-
cinated with equilibrium theory that they believed the technical refinement 
of its highly formalised models would ultimately lead to empirical success.24 
This optimism was hardly justifiable, and indeed turned out to be wrong – 
if we owe anything to the refinement of equilibrium theory, it is not empiri-
cal adequacy but rather conceptual clarity. in section 2.4.1 i showed in a case 
study how empirical progress was achieved in economic-growth theory and 
how the first step was actually a turn away from seeing the economy in con-
stant equilibrium, as was the case with Harrod-Domar models. After that, em-
pirically measurable factors such as human capital or institutional settings 
could be integrated.
Again, in this case study i do not claim that the authors should work more 
empirically, but rather that they should be more clear about which problem 
they are solving and which conclusions can be drawn from their paper.
5.1.4. fourth Case: no Problem is solved
i will conclude this selection of case studies by discussing a model that falls 
in the first class of the criteria given at the end of section 4.3.: The model may 
be empirically adequate in many dimensions, but it is doubtful if it solves 
any problem at all. Edmonds/Moss 2004 aims at outlining a new methodol-
ogy for agent-based simulations that stresses the need for descriptively accu-
rate assumptions (remember their catchphrase »Keep it descriptive, stupid« 
(KiDs). At the end of the paper the authors outline a simulation model for 
23 Hausman makes a similar point using the better-known example of samuelson’s 
consumption loan model. see samuelson (1958) and Hausman (1992a), p. 255 et 
sqq.
24 see Kaldor (1985), p. 60 et sqq.
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aggregate water demand in a region of Great Britain. Here is a short summary 
of the model: Agents are distributed at random on a grid. Each agent repre-
sents a household and is allocated a set of water-consuming devices, in such 
a way that the distribution resembles empirically found data from the mid-
Thames region. The households are influenced in their usage of water-con-
suming devices by several sources: »Their neighbours and particularly the 
neighbour most similar to themselves (for publicly observable appliances); 
the policy agent25; what they themselves did in the past; and occasionally 
the new kinds of appliances that are available (in this case power showers, 
or watersaving washing machines). The individual household’s demands are 
summed to give the aggregate demand.«26 There is no need to explain the 
model in full detail here; the main methodological point can be made by 
looking at the outcome of many runs of the model starting with the same in-
itial conditions:
Fig. 1: Aggregate Water demand from model runs specified 
in Edmonds/Moss 2004, p. 10.
Moss and Edmonds note that »significant events include the droughts of 1976 
and 1990, which often show up in a (temporarily) reduced water demand, 
due to agents taking the advice from the policy agent to use less water. Power 
showers become available in early 1988 and water-saving washing machines 
in late 1992 which can cause a sudden increase or decrease respectively.«27
25 The policy agent suggests a lower usage of water if there is less than a critical 
amount of rain during a month. This influences the agents to a certain degree.
26 Edmonds/Moss (2004), p. 8.
27 Edmonds/Moss (2004), p. 10.
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it is hard to see how this simulation gives any insights at all. The only rec-
ognisable effects result from the external shocks that are programmed into 
the model – and even those are difficult to identify. Additionally, it is doubt-
ful whether the authors achieved their own goal of setting up descriptively 
adequate assumptions, as there are certainly more factors influencing peo-
ple’s demand for water than those integrated into the model. Moreover, the 
runs depicted above all start from the same specification and yet widely di-
verge in their outcomes. it is hard to learn anything from the model, as any 
outcome is possible – from very low water demand to very high and from 
great changes in water demand to nearly constant consumption. The authors 
write that the model is made to capture the range of water-demand respons-
es.28 They indeed show that there is a very wide range, but they fail to show 
the different results come about. By trying to create a descriptively adequate 
model, Moss and Edmonds arrive at »a complex model whose behaviour is 
not fully understood«,29 which therefore neither explains matters nor suc-
ceeds in being descriptively adequate on both the assumption and the im-
plication sides.
The discussion of the Edmonds and Moss model has shown once again 
that a problem-oriented criticism is much more fruitful for complex eco-
nomic models than is schematically applying empiricist standards.
5.1.5. ConClusions from the Case studies
From the four case studies i have briefly outlined here it should have be-
come clear that economic models can be productively criticised by exam-
ining whether or not they provide solutions to the problems they set out to 
solve. There is no need to argue generally for more empiricism in economics, 
for rhetorical analysis, for realism or even for relativism. Productive and help-
ful criticism can be based solely on the question of whether or not a model is 
a helpful contribution for solving a problem. in the next section i will reflect 
on the implications this has for the role of methodological reasoning and its 
relation to the sciences.
5.2. refleCtions on the role for methodology
if theory evaluation is executed in the way it was done in the preceding chap-
ter, what role is left for philosophy? Certainly the old days, when philoso-
phers of science judged good science from bad science by an external crite-
28 see Edmonds/Moss (2004), p. 10.
29 Edmonds/Moss (2004), p. 8.
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rion, have passed. However, this does not mean that philosophers are forced 
to remain silent on normative issues. lawrence Boland has constantly argued 
for a kind of socratic role for methodology. Following the later Popper and 
rejecting naïve falsificationism, he sees an apt role for methodology in crit-
icising economic theories on their own terms, thereby helping to improve 
our understanding of the theories and (indirectly) even the theories them-
selves.30 There are no general external standards for assessing a theory, but 
there is the legitimate question of whether or not a theory is a useful contri-
bution to the problem it was set out to solve. The role of philosophers is now 
to adopt a critical attitude and show practitioners the limits of their respec-
tive approaches. When a methodologist is attracted by the economics of sci-
entific knowledge (EsK), she can additionally propose institutional reforms 
that foster a critical but constructive attitude in the respective scientific com-
munities.
As seen in the above case studies, errors often lie not in the theory or 
model itself but in its interpretation. Within science there are incentives to 
over-interpret the power of the research programme one has chosen: once 
a community has settled on certain standards (i. e. in Kuhn’s words estab-
lished a paradigm), there is nothing to lose and much to gain from claiming 
that pressing problems can be solved in the near future, even if this claim is 
hard to defend.
The big advantage held by an external methodologist (and of course, it 
does not matter whether she works in the philosophy or the economics de-
partment) is her relative independence from established scientific communi-
ties; she is in a better position to analyse whether or not the promises made 
by a theory are likely to be kept, because her future does not depend on those 
promises. in general, this results in a much more sceptical position that often 
stresses the imperfections of models and recommends caution and modesty 
concerning the status of our current scientific theories. This does not mean 
that philosophers have to take a critical attitude against all scientific theoris-
ing. on the contrary: As i have shown throughout chapter 4, philosophical 
reasoning can help to understand the methodological status of economic 
theories and thereby leads to better defences than those given by practition-
ers. The characterisation of neoclassical economics as a separate and inexact 
science, the methodological debate about assumptions and the rejection of 
realism as a useful term for settling questions of theory appraisal are some 
examples where methodological reasoning was used against short-sighted at-
tacks criticising the »unrealisticness« and low predictive precision of eco-
nomics. Even if philosophers cannot claim to have superior insight in the 
»right« methodological rules, their professional training can help in apply-
ing the principle of charity and making economic theorising as strong as it 
30 see e. g. Boland (1994) for a concise summary of this view.
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can get – which is a first step towards a methodological discussion that can 
actually connect to practitioners and give them useful advice for improving 
their theories.
in a best-case scenario, philosophical analysis could clear up ongoing 
methodological quarrels in economics, such as the one between experimen-
tal economics and the neoclassical tradition. Here methodological argu-
ments have shown that the two research traditions can coexist peacefully 
when it is made explicit that neoclassical economics, using rational choice 
for explaining long-term macro-effects and experimental results, describes 
the way individuals make up their minds. This does not mean that exper-
imental results should have no influence at all on neoclassical economics: 
Again, by their relative independence from existing communities, philoso-
phers are in a good position to discuss which kinds of dogmatism are jus-
tified and which are not. While neoclassical economics can be defended 
against some charges, it is certainly not sacrosanct, as the now widely accepted 
integration of institutions in the neoclassical models shows.31 The hard core 
of economic reasoning has proved to be more flexible than it seemed in the 
days before Gary Becker, and philosophers or historians of economics can 
point to past changes when an economist appears to be too dogmatic.32
An important precondition for any methodologist to settle methodologi-
cal disputes among economists is his ability to connect to the daily work of 
practitioners. in order to do this, two things must be avoided: First, the meth-
odologist should not try to reform economics from the bottom up or claim 
to have knowledge about a superior methodology without having done any 
successful research himself. second, she should not spend too much time on 
settling subtle philosophical problems that may have no relevance for prac-
ticing economists. i have tried to adhere to both demands in this work, and 
indeed one main argument i leveled against the realists in economic meth-
odology was the irrelevance of the realism vs. anti-realism debate for theory 
appraisal.
A main philosophical result of this work is the thesis that global relativism 
about aims is irrefutable, but as i argued in section 4.1.4.1, that does not lead 
31 see section 2.4.1.
32 note that it is of course the right of every scholar to be dogmatic about meth-
odological choices, as a methodology is nothing more than a promise for future 
research. if an economist does not believe a certain proposal to be fruitful, she 
does not need to follow it. But dogmatism ends when she actively tries to hinder 
others from pursuing their different methodologies. some methodologists argue 
that this has been the case in economics. see Blaug (1998). As many former het-
erodox assumptions have made their way into orthodoxy, and as there is plenty 
of room to tackle economic questions in other social sciences (where neoclassi-
cal economists have less of an influence), i am not convinced by these voices. see 
Colander (2007) for a similar point of view.
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to »anything goes« at the local level where the aims are set. it is important to 
note that even if philosophy can clear up misunderstandings in some cases, 
the great majority of methodological disputes are settled in the respective sci-
ences themselves: in section 4.1.3 i outlined how the competitive structure 
of science, combined with its inherent openness, can help to resolve many is-
sues over time without the need for external interference.
if you are already convinced that my pragmatic framework is the best we 
can have for theory evaluation in economics, you can skip this final section, 
in which i will try to refute some critical remarks against this concept.
5.3. taking the wind out of the (Putative) CritiCs’ sails
The first and most fundamental charge that may be brought against the prag-
matic way of theory evaluation is the point that it is, in fact, too pragmatic. 
Critics arguing along this line would suggest that pragmatic theory evalua-
tion must be rejected because it undermines the traditional aim of science, 
which is the search for truth. However, this charge is misleading: The prag-
matic framework for theory evaluation allows scientists to search for what-
ever they like, be it truth, empirical adequacy or consistency.33 The impres-
sion that a pragmatic theory evaluation does not allow one to search for truth 
may be created by the fact that there is no way to know whether or not we 
have achieved truth – or even if we are close to it.34 This is why a pragmatic 
theory evaluation must suspend judgement on the achievement of this aim 
and propose other, more workable criteria.35 Those criteria, such as empirical 
adequacy in the context of a given problem, may well be accepted by those 
who look for truth, because truth (if ever found) is surely empirically ade-
quate and will lead to the solution of many problems. What pragmatic the-
ory evaluation must reject is any exclusive status for selected aims: if a phi-
losopher of science would state that truth is and always will be the only aim 
and criterion for scientific theories, the pragmatist cannot accept this, as he 
generally refuses any evaluation of aims and therefore talks only about the 
means to achieve them. The plurality of aims is a basic assumption of prag-
matic theory evaluation, because if there were only one legitimate goal for sci-
ence, pragmatic instrumental reasoning would collapse with the rule-based 
methodologies it was designed to replace. The pragmatic rejection of monis-
tic conceptions is of course dogmatic as well (as any fundamental assump-
33 it even allows for non-scientific aims such as personal happiness. The only aims 
that are excluded from the start are those that are internally self-contradictory.
34 Remember the discussion in section 4.2.1.4.1.
35 in a way, there is a point to the criticism that pragmatic theory evaluation ex-
cludes truth as a criterion: This is because pragmatic theory evaluation needs vi-
able criteria. it is hard to think of any form of theory evaluation that does not.
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tion necessarily is), but it can be well argued for: in section 4.1.4.3 i presented 
some traditional criteria for theory evaluation, and by this it became clear 
that there is indeed a plurality of norms that can be attributed to scientific 
theories. note that while pragmatic theory evaluation suspends judgement 
on the matter of aims, this does not mean that it counts the achievement of 
any aim as »scientific«. Whether or not something is called »scientific« de-
pends on how we understand the word »scientific« – so the definition of the 
predicate »scientific« is first and foremost not a matter of theory evaluation 
but a matter of defining words.36
With the above arguments in mind, it is easy to refute a slight variation 
of the criticism that pragmatic theory evaluation undermines the search for 
truth: Critics may also say that the strong problem-orientation of pragmatic 
theory evaluation leads to an unfair disadvantage for fundamental research. 
However, a careful reading of my arguments will show that this is a misunder-
standing: Focusing on problem-solving by no means restricts the domains 
of valid problems. Highly abstract theoretical problems of fundamental re-
search are valid problems as well, and there is no need for additional justifi-
cation; increasing our knowledge is a strong enough reason.37
While pragmatic theory evaluation is neutral towards problem selection, 
a side effect may indeed be harmful to some projects: As pragmatic theory 
evaluation requires an honest description of the problem a scientist tries to 
solve, it can cause trouble for those who tend to over-interpret their results 
and hence cannot keep the promises they are making. Thus pragmatic the-
ory evaluation can have destructive effects on science, but for the right rea-
sons: if an economist claims to be doing policy-relevant research and is in 
fact merely proofing existence theorems for nash equilibria, pragmatic the-
ory evaluation enforces a higher transparency and will give negative assess-
ments if the claimed objectives are not met. True pluralists may be offended 
by this, but any methodology that wants to be normative must be able to criti-
cise some aspects of science. The fact that criticism comes from both monists 
(who think that the pragmatic framework is too permissive) and from plural-
ists (who fear that some parts of science will be under attack) indicates that 
pragmatic theory evaluation has in fact found the right balance.
Another criticism against a pragmatic framework might be the claim that 
it is far too imprecise. For the framework, i. e. for the general concept, this is 
true. Pragmatic theory evaluation refrains from giving precise prescriptions, 
36 Again, in section 4.1.4.3 i argued that there is a relatively stable core of values 
that define Western science which does not provide strong demarcation of sci-
ence from pseudo-science but still provides a good idea of what science is about.
37 if fundamental researchers want to justify their work they could point to the fact 
that even the most abstract theory can lead to varieties of applications when solv-
ing practical problems. Just think of the development of philosophical logic – 
which is the theoretical basis of any computer.
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as it recognises that different aims require different methods of criticism. 
As shown in chapter 2.3, traditional empiricist standards are precise, but ill-
suited for theory evaluation in economics. Therefore, the imprecision of the 
pragmatic framework for theory evaluation can be an advantage rather than 
a disadvantage, because it allows for applying different standards to different 
problems. As the case studies in section 5.1 have shown, the imprecision of 
the general framework allows nonetheless for criticism of individual models 
that is precise and to the point. so this criticism can be answered by pointing 
out that precision is not to be sought after in the general framework but only 
when assessing single models.
The point of criticism i wish to answer now is influenced by the post-
modern shift discussed in chapter 3. Many postmodernists are convinced 
that philosophy of science cannot be prescriptive, and therefore, in their 
view, philosophers or methodologists should not be dealing with apprais-
ing the aptness of a theory for solving given problems. As i argued in chap-
ter 5.2, there are several ways that philosophers can contribute to theory eval-
uation, as their institutional and intellectual independence from practicing 
scientists allows them to address fundamental issues of theories that practic-
ing scientists usually do not deal with. of course philosophers must have de-
tailed knowledge about the theories they want to assess, but if this is the case 
there is no reason why they should completely refrain from normative judge-
ment. Rather the opposite: if philosophy of science were not normative at 
all, it would be a separate enterprise that had no relevance for anyone work-
ing outside philosophy.
The last point of criticism i will address here comes from sociology of 
science. similar to postmodernists, some sociologists of science argue that 
the dynamics of science do not follow rational criteria but are driven by so-
ciological forces such as power, influence, herding-behaviour or desire for 
fame. They claim that the social nature of science makes any attempt of ra-
tional theory evaluation futile. in my opinion, this conclusion is drawn too 
quickly. Even if philosophers admit that scientists do not follow rational cri-
teria, this does not actually refute the point of rational criticism. An analogy 
is helpful here: Even if politicians may not be interested in common welfare 
and are merely trying to win the next election, this does not show that a crit-
ical press is useless.38 in politics as in science, rational criticism can lead to 
improvements, even if only in the long run. As i argued in section 4.1.3, so-
cial nature is no reason to step back from normative judgements, even if re-
form of scientific institutions may be a more efficient means to change sci-
38 A more radical example is political philosophy. Here critics might argue as well 
that political leaders do not care about philosophical considerations. However, 
it is hard to refute that political principals such as the separation of powers have 
their origin in philosophical arguments.
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ence. Those sociologists who fail to see the possible long-term consequences 
of methodological work do not argue convincingly against pragmatic the-
ory evaluation but rather endanger their own work: like the postmodernists, 
they, too, insulate themselves and unintentionally characterise their work as 
nothing but a strange hobby.39
Are you convinced that a pragmatic approach to theory evaluation is the 
way to go? You might argue that it was easy for me to arrive at a pragmatic way 
out of the dichotomy between positivist methodology and relativism: This 
dichotomy, you might suggest, is simply a result of my own over-interpreta-
tion of philosophical positions. But even if i were to admit that both the pos-
itivists and relativists are merely straw men in my presentation here (which is 
not the case), and that both positions are in fact much more pragmatic than i 
show them to be in this work40, does this really make the pragmatic approach 
less attractive? Quite the opposite – this would provide it with argumentative 
support! But hey, what kind of philosophical work would this be without a 
dichotomy resolved through a magical solution?
39 note the well-known saying (attributed to Richard Feynman) that philosophy of 
science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds. While the nor-
mative claims of early empiricists were clearly too strong, this is no reason to step 
back from normativity completely and thereby undermine the public image of 
philosophy of science.
40 see e. g. Richardson (2007) or Price (1997) for pragmatic aspects of Carnap’s phi-
losophy. McCloskey even attributes the term »pragmatic« to herself from time to 
time. see e. g. McCloskey (1983), p. 483.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Quotes Supporting the Analogy of Kuhn’s Methodology to 
the Economics of Standardisation
1. »When we observe an economy in the midst of an extended period of 
rapid and far reaching technical change, we can usually identify epi-
sodes of disruption and episodes of stabilization.«1
The analogy to revolutions and normal science is obvious.
2. »An integral part of this stabilizing process is technical standardiza-
tion, which takes place either through an entire market adopting a sin-
gle technology, or through modification and adaptation of existing 
technologies.«2 »… it is sometimes possible to finesse this issue by ob-
serving that this is a case of several distinct markets.«3
This is an analogy to the different coverage of paradigms. The second quo-
tation suggests a separation of markets by standards – a clear parallel to the 
separation of different scientific branches by paradigms.
3. »In this situation, users have two choices: they can either modify their 
technologies; or they can agree (tacitly perhaps) on a standard technol-
ogy, requiring that those not already using it switch. Joint modification 
will take place if the cost of modifying the technologies is less than the 
cost of this switching. Costs of modification include the development 
and installation of the technical changes, whereas switching costs in-
clude costs of acquisition of new physical and human capital as well as 
the loss of any function that was unique to the abandoned technolo-
gy. At the global level, switching costs will exceed modification costs if 
there is a large installed base of users, if the cost of capital acquisition is 
very high, or if the current technology is unique in providing a very val-
uable function. In any of these cases, we observe a group of users who 
1 Cowan (1992), p. 1.
2 Cowan (1992), p. 1.
3 Cowan (1992), p. 9, footnote 10.
7. Appendix234
are effectively locked in to a technology because the costs of switching 
away from their technology are too high to bear.«4
This is easily transferred to paradigm-shift. As long it is not difficult (costly) 
to adapt the paradigm to new problems it will not change. The cost catego-
ries fit perfectly.
4. »There are several sources of increasing returns to adoption, not all of 
which apply to every technology. But all of which act to increase ben-
efits to or reduce costs of adopting a technology as that technology is 
more heavily adopted.
Learning by doing refers to the decline in unit costs as the number of units pro-
duced increases. As production experience increases, how to organize pro-
duction efficiently comes to be better understood, and production costs fall. 
Thus the (social) cost of later adoptions is lower than early adoptions of any 
particular technology.
Learning by using refers to learning about how to improve the design and 
use of a technology. Early designs are typically far from optimal, as design-
ers do not know exactly what the capabilities of the new technology are, or 
exactly the uses to which it will be put. As adopters use the technology, they 
communicate with the manufacturers, and the design evolves to increase the 
benefits from its use.
Increasing returns to scale are said to exist if cost of production falls as the 
scale of production increases. If, for example, the production technology has 
very high fixed costs, then spreading these costs over a larger number of units 
produced will lower the average cost of production.
Network externalities differ from the previous sources of increasing returns 
in that to capture them requires using a technology that many other people 
are currently using. Many technologies are useful in their own right, but in-
crease in value as other people use them, ‘joining the network.’ As more peo-
ple subscribe to the same electronic mail network, the more valuable it be-
comes to any user because he can communicate (share information) with 
more people.…
The presence of any of these features in a technology is a source of increas-
ing returns to adoption, and will act to encourage standardization by mar-
ket exclusion. As more agents use a technology the greater is the benefit from 
using it, and so the stronger are the incentives for other agents to adopt it.«5
All these sources of increasing returns to adoption hold as well when sci-
ence and not technical standards is concerned.
4 Cowan (1992), p. 3.
5 Cowan (1992), p. 6-7, emphasis by S. D.
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5. »Typically, competitions for market share take place when technologies 
are relatively new. This is the time, of course, when there is the most un-
certainty about them – about their characteristics, the functions they 
will perform, and the functions users would like them to perform. Early 
adoptions take place within this uncertainty, but, through the informa-
tion they provide, contribute substantially to the formation of beliefs 
about all of these issues. Reduction of uncertainty through strengthen-
ing the beliefs of future adopters is enough to generate market exclu-
sion.… «6
There is a clear correspondence between this quote and the lock-in into a par-
adigm after the preparadigmatic phase (or revolution).
6. »Agents adopt the technology that they believe will yield the highest net 
benefits in expected value.… This opinion can be erroneous, of course. 
If a good standard has bad luck early on … opinion forms that it is bad 
and so it is set aside while an inferior one is taken up. As the good one 
is left idle, it has no way to prove its superiority – opinions about it do 
not change, and there is never incentive to switch to it.«
This corresponds to Kuhn’s assertion that the paradigm with the »best« prom-
ise of success is being established whereas other potential paradigms never 
fully develop. These are path dependence problems of the second degree.
7. »What is important from the point of view of standard setting … are 
the relative merits of the competing technologies or standards. In a new 
technological paradigm, problems arise in making these comparisons.«7
As I already noted in section 4.1, this is analagous to the incommensurabil-
ity problem.
8. There is a passage in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions which puts for-
ward typical economic reasoning. Kuhn gives economic reasons for re-
jecting or ignoring anomalies.8 Earlier in the book he argues that old 
paradigms can still be useful for solving problems. Thus we have to use 
the most advanced paradigm only when it is really worth it.9
The collection of the above quotes shows the vast similarities between Kuhn’s 
methodology and the economics of standardisation.
6  Cowan (1992), p. 7-8.
7 Cowan (1992), p. 11-12.
8 See Kuhn (1962), p. 95.
9 See Kuhn (1962), p. 39.
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7.2 Harrod-Domar Models
For growth to be on equilibrium, the following conditions must hold:10
(P = production potential, c = marginal product of capital, K = capital, 





=V ; whereas c’ is defined by 






Under the »heroic« assumption c’ = c = constant this leads to:
1 1 1;
' '
I sy I P y I I
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= = → = → =
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Hence, the growth of investments is on equilibrium if it equals the fraction 
of propensity to save to the marginal product of capital.
7.3. The Basic Solow Model
Here is the basic equation (t = globally neutral technical progress, w = wage 
rate, W = wage sum):
1( * )m my t L K −=
The productive elasticity of each factor equals its marginal rate of substitu-
tion, therefore:
: ; 1 :
y y y ym m




Given perfect competition, the payment to factors (wage rate, interest rate) 
equals their marginal productivity, hence:
; ;L Wm w m
y y
= =  m is equal to the wage share
10 The short exposé of the basic structure of Harrod-Domar and Solow models is based 
on a lecture by Egon Görgens in 2006, University of Bayreuth, Germany.
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1 * ;K Rm i
y y
− = =  1-m is equal to the revenue share.
If m is constant, the ratio of factor usage must equal the ratio of factor prices. 







If one differentiates the basic equation to time, the growth formula emerg-
es (G = growth):
(1 )y F A KG G mG m G= + + −
Under the assumption that growth is on equilibrium, the following formu-
las hold:
(1 )y K k y yG G m G G mG= → − = − ,






Growth is now independent from the growth of the capital stock.
7.4. Kitcher’s Argument for the Possibility of the Division of 
Labour in Science
The division of labour result is derived by Kitcher as property of the nonco-
operative Nash-equilibrium of a single-prize lottery game played by N self-
interested scientists.11 Let there be two possible theories that scientists might 
work on: T1 and T2. There are N scientists (N>0) and each scientist works on 
one and only one theory. Thus, if we let n be the number devoted to T1, then 
N-n will be devoted to T2. Let A1 be the assertion that T2 will come to be 
11 I follow the presentation of Wade Hands. See Hands (2001), p. 370 et sqq.
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accepted and A2 the same for T2. Because one of the theories will ultimately 
come to be accepted, we have the following conditional probability relation:
P (A1| n)+P (A2| n) = 1 for all N ≤ n
We also make the reasonable assumption that if no one works on a theory it 
will never be accepted, so:
P (A1| 0) = P (A2| N) = 0.
Each scientist will maximise their own expected utility and each know that 
the other N-1 scientists will also do so. To simplify the analysis, assume that 
the scientists are competing for a prize of 1 unit of utility and that prizes 
in this (lottery) game are allocated in the following way. Once it is known 
whether T1 or T2 wins (come to be accepted) the scientists who worked on the 
winning theory get their names thrown in a hat and the (1 unit of utility) win-
ner is selected at random; the others working on the winning theory also get 
nothing. Thus, if n scientists are working on T1, the expected utility of any of 
these n scientists is given by EU1 and the expected utility of any one of the 
scientists working on T2 is given by EU2, where
EU1 = [1*P (A1| n)]/n and EU2=[1*P (A2| n)/N - n.
The equilibrium concept for the lottery game is a Nash equilibrium. A group 
of n scientists working on T1 and N-n working on T2 is a Nash equilibrium if 
no scientist would defect (change the theory they are working on) given the 
play of the other scientists. The distribution n will be such a Nash equilibri-
um if it is both stable upwards and stable downwards; stable upwards means 
that no one will move from T2 to T1 (n will not get bigger), whereas stable 
downwards means that no one will move from T1 to T2 (n will not get small-
er). Thus, the Nash equilibrium distribution n* is characterized by the fol-
lowing two conditions:
1*P (A1 | n
*+1)   1*P (A2 | n
*)  (n* is stable upwards)
   n*+1    
≤
       N - n*    
1*P (A2 | n
* - 1)     1*P (A1 | n
*)  (n* is stable downwards)
    N-n*+1    
≤
         n*    
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The Nash equilibrium will exhibit the cognitive division of labour if some 
scientists are working on T1 and some scientists are working on T2. Thus, we 
can say that the equilibrium distribution supports the cognitive division of 
labour if n*≠0 and N*≠N. Notice that n*≠0 if n=0 is not stable upwards (that 
is someone will start working on T1 whenever n=0) and that n*≠N if n=N 
is not stable downwards (that is someone will quite working on T1 whenever 
n=N). Thus, the Nash equilibrium distribution n* supports the cognitive di-
vision of labour when the following two conditions hold:
P (A1 | n
* - 1)  
>
   P (A2 | 0)  ⇒
  
P (A1 | 1)
    
>
 1      
(1)
   1          N         N
 
P (A2 | N - 1) >
   P (A1 | N) ⇒ 
 





 1      
(2)
   1           N           N
  
The fact that the two conditions on the right hand are relatively easy to sat-
isfy completes the argument that sullied scientists could (acting noncooper-
atively) bring about a cognitive division of labour.
